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A few days after New Year's in 1857 on a windy, bitter
cold afternoon in Boston, a gaunt somber-faced man named John
Brown appeared at the Bromfield Street offices of the
Massachusetts Kansas Aid Committee. The gray-haired fifty-
six year old had recently returned from Kansas where for over
a year he had helped lead the violent struggle to prevent the
imposition of slavery on that territory. Brown believed that
force had to be used to prevent a proslavery takeover in
Kansas and he came east seeking funds to further subsidize
freestate military efforts. After introducting himself and
presenting his references, the Kansas warrior was greeted by
the committee's newly appointed secretary, young Franklin
Benjamin Sanborn. Their meeting on that cloudy winter day
began a three year relationship in which Sanborn became the
"lynch-pin" of Brown's fund-raising activities in Massachusetts
and New England. In fact, during the next few years Sanborn
and five other prominent abolitionists, Theodore Parker,
Samuel Gridley Howe, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Gerrit
Smith,
and George Luther Stearns would not only help Brown
collect
funds for Kansas but would also form a secret
committee to
subsidize his raid on Harpers Ferry. By March 1858
all six
men were engaged in a conspiracy to provide
supplies, arms and
money for the old man's insurrectionary thrust
at slavery.
They supported Brown's plan to "make a dash"
south, stir a
vast and, if necessary, bloody slave
uprising and then retreat
into a Virginia mountain fortress where other similar attacks
might be prepared. By October 1859, the Six had given Brown
4000 dollars to begin the raid as well as 200 Sharpe's rifles
and 200 hand guns.
But in spite of the fact that, a record of the conspiracy
can be accurately reconstructed from a number of historical
sources, no full-scale analysis of why the members of the
Secret Committee of Six, either collectively or individually,
decided to support Brown has been undertaken. This disserta-
tion seeks to begin a discussion of that question and in the
process expand understanding of abolitionist class values,
racial attitudes and notions of justified violence.
Immediately three problems present themselves. First
there is the issue of the group's ambivalence toward violence.
Despite their regard for Higher Law and their belief that it
theoretically justified the use of violent means against slav-
ery, none of the committeemen were ready to actually subsidize
force when they met Brown in 1857. Yet by the spring of
1858
they made a tentative commitment to the use of force.
This
study examines how they resolved this ambivalence and
moved
beyond Higher Law for a justification of violence.
The second problem to face in examining the
motives of
the Secret Six is how to explain why six men
who were so
thoroughly imbued with a romantic racialist
stereotype of the
black man found it possible to support black
insurrection.
After all, if, as most of the committeemen
agreed, blacks were
pliant, docile and "little addicted" to revenge, it seems
unlikely Brown could have convinced them that slaves would
make violent efforts for freedom. The question remains: how
did the Six come to believe a race without vengeful emotions
would or could fight for freedom?
Finally there is the problem of Brown's relation to the
Six. Most historians talk about the personal and religious
differences between the warrior and his associates. They see
the link between him and the others only in terms of their
mutual hatred for slavery. Whenever any historian ventures
beyond this tie, Brown is portrayed as someone spiritually
separated from his supporters—almost incomprehensible to
them as a person. My research suggests a different conclu-
sion. Brown's social character, his personality and values
were quite comprehensible to the members of the Secret Com-
mittee of Six. Indeed it was on the basis of similar social
values that the relationship between Brown and his committee
associates was founded. These values have profound implica-
tions for the Six's willingness to commit themselves to vio-
lence and see the black man in other than romantic racialist
terms
.
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INTRODUCTION
A few days after New Year's in 1857 on a windy, bitter
cold afternoon in Boston, a gaunt somber- faced man named John
Brown appeared at the Bromfield Street offices of the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee. The gray-haired, fifty-six
year old had recently returned from Kansas where for over a
year he helped lead the violent struggle to prevent the impo-
sition of slavery on that territory. Brown believed that
force had to be used to prevent a proslavery takeover in
Kansas and he came east seeking funds to further subsidize
freestate military efforts. After introducing himself and
presenting his references, the freedom fighter was greeted
by the committee's newly appointed secretary, young Franklin
Benjamin Sanborn. Their meeting on that cloudy winter day
began a three year relationship in which Sanborn became the
"lynch-pin" of Brown's fund-raising activities in
Massachusetts and New England. And during those years,
Sanborn, along with five other prominent abolitionists,
Theodore Parker, Samuel Gridley Howe, Thomas Wentworth
Higginson, Gerr.it Smith, and George Luther Stearns, would not
only help Brown collect funds for Kansas but would also form
a secret committee to subsidize his raid on Harpers Ferry.
By March 185 8 all six men were engaged in a conspiracy to
provide supplies, arms, and money for the warrior's insurrec-
tionary thrust at slavery. They supported Brown's plan to
2"make a dash" into the South, stir a slave uprising, and
then retreat to a Virginia mountain fortress where other sim-
ilar attacks might be prepared.
When Brown's attack aborted in the fall of 1359 and he
was captured in the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry, all of
the secret committeemen (except Higginson) burned significant
portions of information which linked them to the scheme.
Still, enough source material remains to suggest a number of
factual conclusions about their conspirational activity on
his behalf. We know that Brown formally revealed his plan
to the Six in late February and early March of 1858, that he
was able to calm their initial fears and quell their doubts
during the next year and that by October 1859 he had
received almost 4000 dollars from them to finance the raid.
We know, too, that although the raid was originally scheduled
for the late spring of 1858, it had to be postponed when a
disgruntled associate of Brown's named Hugh Forbes threat-
ened to reveal the whole scheme to influential political
leaders in Washington D. C. It is also true that while all
of the committee members didn't know all of the specific
details of the proposed attack (they were shocked when Brown
was trapped inside of the arsenal), at least four, Sanborn,
Stearns, Smith and Higginson certainly knew when, where,
how, and why Brown desired to begin his violent work. It is
very probable Samuel Gridley Howe also knew these facts.
Just ten days before the October assault Sanborn,
Stearns and
3Lewis Hayden, the leader of Boston's black abolitionist com-
munity, stayed awake all night outlining the plan to an
erratic young man named Francis Merriam who was determined
to join Brown's small insurrectionary cadre. In short, the
factual record of the conspiracy can be accurately recon-
structed despite the destruction of some documents."'"
But up to now no one has attempted a full-scale analysis
of why the members of the Secret Committee of Six (either
collectively or individually) decided to support Brown's vio-
lent aim. While biographers of Brown and those who supported
him have made some attempt to examine motive, no one has pro-
duced a detailed and probing examination of the reasons for
the committee's activities. It is my belief that in failing
to do so these historians have forfeited an important oppor-
tunity to assess abolitionist class values, racial attitudes
and notions of justified violence.
There seem to be many reasons for this failure. The
most prominent has to do with what Stanley Elkins called the
"persistent rhythm" of rightness and wrongness which charac-
terizes much historical writing on the issues of slavery and
abolition. Most examinations of the men who formed the
Secret Committee of Six spend far too much time justifying
or chastising the conspirators for their activity and far too
little time trying to assess and understand that behavior.
Two historians who criticize the Six most severely are J. C.
Furnas and Allan Nevins.
4Furnas provides the most elaborate and censurious exam-
ination of the collective and individual motives of the
Secret Six. He believes the conspiracy was nothing more than
a "literary-flavored antic" by men who read too much for
their own good. It was the most "bookish" conspiracy in his-
tory. Furnas feels the entire membership of the group was
"stimulated by Scott, Byron and their imitators." They were
obsessed with romantic tales of "God-minded, zeal-and-steel
militants" who roamed England during the 1600' s. In the
process of this romantic identification, the Six forgot the
"immoral aspects of disorder, violence, anarchy and murder."
Furnas contends that all of the conspirators had a "Victo-
rian zeal for romantic violence" which was both "ill-advised"
and "insincere." They failed to develop "adult approaches"
2
to the problem of ending slavery.
Furnas is very dismayed by Thomas Wentworth Higginson
who admitted his boldness came as much from a "love of adven-
ture" and "boyish desire" for stirring experience as from
"moral conviction." The historian censures Samuel Gridley
Howe for the "ailment" of "daring-do-goodery " combined with
"Yankee Scottery." Howe helped convince the other group mem-
bers that Brown's plan was militarily "feasible," thus allow-
ing the warrior to give enough details to keep the committee
"confused but open-handed." Howe was "necessarily fasci-
nated" by Brown's "steady glow" of emotion. Theodore Parker
also backed Brown because he read Scott and had a
5"backhanded fascination" with Byron. In addition, Parker's
statements about Higher Law allowed him to rationalize
Brown's violent "delusions." Parker was "infatuated" with
Brown and saw him as a "self-elected exponent of Higher Law"
who was determined to act out what the minister had been
"demanding for a generation." Parker's relish of insurrec-
tion and willingness "to tempt . . . thousands of slaves to
go out and get massacred" was "ill-conceived." Furnas brands
Gerrit Smith a "self-dramatizing" millionaire who was
addicted to causes and "guilt assuaging" subsidies of move-
ments, and men. George Luther Stearns' passion for Brown
stemmed from a "puzzling emotional-chemical affinity."
According to the historian, it was Frank Sanborn's "talent
for hero-worship" which attracted him to Brown and such a
talent is "implicit in Byronic Scottery." When each of the
members romanticism was coupled with Brown's ability to
"snuff up the odor of blood righteously shed by the Choosen
People," the Kansas Warrior gained "personal ascendancy" over
3
the Six and made "fools of them all."
Though hostile to the secret committee, Furnas admits
that he is somewhat perplexed by the group's support of Brown
and does not feel fully able to explain it. Allan Nevins is
equally hostile and, seemingly, as equally perplexed. Nevins
also sees Brown as gaining a "personal ascendancy" over the
Six when he suggests that the warrior "awed" committee mem-
bers. Awe, and the group's "deluded visions" of
"widespread
6slave insurrections" explains their support for Brown.
Nevins also asserts the group hoped to "provoke war" by sub-
sidizing the raid. And he chides them for a lack of "manli-
ness" in dealing with Brown by noting that after the Forbes
disclosures they continued to support the warrior but didn't
want to know any mere details of the plan. Nevins also
scolds the Six for not making "creditable" efforts to save
4
Brown once he had been captured.
Those historians who are more charitable toward the Six
and seek to demonstrate the moral rectitude of their support
for Brown are led by Oswald Garrison Villard. Yet for all
his belief in the correctness of the group's act, Villard
seems quite as puzzled about motive. The historian's schol-
arly biography of Brown provided the first and most thorough
documentation of the extensive nature of the conspiracy. But
in spite of his painstaking accumulation of data Villard made
little attempt to explain why these men attached themselves
to Brown. He does suggest that the committee members were
tremendously inspired by the warrior's "faith in himself" and
were swept along by the man's ability to quell their
doubts.
Brown met their "every criticism" and always recommended
a
'•plausible way out of every difficulty." Villard
speaks of
Sanborn as being "on fire for the antislavery
cause and
ready to worship any of its militant bodies."
He says
Stearns was "strongly impressed" with Brown's
"sagacity."
Parker supported Brown "vigorously" though
unsure the plan
7would succeed. By the end of his heavily-documented treatise,
however, Villard still has not added anything substantial to
his first hints about reasons for the committee's support of
Brown. Indeed, in his conclusion he returns to the theme of
inspiration as his basic explanation of motive. Brown
"inspired" the Six and it was this "weapon of the spirit"
which compelled them to support insurrection. The "secret"
of Brown's influence was his spiritual power and the morality
of his cause.
Most biographers of the individual committee members
support both of Villard' s themes . They continually assert a
belief in Brown's inspirational nature and imply that to know
an act was morally justified is to know the fullness of moti-
vation. Ralph Harlow speaks of Gerrit Smith's "continuous
flow of enthusiasm" in the "cause of good works." Smith
never allowed himself to be content with "normal routines"
and enjoyed life when spiritual "demands came thickly upon
him." He could hardly resist Brown's extraordinary scheme.
Henry Steele Commager speaks of Theodore Parker's recognition
„6
of Brown as the recognition accorded a "kindred spirit.
But both Commager and Harlow are troubled in their
assessment of Brown and the Six even as they applaud them.
Both men believe the group's act was justified but they, like
many historians who praise the abolitionists for their val-
iant efforts on behalf of the black man, seem unsure
about
how to precisely assess the actual violence that was
inherent
8in Brown's scheme from the beginning. Commager says Parker
and Brown both understood that slavery must be "settled . . .
by the sword." Neither man was afraid of "a little blood-
shed" or a slave insurrection. But Commager does not push
the theme of Parker's belief in the necessity of violence too
far. Actually, before this historian finishes his biography
he suggests Brown was something more than a "kindred spirit"
to Parker. Commager separates Parker from a belief in the
necessity of force by invoking a form of Villard's "secret
weapon"—spiritual power. He claims that Parker and the
other committee members were not only inspired by Brown but
were also "hypnotized." And, as if being hypnotized were not
enough to absolve Parker of responsibility for death at
Harpers Ferry, Commager introduces a second attenuating fac-
tor into the relationship of Brown and the Unitarian minis-
ter. He attempts to ritualize the conspiracy. Theodore
Parker and his friends did not really intend to support
bloody, violent insurrection, they were merely engaged in a
"game." They "enjoyed . . . the hatching of plots, the
secret meetings, the code . . . the purchase of arms, the
tall talk and the rodomotode, matching Southerners word for
word." The secret committee's relationship to Brown was, as
C. Vann Woodward has also suggested, simply one big
"conspir-
7
ational drama."
Ralph Harlow similarly portrays Gerrit Smith's commit-
ment to violence. He admits that after 1354 the
idea of
violence took a "firmer hold" on Smith because the philan-
thropist believed traditional American institutions were
"incapable of fostering men for high and holy works." Yet
the historian ascribes much of Smith's "acerbity of expres-
sion" about violent means to the "nagging physical pain" of
ghis many physical ailments.
Harold Schwartz's biography of Samuel Gridley Howe also
reflects uncertainty about violence and seeks to portray the
doctor's participation in the conspiracy two ways. On one
hand, Schwartz says that Howe "never sanctioned illegal
activity" and cannot be blamed for supporting Brown because
he did not "fully realize" what the warrior had in mind. But
Schwartz readily admits that in May 1858, when Brown's plan
was postponed because of the threats and minor disclosures of
Hugh Forbes, Howe rejected the idea of postponement and
"urged Brown to proceed with his plans." When Schwartz isn't
denying Howe's participation in the conspiracy he's ration-
alizing it. He asks us to believe that Howe's "advancing
age" (the doctor was in his fifties) brought on "debility"
and a failure of judgment. Howe had experienced many "great
shocks" in his life, his "little world began to crumble," and
he "lost all perspective" in evaluating Brown's character.
Howe was "unwilling or unable to realize Brown was . . .
9irresponsible
.
Schwartz also produces another variation on a familiar
theme. Howe and the others could not make a "clear
judgment"
10
of Brown because Brown had an "electric" effect on them.
This electricity prevented them from realizing that Brown was
"a failure," a man of "proven instability," an "incompetant,
"
and a "megalomaniac.
"
There is some irony in the ambivalence these historians
obviously feel about their subject's commitment to violence.
For while each historian seems to feel that his subject's
commitment to Higher Law implied both a theoretical and
actual commitment to violence, my research suggests that such
is not the case. Indeed, though none of the scholars admit
it, the individuals they have studied were themselves ambiv-
alent about the use of violent means. While all of the mem-
bers of the Secret Six did (with varying degrees of intensity)
espouse the use of force before Brown sought their assistance,
none (except Higginson) had the practical will to use force
to end slavery. They were ambivalent about the use of force
when Brown proposed his scheme and for quite awhile after-
wards. No doubt the Six were disillusioned with political
abolitionism. No doubt they were facile in marshalling argu-
ments to support the theory of justified violence. But all
found the distance between theory and practice, idea and act
to be very great. Anthony Burns, a fugitive slave who was
arrested in Boston in the spring of 1854 and returned to
slavery was partially a victim of Howe's and Parker's irres-
olution over the issue of supporting his forceful release.
This ambivalence has a profound meaning for any analysis of
11
why the secret committeemen eventually decided to support
Brown's effort. They not only had to be convinced of the
warrior's ability to execute the scheme, his competence, but
they also had to find a rationale that went beyond Higher
Law if they were to justify their practical abolitionism.
The problem with these historian's examination of vio-
lence is that it focuses on the origins and justification of
each individual's appeal to violence. Little attention has
been paid to the nature of that appeal. For instance, no one
asks whether Parker's repeated pleas for violence were meant
to be taken literally or whether they were the purposeful
rhetorical flourish of a masterful opinion-maker who was
merely trying to jolt slumbering northern moral sensibili-
ties. These historians do not ask whether the Six envisioned
a purpose for violence beyond its use as a means to achieve
the liberation of blacks from slavery. Nor, as I have previ-
ously suggested, has any careful examination been made of the
distance between the group's theoretical justification of
violent means and its practical will to personally or by sub-
sidy implement such means. If we too readily accept the
proposition that all committee members were theoretically
dedicated to force and fail to question what that dedication
meant in practice, we cannot possibly probe the complexity
of their conspirational relationship. We cannot understand
their attachment to a man who sought to both symbolize and
actualize the violent overthrow of slavery.
Fortunately the two most probing and most sophisticated
examinations of motive among the conspirators, Stephen B.
Oates
'
biography of Brown, To Purge This Land in Blood and
Tilden Edelstein's work on Thomas Wentworth Higginson enti-
tled S trange Enthusiasm
, have begun to grapple with the prob-
lem of violence. Oates begins his consideration of why the
Six committed themselves to the use of violent means by sug-
gesting that the six abolitionist committeemen saw violence
as the "only solution" to slavery. They were imbued with
Higher Law notions, believed all "peaceful alternatives" for
ending slavery had failed and were convinced that black
"revolution" must be attempted. War upon the South "could
destroy the Slave Power conspiracy, eradicate slavery, and
restore [the] nation to God and the ideals of Jefferson's
Declaration." Oates also suggests that the committeemen
believed that if the raid achieved only temporary success it
would alter white racial conceptions, shock sectional ten-
sions, stimulate slave convulsions and possibly provoke
11
war
.
Edelstein says that the committee's devotion to black
violence derived as much from the conviction that white atti-
tudes about the slave's nature could be changed as from the
hope that insurrection would totally destroy the institution
in one convulsive episode. According to Edelstein, Higginson
wanted Brown to destroy the northern belief that all blacks
were as "submissive as Uncle Tom." Higginson was as
13
interested in having blacks fight their way out of a stereo-
type as he was in having them fight their way off the planta-
12
tion.
But neither historian pursues the notion of an altered
racial image far enough. My own work suggests that Higginson
and the others were interested in two freedoms for the south-
ern slave: the freedom from and the freedom to. The Six
wanted black men and women liberated from the debilitating
environment of slavery and they also wanted that liberation
governed by a prescribed social outlook. Black violence
would free slaves, kill white slaveholders, encourage a
change in white racial attitudes and, as important, begin to
inculcate a particular set of values in the Afro-American.
In theory Higginson and his colleagues always believed that
justified violence and the willingness to fight for freedom
were the keystone virtues of Anglo-American political, social,
economic, and cultural life. By October 1859, they had come
to believe (and were willing to subsidize acts based upon the
belief) that assimilation of these virtues could put black
men well on the road to attaining that superior culture.
Assimilation could unleash the black man's potential for par-
ticipation in the industrial, democratic, marketplace of the
North. By October of 1859, the advocacy of violence by the
six committeemen had fundamental class implications and had
carried them beyond Higher Law.
14
Oates and Edelstein also begin to confront the whole
issue of Brown's "spiritual" power. Oates flirts with a
variation of the theme but does not quite embrace it. He is
convinced Brown saw himself as an Old Testament Calvinist; a
missionary who was God's providential instrument to destroy
slavery. He believes that the six committeemen were
impressed with Brown's "unbending conviction" of that instru-
mentality. But Oates does not say they were awed, hypnotized
electrified or in any other way paralyzed by the warrior's
"spiritual power—only enthused by his religious conviction."'"
Tilden Edelstein finally pulls the plug on the theory of
Brown's "electric" attraction. His examination of the one
individual supposedly most electrified by Brown, Frank
Sanborn, fully demonstrates this. Far from viewing Sanborn
as Brown's "orderly," Edelstein sees the young secretary as
an ambitious, calculating, and cynically manipulative person
whose actions suggest strongly that he used Brown as much as
Brown used him. As I suggest more fully in my own analysis,
Sanborn's support for Brown grew as much out of personal
14
motives as out of selfless hero-worship.
Like Oates, Edelstein also presents a far more balanced
view of Brown than has emerged in previous research. Brown
is seen as a man who depended as much on slyness as his abil-
ity to inspire and less on people's belief in his "spiritual
power" than on a confidence in his business-like manner.
When John Brown made his first plea for support of the
15
Harpers Ferry scheme in 1858, Edelstein shows how the wise
old man "artfully played-off" his "key supporters" against
each other. Edelstein does exempt Higginson from such manip-
ulation (Higginson "shrewdly baited" Brown) but, generally
his analysis has great merit and must be examined further if
we are to understand the complexity of Brown's relationship
with the Six."^
Edelstein has done more than cut through redundancy in
historical interpretation by such views. He has stopped
attempts to force Brown's relationship to the Six into basic
incomprehensibility. Most scholars have overemphasized
Brown's spiritual attraction, his moral and religious affin-
ities because they have overlooked other fundamental personal
and social values. This is not to suggest that Brown was not
attractive to the committeemen because of his piety and reli-
giosity. He was. But it is to suggest that there are many
levels of attachment among men engaged in a common cause not
all of v/hich need have to do with the essential morality of
that cause. The morality of the issue need not even be their
primary attachment. And all of these levels must be plumbed
if we are to have a chance at understanding.
My research indicates that in many ways other than spir-
itual, moral or religious Brown was very comprehensible to
the committeemen. Indeed, the virtues he aspired to and val-
ues he recommended were the same as those of the secret com-
mitteemen. All of these men had internalized similar values
16
and manifested similar traits. Their quest for civic repute
and professional achievement was precisely the quest of John
Brown. Their search for place, security, order, and disci-
pline amidst the chaos and instability of mid-nineteenth cen-
tury America was as frenetic and anxiety- filled as his own.
Futhermore, Brown knew how to appeal to this value system. He
consciously displayed what the Six just as consciously
demanded. The old man's years in the marketplace made him
adept at negotiating business deals even if it didn't
increase his ability to bring these transactions to a suc-
cessful conclusion. If the group was intrigued with Brown it
was as much the intrigue of Narcissus as that of Faust.
In recent years a number of historians have begun to
define Brown's social personality and character. Ronald
Story's analysis of this work in his essay "John Brown and
the Injuries of Class" is a particularly insightful examina-
tion of these scholar's findings.
16
Throughout his varied and disastrously unsuccessful
career in the northern marketplace, Brown constantly preached
about the values which should govern a man's life. He coun-
seled his sons, friends, and all who would listen about how
they should act. He was perpetually concerned with success
and how to achieve it. Young men should learn "about busi-
ness, about general subjects, and ... the fear of God."
They should be ambitious, frugal, ever on the lookout for
their "main chance," and careful to husband funds which
could
17
be put "out on interest." Eventually they would "employ
others," Indeed, a "world of pleasure and success [wasl
sure" if one was "constantly attendant upon early rising ."
Brown's Poor Richard mentality frowned on those who squan-
dered earnings. Men were not made to "idle away their time
and learn lazy habits." Brown was full of uplift maxims and
abstinent behavior. He was obsessed with his own neatness
and cleanliness."^
Above all, John Brown was a family man. It was the
source of his "utmost comfort." It made him feel secure to
know he had a "warm place in the sympathies, affection, and
confidence of my most familiar acquaintance; my family ." A
man could "hardly get into difficulties too big to be sur-
mounted" if he had a "firm foothold at home." It was essen-
tial for Brown to have the social and economic sustenance of
his family as he lurched from one failed business transaction
18
to anotner.
The virtues Brown aspired to and the values he recom-
mended were "self-control, order, cleanliness, industry and
ambition." Such values produced a "respectable, autonomous,
God-fearing, accumulator with a subordinate nuclear
family. ..." And while this system may have been "modi-
fied" by the "intensity" of his "antislavery sentiment" and
his "Calvinist piety," it did not change him radically" after
Kansas. According to Story "whatever his [Brown's] immediate
18
objectives
. . . [his] ideal person was always comfortably
within the nineteenth century mainstream."
Brown's values and those of his friends on the secret
committee were produced by two dominant trends in northern
ante-bellum society. The first was the emergence of a market
economy which "rewarded (or seemed to reward) such traits."
The second was the appearance of large groups in society
[who] did not engage directly in the market place and did not
have a similar mode of life." For Brown and the Six it was
the "marketplace North with its burgeoning assertive middle
class that served as the measure of the rest of society."
The North was "virtually synonomous with its new middle class:
a society of projecting, rootless individuals whose deepest
values were, discipline, achievement, and the nuclear
family
.
My research suggests that it is only by examining the
relationship of Brown with the Six on the basis of these
assumptions that we can break the persistent rhythm of right-
ness and wrongness Elkins speaks of. In this way we can add
dimension to that relationship. In this way we can begin to
appreciate more fully why the Six believed in Brown's compe-
tence and why they felt sure violence could instill the
M 21
"proper" values in his black insurrectionist followers.
Finally, there is the important matter of the Six's
attitudes toward the black race. Recently, it. has been c
rectly suggested that Higginson, Howe, Parker, and Smith were
19
imbued with a "romantic racialist" image of the black man.
They believed blacks were pliant, docile, and "little
addicted" to revenge. Seemingly the basic difference between
their stereotype and that of the slaveholder was that far
from demanding the institutionalization of a paternalistic
slave system, they believed such a nature was to be rever-
enced for its high degree of Christian virtue. Man, in the-
ory, could have no greater aim in life than to be docile
before Christ. My analysis of the Secret Six will deal with
the tortuous trail each conspirator walked in attempting to
square such racial imagery with the subsidy of black vio-
lence. The group's drift from romantic racialism to a bud-
ding conviction in the necessity and ability of slaves to
fight is inextricably tied to their movement toward practical
abolitionism and their belief in the assimilative value of
22black violence.
20
CHAPTER I
Deputy marshal Asa Butman paced nervously as he waited
on the sidewalk across the street from Colin Pitt's clothing
store. Attempting a fugitive slave arrest in Boston was
never easy; trying it during Anniversary Week when hundreds
of delegates were in town for the Anti-Slavery and Women's
Rights conventions compounded the problem. Butman kept him-
self well hidden. He periodically checked the time and
glanced down Brattle Street to see if his men were properly
positioned. It had been a mild May day but now, as the sun
set and nearby church bells struck five, a chill breeze began
to stir.
Moments after five Colin Pitts and Anthony Burns, a
black man he had recently hired, stepped out of the store
offices and into the street. After a brief conversation,
Pitts headed toward the corner of Brattle and Court Streets;
Burns in the opposite direction. Butman panicked. Every
day for a week, Burns had accompanied his employer and the
deputy marshal positioned his men accordingly. Now the sus-
pected fugitive was walking away from the trap set for him.
It looked as if a day of waiting and week of investigating
had been wasted. Suddenly, Burns stopped, turned around, and
ran to catch Pitts. Butman jumped from his hiding place,
signaled his men, and hurried across the street with
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stiff-legged strides. When he reached Burns the deputy mar-
shal identified himself and claimed the black man was wanted
in connection with a robbery investigation. Before Burns
could protest, Butman's deputies lifted him off his feet,
held him horizontally above the ground in their out-stretched
hands, and rushed to the Court House. Once inside the build-
ing, the suspected fugitive slave was carried up three
flights of stairs and taken to the Jury Room where he was
bound hand and foot and placed in a chair.'''
About twenty minutes later, the door to the Jury Room
opened. Butman accompanied Virginia slave owner Charles F.
Suttle and his hiring agent William Brent inside. Obscuring
Burns' view of the others in the room, Suttle faced Burns and
asked him why he had run away. "I fell asleep on board the
vessel where I worked and before I woke up she set sail and
carried me off," Burns replied.
"Haven't I always treated you well, Tony?"
"You have always given me twelve and a half cents once
a year," Burns said.
In the silence that followed this exchange, Butman blurted
out, "Well that's the man is it?"
"Yes," replied Suttle. A moment later he and Brent left
2
the room.
After they left, Burns faced Butman and asked why the
marshal had lied about wanting him in connection with a rob-
bery. Butman smiled and replied that he was "afraid of the
22
mob." Burns turned away from his captor. He knew there
would be a hearing to certify his identity and then he would
be shipped back to Virginia. He anticipated harsh treatment
and realized his ordeal had begun when the taunts of guards
outside his cell prevented him from sleeping. They kept
reminding him that Thomas Sims, a fugitive slave captured in
Boston two years earlier, had occupied the same cell before
being sent back to slavery. Ironically, if Burns had even a
slight chance for freedom, it was because of the Sims rendi-
tion. The failure to stop Sims' return had stimulated
Boston's abolitionist community to develop better methods for
dealing with slave arrests. By early evening the Vigilance
Committee of Boston was aware of Burns' plight and had begun
3
efforts to prevent his return to Virginia.
II
At nine o'clock in the morning on May 25, 1854, Commis-
sioner Edward Loring convened the rendition hearing of
Anthony Burns. Famed novelist and Vigilance Committee law-
yer Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was at the fugitive's side from
the beginning of the hearing. He hoped to defend Burns. But
after a night in jail and further reflection on what awaited
him in Virginia, the captive felt defense counsel was "no
use." He was certain to "fare worse" if he resisted rendi-
tion. Seconds after this refusal Dana was joined by two
other committee members, Charles M. Ellis and Theodore Parker,
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the well-known Unitarian minister. Parker immediately con-
ferred with Burns and explained his appointment as minister-
at-large for the Boston Vigilance Committee. He pressed
Burns to accept counsel but the fugitive refused to recon-
sider his decision. Burns said he wanted to go back to
Virginia "as easy as I can." Parker wouldn't yield. It was
only "fear" which gave Burns such a "sad presentment" of his
fate. No harm would be done by making a defense. Still
Burns hesitated as Loring began the proceedings by summoning
William Brent to give testimony. Then, just as Brent began
to discuss the conversation which took place between Suttle
and Burns in the Jury Room on the previous day , Dana inter-
rupted. He notified the Commissioner that Burns had accepted
counsel and strenuously objected to Brent's testifying before
a proper defense could be prepared. Suttle 's attorney, Seth
Thomas was enraged. Thomas was certain that "the only object
of those who sought delay was for public purposes of their
own." Pandemonium broke loose in the court room and Loring
repeatedly gavelled order. When calm was restored he asked
the fugitive to approach the bench. What was his decision?
Would he accept a defense? Burns glanced over his shoulder
at Suttle and Brent, then at Parker and Dana, finally he
turned to Loring and announced his desire for counsel.
Loring called for order, postponed the hearing until Satur-
4
day, May 27, and dismissed the court.
Theodore Parker was elated as he left the building and
went home to await the Vigilance Committee meeting scheduled
for two o'clock that afternoon. He felt great satisfaction
at having convinced Burns to make a defense. After the
humiliation of the Sims affair Parker repeatedly predicted
Boston would become easy prey to federal authorities if slave
"kidnappings" were not resisted. Powerful reaction to Burns'
arrest would prove Boston was willing to resist unjust laws;
willing to "fight manfully" for the freedom of slaves. Now
was the time "to push and be active . . . call meetings,
bring out men . . . agitate, agitate." Parker had been
"waiting a long time for some event to occur which would blow
so loud a horn it should waken the North." Seth Thomas was
correct, Anthony Burns would serve "public purposes." If
Bums' defense were handled properly the black man from
Virginia might have his freedom. But whether Burns was freed
or sent back Parker knew the incident could become a "start-
5
ing horn" for a new wave of antislavery sentiment.
Parker came late to the antislavery movement. It wasn't
until the mid-1840 ' s, some fifteen years after Garrison had
launched the crusade, that he began to devote himself to the
cause. However, once committed, he totally immersed himself
in the work. The minister studied Roman slave codes, poured
over census statistics, examined the economic indices of
slavery, and read tracts which condemned the institution as
well as those which justified it. He listened to the stories
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of fugitive slaves living in Boston and consulted with free
blacks like Lewis Hayden and Fredrick Douglas. By 1850,
Parker relegated all other efforts to a secondary status.
Abolition became his primary religious duty; absorbing all
his passion and serving as a way to bring morality to an
imperfect but perfectible world. 6
Nor did Parker confine his activity to mere study or the
preaching of sermons. He was convinced that men and women in
the movement must act, as well as speak, in accordance with
their beliefs. After the new Fugitive Slave Law appeared in
18 50, he was instrumental in forming the Boston Vigilance
Committee, an organization dedicated to preventing the return
of slaves who fled to the city. During October of that year
when William and Ellen Craft, two members of his congregation,
were threatened with "kidnapping," Parker led a group of
sixty vigilantes to the hotel where marshals charged with
arresting the Crafts were staying. Without any physical vio-
lence, the group successfully intimidated the officers, drove
7
them from the city, and protected the Crafts* freedom.
Then, in April, 1852, Parker took an active part in the
unsuccessful effort to prevent the rendition of Thomas Sims.
He and other committee members never did settle on
a plan to block the attempt and listened only skeptically as
a young firebrand minister from Worcester, Thomas Wentworth
Higginson, called for an attack on the Court House to free
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Sims. Because of their indecision they were forced to wit-
ness Sims' return to slavery. 8
Theodore Parker based his abolitionist efforts on a
foundation of Higher Law. There was an infinite law existing
before all time and stored in the intuitive recesses of man's
soul which justified resistance to the great moral crime of
slavery. Higher Law negated any and every man-made measure
designed to preserve and perpetuate the institution of slav-
ery. It impelled antislavery men to "help fugitives;"
impelled them to "seek and save what is lost." But Parker
had problems in attempting to apply this theory. By late
May of 1854/ the minister still hadn't determined the bounds
or form of his own personal resistance to the "crime" of
fugitive slave renditions. He was quite uncertain as to
whether forcible means should be used in defense of black
liberty. Theoretically men were justified in using such
means. But the distance between theory and practice was
9
great and it was one which Parker had not fully traversed.
In 1850, the minister informed President Filmore that he
was "not a man of violence." He had tremendous respect for
the "sacredness" of life. If he resisted efforts to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Law it would be "as gently as I know how
but with such strength as I command." He vowed to serve as
"head . . . foot or . . . hand to any body of serious and
earnest men who will go with me with no weapons." When free
blacks in Boston led by Lewis Hayden rescued a fugitive slave
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named Shadrach in early 1851, Parker called it the "most
noble deed done in Boston since the destruction of tea in
1773." However, he still shied away from personally commit-
ting himself to the use of force. He would "not . . . use
force to rescue a man with. But go unarmed when there is a
chance of success."^
By 1853, Parker's views had shifted slightly. When he
lectured William Craft on the obligations of a husband,
Parker suggested that if Craft was attacked and there was an
attempt to force him back into slavery, he had "a natural
right to resist the man to death." While Craft might refuse
to exercise the right for himself, "his wife was dependent
upon him for protection and it was his duty to protect her."
It was a duty Craft "could not decline." Even in this admo-
nition the minister was cautious when counseling the use of
force. He warned against hatred and vengeful emotions—hat-
ing the man one struck "would not leave action without sin."
This warning, when coupled with future actions, suggests that
by May, 18 54, Parker still had not resolved his personal
debate about participating in forcible resistance to law. 11
Parker was apprehensive as he prepared placards adver-
tising the date and time of the Burns hearing. Surely forc-
ible resistance would be demanded by some of the membership
when the Vigilance Committee met that afternoon. How would
he respond?
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Some 200 members of the Vigilance Committee met in
Faneuil Hall that humid, Thursday afternoon. Soon two plans
commanded their attention. About twenty men spoke ardently
for forcible rescue of Burns from the Court House. But the
vast majority of the committee took a "wait and see" position.
They didn't want to move until Commissioner Loring made his
decision. Then, if Burns was to be returned, they could jam
the streets, create a melee, and spirit the fugitive away.
Logic supported the majority position. After all, it would
be very difficult to force entry into a strong stone Court
House which was sure to be filled with armed deputies. And
even if the attack succeeded Burns might be hidden and not
found during the brief possession of the building. By eight
o'clock that evening, the majority plan was formally adopted.
In addition, a public meeting was called for Friday night,
May 26, in Faneuil Hall and a detail of men sent to watch the
Court House. If there was any attempt to remove the black
captive these committeemen would provide a warning. Proper
planning and organization would prevent a repetition of the
Sims affair.
After the meeting adjourned the advocates of forcible
rescue, and some of those in doubt such as Parker, remained in
the hall and continued to discuss the feasibility of their
plan. Parker, Wendell Phillips, Samuel Gridley Howe, Austin
Bearse, and William Kemp eventually formed an executive com-
mittee for the group. They decided to reconvene on Friday
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afternoon and again debate the plan for forcible rescue.
Though Partker had not committed himself to such means his
membership on the executive committee indicates his continued
willingness to entertain the idea of force. His experience
with the Crafts, Sims, and now Burns, coupled with the inten-
sity of his commitment to antislavery reform and the logic of
his Higher Law doctrines demanded that he consider the use of
force as a legitimate form of resistance. 13
Parker's personal debate was also strongly affected by
the militance of his young protege, Thomas Wentworth
Higginson, minister of the Worcester Free Church. Like
Parker, Higginson came from a family that traced its ancestry
back to the first families of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.
He was the son of Stephen and Louisa Higginson.
Stephen Higginson came from a highly successful merchant
family but had experienced personal economic misfortune dur-
ing the War of 1812 because of bad investments and his own
mismanagement. He eventually took a position as Treasurer of
Harvard College but continued to be plagued by a poor organiza
tional sense and the inability to handle accounts properly.
Stephen Higginson never did regain the affluence of his early
years and died soon after his youngest son, Thomas Wentworth, wa
ten years old. It was up to Thomas' mother, Louisa, to rally
the family fortunes and provide for the children's education.
She did a creditable job. Eventually, in 1837, her prodding,
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Thomas' hard work, and family connections paved the way for
his entry into the college. He was only thirteen. 15
While at Harvard the ambitious young man distinguished
himself. Thomas Wentworth was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and
graduated near the top of his class. The grade-conscious
young man seemed destined for great achievements. There was
only one problem: Higginson was uncertain about what career
he should apply his intelligence and energy toward. After
graduation the gangling six-footer spent three years marking
time as an unfulfilled schoolteacher trying to decide in
which direction he should move. Finally, in 1844, he
enrolled in Harvard Divinity School, prompted less by his own
desire than by the urging of family (particularly his mother)
and friends. They wanted him to begin satisfying the promise
1
6
of his undergraduate days.
Higginson' s own uncertainty about a career as minister
and the boring, rationalistic Unitarian theology taught at
Harvard combined to totally alienate him from his studies.
He concluded that as a minister he couldn't really be a
"leader of men" and so left school at the end of his first
year. He soon reconsidered his decision, however, after lis-
tening to Theodore Parker's address to that year's graduating
class. The young scholar was astounded by the impact
Parker's radical theology made upon his listeners. Parker's
theology and the reputation he built as a minister fused
Higginson 's personal need to be "a leader of men" with
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religious, romantic and reform elements. He went back to
Harvard Divinity School and distinguished himself by gradu-
ating at the top of his class. Ironically, when Higginson
gave the graduation address in 1847 on "The Clergy and
Reform,
"
Parker sat in the audience and marvelled at the
17
speaker
.
Despite his commitment to religious life, Higginson'
s
doubts about a ministerial career continued over the next
nine years in a somewhat abated form. He continually ques-
tioned whether such a career was "worthwhile" or would give
him "position and influence." His confidence in his decision
to become a minister was severely challenged by his first
congregation in Newburyport. Here he pumped for antislavery
reform among men who made their living by trading with cotton
planting slave owners and then added insult to injury by
exchanging pulpits with Theordore Parker, a man shunned by
virtually all established Unitarian ministers in the Boston
18
area
.
While at Newburyport, Higginson did begin to earn a con-
siderable reputation among Massachusetts reformers. He
became very active in the Free-Soil campaign of 184 8 and by
the time he was forced to resign from his pastorate in 18 50,
was well-enough known to do a brief tour on the lecture cir-
cult.
Like Parker, Higginson saw the enactment of the Fugitive
Slave Law as contrary to the dictates of Higher Law. He
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suggested that men and women of Massachusetts "disobey it"
and show their "good citizenship" by "taking the legal conse-
quences." His address "The Crisis Now Coming," written dur-
ing the attempt to arrest William and Ellen Craft, advanced
a more militant position than that of his mentor. Though he
claimed to "abhor bloodshed," Higginson found it difficult to
"say when a man must stop in defending his inalienable
rights." To Higginson, the Shadrach rescue was not merely
"a noble deed." The "issue of manliness" was too keenly
involved. There wasn't anyone "of any real manliness" who
did not in his "secret soul respect these colored men of
« *. ..20Boston
.
Higginson put greater distance between himself and
Parker on the issue of forcible resistance during the Sims
affair. In a Vigilance Committee meeting he held the audi-
ence "spellbound" with an eloquent plea for active resistance
to the law. Wendell Phillips was convinced Higginson had
brought the group to the "eve of Revolution." And Parker
realized the intensity of Higginson' s convictions when the
young minister planned with Austin Bearse to rescue Sims from
the frigate Acorn . The two men wanted to try a pirate- like
attack on the boat which was taking Sims back to Virginia.
Nor did Parker miss the impact Higginson was making on many
2
1
antislavery leaders by advocating such tactics.
Thomas Sims' rendition upset Higginson greatly. He was
bitter about the committee's failure to develop and execute
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a rescue plan. Higginson was angered by "disorderly" meet-
ings where each man advanced his "own theory." a fugitive
slave arrest was an occasion which "required the utmost
promptness and decision." It also required men to scrap
"fixed rules" and "strive to do what seems best without ref-
erence to others." If commitment to Higher Law meant commit-
ment to "bloodshed," Thomas Wentworth Higginson was ready to
22take the step.
Just a month before the Sims rendition, in March 1052,
Higginson began work as minister of the Worcester Free Church.
The Free Church was a congregation organized on principles
similar to those which governed Parker's religious society.
In fact, Parker had argued for Higginson to take the position.
At first, Higginson was reticent but he finally decided to
accept the post and soon enjoyed a warm relationship with the
men and women of his congregation. On Thursday, May 25, 1854
,
while preparing his sermon for that week, Higginson was noti-
fied of Burns' capture and the Vigilance Committee meeting
scheduled for Friday evening. By early Friday morning he was
on a train headed for Boston. As he rode to Boston,
Higginson reflected on the Sims arrest two years earlier. He
wondered if the committee would still be plagued by "great
want of preparation" for their "revolutionary work." He won-
dered if the men of the committee could ever disobey law.
Like himself, they had been brought up to respect law. It
had taken the "whole experience" of the Sims case to educate
his mind "in the attitude of revolution." He wondered how
others had been affected by the episode. For Higginson it
had been "strange to find oneself outside established insti-
tutions, to be obliged to lower one's voice and conceal one's
purposes, to see lav; and order, police and military on the
wrong side." Had Parker, Phillips, Howe and the others been
affected the same way? Did they really understand the neces-
sity of force? Were they as ready as he to prevent Burns
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return by any means? He wondered.
The Worcester activist arrived in Boston just before
noon and soon learned of the executive committee meeting
called the previous evening. He attended the meeting, asked
that Martin Stowell's name be added to its membership, and
hinted that Stowell was bringing men from Worcester to
attempt a forcible rescue. Because Higginson couldn't give
any details about the plan before consulting with Stowell and
because the executive committee had not developed any plan of
its own, the meeting was adjourned. They decided to meet
again in the anteroom of Faneuil Hall a few minutes before
the eight o'clock assembly. If Stowell did have a plan, it
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could be discussed then.
Around six o'clock Higginson went to the train station.
There he met Stowell and a few men he brought with him from
Worcester. Stowell immediately outlined his rescue plan. He
wanted an attack launched on the Court House in two stages.
First Higginson, he, and his men would storm the doors of the
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Court House. They would be reinforced after the initial
charge by the large crowd slated to attend the evening meet-
ing at Faneuil Hall. A great deal depended on the speakers
who were addressing the assembly. it was up to one of them
to incite the crowd and send them rushing to the Court House.
Stowell realized the precariousness of the plan. He realized
how important it was for Higginson and himself to coordinate
their efforts with the speakers. He realized timing would be
delicate. It was absolutely necessary that the Faneuil Hall
crowd arrive moments after the first stage of the attack
began. But Stowell was sure it could be done. Higginson
25thought so too.
The two men hurried to meet with the executive committee
members and outline their proposal. When they unveiled the
scheme Austin Bearse immediately rejected it. William Kemp
liked it but claimed he couldn't help because he wasn't
scheduled to speak. Phillips was scheduled to address the
assembly but couldn't be found because he was busy with last
minute preparations for the gathering. Only Parker and Howe,
both of whom were to speak, could assist. These two men lis-
tened incredulously as Stowell and Higginson discussed the
planned rescue effort. Howe and Parker weren't sure of the
scheme's chances and seem to have been a bit confused about
their own role in it. But neither vetoed the plan. As a
result, Higginson and Stowell left the anteroom meeting
believing they could depend on one of the two (most likely
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Parker) to send the crowd rushing to Court Square. Higginson
and Stowell were also heartened by Lewis Hayden's promise to
send ten blacks to assist the first stage of the attack.
Minutes after they left the hall, the two Worcester activists
strolled around Court Square checking to see that everything
was ready for the assault. As they did, Samuel Sewall intro-
duced George Russell to the large assemblage at Faneuil
Hall. 26
After Russell welcomed the audience, Samuel Gridley Howe
stood up to read the resolves of the meeting. Howe was well-
known to Massachusetts citizenry as the founder of Perkins
School for the Blind. He was a close friend of Parker's and
helped found the Vigilance Committee. Whenever a fugitive
slave arrest was attempted, Howe stood right along side his
friend Parker in efforts to prevent it. He smiled warmly and
acknowledged the applause which greeted him as he stepped to
the rostrum. Actually, Howe was quite tense as he prepared
to introduce the resolutions. He was beginning to realize
the implications of his meeting with Higginson and Stowell
moments earlier. Yes, he believed in Higher Law and knew
that unjust laws must be resisted but like Parker he had
always stopped short of personally participating in acts of
violent resistance. Why had he assented to the Higginson-
Stowell plan? It could mean bloodshed.
Only half-concentrating on the resolves, Howe's mind was
flooded with memories of past fugitive slave rescue efforts
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and he vainly wrestled with the question of forcible resis-
tance. His thoughts drifted as he mechanically called out
the resolutions.
"Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God ..."
Eight years before, Howe stood in Faneuil Hall and
addressed a gathering of abolitionists on the necessity of
preventing the rendition of fugitive slaves. At the begin-
ning of his speech he assured the audience that he did not
propose to "move the public mind to any expression of indig-
nation—much less acts of violence." Yet during the speech
he could not contain his anger and suggested law would "not
prevent" the "outrage" of kidnapped slaves. Despite such
anger Howe did not take the final step. He veered away from
outright suggestions of violent resistance in his conclusion
by claiming that renditions could be prevented if citizens
fixed their "eyes upon him [the slave hunter]" and didn't
take them off until "he leaves our borders without his
,.27prey
.
Throughout the early 1850' s Howe continued to struggle
with the notion of violent resistance. He began to believe
law could do great harm to men. When Horace Mann asked him
what he thought of legislation prohibiting corporations from
employing people for more than ten hours a day, Howe replied
heatedly that he was against the proposal. Law emasculated
men. It prevented them from protecting themselves and inured
them to their own responsibilities. But this distrust of law
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and his recurring contention that nothing could truly become
law that could not "answer the eternal principles of right"
didn't help the doctor resolve the debate inherent in his
first speech against the Fugitive Slave Law. For all his
conviction about the transcendence of Higher Law, the evil of
the Slave Power, and justice in protecting escaped slaves, he
still could not accept shedding blood in the resistance to
unjust laws. He could not bring himself to participate in
2 8
actual violence
.
As he pronounced the words of the last resolution and
sat down, Howe knew his approval of the Higginson-Stowell
plan meant very little. He personally would do nothing to
incite the crowd. No matter what his theories, he could not
abet violent resistance. He was horrified by the thought of
what might happen in Court Square at any moment.
The next speaker was Wendell Phillips. He rose, stepped
to the rostrum, and was greeted by an enormous ovation.
Phillips knew nothing of the rescue plan and spoke temper-
ately. He suggested only that people turn out on Saturday
morning at nine o'clock to show that Anthony Burns had "no
29
master but his God."
At Court Square, Thomas Wentworth Higginson heard the
roar go up from Faneuil Hall. He realized the ovation must
be for Phillips since he was scheduled as the first major
speaker. Higginson also reasoned that it would be best to
delay the attack until it was Parker's turn to speak.
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Phillips had not been informed of the plan and there was no
way to be certain that Howe or Parker had approached him
before he gave his speech. The ovation that greeted Parker
would cue their attack. Higginson and Stowell drew the men
together, passed out a dozen hand axes, readied the huge
wooden beam they were going to use as a battering ram against
the Court House doors, and waited patiently. At that moment
Lewis Hayden appeared with ten blacks. Everything was going
as scheduled. It was all up to Parker. He must trigger the
emotions of the crowd and send them to the Court House.
Higginson was confident. If anyone knew how to arouse an
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assembly it was Theodore Parker.
After Phillips* speech Parker stepped nervously to the
rostrum. Higginson 's revelations a few minutes earlier had
been startling and a bit confusing but Parker was fully aware
of the scene about to be acted out in Court Square. What is
more, he knew the importance of his role in the scheme. He
was the only major speaker with prior knowledge of the
planned attack. It was up to him to incite the crowd and
send them rushing toward the square. When Higginson first
revealed the plan Parker was certain he could assist. Now,
that certainty faded as his persistant doubts about using
forcible means returned.
Parker began his speech auspiciously and with a taunt,
addressing the assembly as his "fellow subjects of Virginia."
Shouts of "No'." "No!" greeted his words. After these
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inflamatory remarks, Parker referred to the Sims capture and
claimed that "if Boston had spoken then, we should not have
been here tonight." Yes, the people of Boston were "vassals"
of Virginia and federal authorities were so confident of this
that they hadn't even bothered to chain the Court House.
They had no fear of Burns being rescued. Boston's submissive
behavior would allow the police to carry Burns off "in a
cab." Again, the crowd roared back. "No I" "They can't do
it!" "Let's see them try!" Parker exhibited a masterful
control of the assembly. Actually, this was the only kind of
violence he really understood. It was a vicarious form,
purely rhetorical, rising out of the mix of his own incen-
diary words and the crowd's emotions. First, he built the
crowd's confidence by involking "higher law." Then, he
advised them of the power of public opinion. He claimed
there was only one law--"slave law"—and it was everywhere.
Next, he spoke to them of "another law," one that was in
their "hands and arms." They could put such law into effect
whenever they saw fit. Parker challenged the crowd and
shoved them toward violence. He was a "peace man" but real-
ized "there is a means and there is an end, liberty is the
end, sometimes peace is not the means toward it." With these
words Parker seemed to be condoning violence, seemed to be
resolving his own personal debate over participating in forc-
ible resistance. As he spoke, he fed and was fed by the
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rampaging emotions of the crowd. They were ready to charge
the Court House and he was ready to send them. 31
But in the very next moment his power, control, and com-
mitment drained away like fine sand from a tightly clenched
fist. It began when he asked the crowd what they planned to
do about Burns. "Shoot:" "Shoot!" a voice cried out.
Parker was stunned. Words caught in his throat. In an
instant he realized his desire for action was far less
intense than his fear of bloodshed. He couldn't send the
crowd to Court Square. He must restrain them. "There are
ways of managing this without shooting anybody," he yelled.
"These men who have kidnapped a man in Boston are cowards
. . .
if we stand up there resolutely and declare that this
man shall not go out of the city of Boston without shooting
a gun , then he won't go back." In his next sentence he for-
feited any chance of forcible rescue that evening. "Now I am
going to propose that when you adjourn, it be to meet in
Court Square at nine o'clock." Parker had abandoned Stowell
and Higginson. He took refuge in the majority plan of the
committee. But before he could carry his own motion, cries
rang out. "Let's go tonight!" "Let's pay a visit to the
slave-catchers at Revere House." Desperately trying to pre-
vent an exodus to Court Square, Parker seized upon the last
suggestion and tried to send the crowd to the Revere House.
"Do you suppose to go to Revere House tonight?" "Then show
your hands." After counting those who supported the measure,
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Parker claimed it was "not a vote." Again, Parker suggested
meeting in Court Square at nine in the morning. Again his
motion was met by screams of "Tonight!" "Tonight:" Parker
paused for a moment then hesitantly called for a vote. Half
the assembly wanted to go to the Court House that evening.
What could he do now? Shouts of "To the Court House I " echoed
around the hall. Parker was at the mercy of the crowd he had
totally dominated only moments before.
Sensing Parker's plight, Wendell Phillips leaped to the
rostrum and yelled out, "If I thought it could be done
tonight I would go first. I am ready to trample any statute
or any man under my foot to do it. But wait until
daytime .... It is in your power to lock up every avenue
so the man cannot be carried off." Moments after he uttered
these words and the crowd seemed to settle down, a man burst
into the hall. He screamed incoherently about an attack on
the Court House. Everyone shoved and pushed for the doors of
the hall. 33
When Higginson heard the ovation that greeted Parker and
the clamor caused by his introductory remarks, he felt sure
the crowd would soon be on its way to Court Square. Now was
the time to attack. On Higginson' s signal several men extin-
guished street lamps and darkened the square. Then, with
Higginson headmanning a large battering ram, the small cadre
moved toward the center entry of the west side of the Court
House. Burns was in a room two floors above this entry. As
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the minister moved through the square and up the steps toward
the doors he recalled words he'd spoken that afternoon. Some
attempt to rescue Burns had to be made. If it wasn't,
"future cases would occur with less traces of manly feeling."
Once up to the door, Higginson and the black man who stood
opposite him guided the thrusts of the battering ram. Stand-
ing behind those who were manning the beam, other members of
the group shouted and hurled rocks through the windows of the
building. A few of the attackers slashed away at the doors
with hand axes. In the midst of this furor Higginson glanced
furtively into the square. He wondered what was keeping the
crowd from Faneuil Hall. 34
Fifty "special" guards recruited by United States Mar-
shal Freeman pressed against the inside of the Court House
doors hoping to prevent them from giving way. But repeated
thrusts of the battering ram buckled the door paneling. A
few of these "specials" stepped back from the door, drew
sabres and firearms, and prepared to repel any attacker who
managed to get inside the building. Higginson and his black
cohort were the first to squeeze through the small passage-
way in the paneling. Once into the building, they began
grappling with some of the deputies. In the melee, shots
rang out, deputy James Batchelder was mortally wounded, and a
flashing cutlass dug into Higginson* s chin. At the same
time, Higginson realized that only he and his black friend
were fighting, the rest of the attackers had already
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retreated. He drew back and shouted at his fleeing comrades,
"You cowards, will you desert us now." He was bleeding pro-
fusely and moved slowly down the steps. At that moment, the
crowd from Faneuil Hall arrived only to see the battered
Court House doors slammed shut. Amid the confusion of mill-
ing people, Higginson haltingly staggered away from the
square. Within hours he was on a train headed back to
35Worcester.
At first, Higginson was deeply disheartened by the
attack's apparent failure. But he soon revised his opinion
of the effort. Public excitement in Worcester stimulated by
the attempt thoroughly amazed him. He heard the "wildest
things" proposed by men who formerly had little or no anti-
slavery sentiment. Even they wanted Burns freed. The min-
ister began to understand the potential power of the con-
certed popular feeling illicited by his act. What to do with
this power, however, was as new and mystifying as the exhil-
aration he felt in breaking down the Court House doors. But
in any case, he was now "thankful for what had been done" and
considered the whole effort the "greatest step in antislavery
which Massachusetts had ever taken." Conveniently forgetting
the successful Shadrach rescue by Boston blacks, the leader
of this "greatest" of all acts was "ready to do my share
• „36
again.
Samuel May, Jr., wrote a letter a few days later which
dampened his enthusiasm. May notified the young minister
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that a warrant had been sworn for his arrest. But what upset
Kigginson more, was May's suggestion about Parker's conduct
during the episode. According to May "Friday night had a
chance of success but the Court Square movement right in the
face and eyes of Faneuil Hall advice was ill-advised and so
failed when with perfect harmony it might have succeeded."
As more information filtered in to Worcester about Parker's
speech, Higginson began to understand why the crowd arrived
3 7
so late. He was tremendously disappointed with Parker.
Ill
It has been argued that Theodore Parker was one of anti-
slavery's most renouned "moral agitators." Indeed, he was.
Parker was always ready to "nullify the laws of slavery
because they stultified the Higher Law." But more than one
account of Parker's fugitive slave activity also implies that
he not only theorized the overthrow of slavery by violent
means but v/as ready to personally implement those theories.
A careful examination of the Burns affair and Parker's role
in it suggests another conclusion: Parker had not committed
himself to anything more than the theory of forcible means.
His fugitive slave efforts had not radicalized him to the
point of practical commitment to the use of force. A tre-
mendous tension existed within him between theory and prac-
tice both before and after the Anthony Burns episode. He
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would not begin to resolve this tension for another three
38years
.
Samuel Gridley Howe faced a problem similar to Parker's.
He shared responsibility with Parker for failing to send the
crowd to aid Higginson and guiltily watched the rendition
proceedings unfold. First, there were rumors of another res-
cue attempt. Then, Dana's plea for postponement was followed
by an attempt to purchase Burns' freedom. Finally, with sol-
diers stationed at all windows, crowds milling in Court
Square, and women abolitionists led by Lydia Parker standing
vigil outside the Court House, the hearings began on Monday,
May 29, at nine in the morning. Dana conducted a brilliant
defense but his efforts were futile. Suttle, Brent, and
Thomas certified Anthony Burns' identity and proved owner-
ship. Commissioner Edward Loring defined his responsibility
in the case as "ministerial" and not "judicial." He claimed
he was not empowered to preside over a jury trial aimed at
testing the validity of the Fugitive Slave Law. As long as
proof of identity and ownership had been established, Loring
said he had no choice but to turn Burns over to Suttle for
. . 39
shipment back to Virginia.
On June 2, thousands of men, women, and children
thronged the streets of Boston to watch Anthony Burns march
from the Court House to the wharf for transportation to
Virginia. The march was scheduled to begin at eleven o'clock
but was delayed three hours as hundreds of soldiers attempted
to clear streets and prevent any further effort to free the
slave. Cavalry patrols drove citizens back on to sidewalks.
Police suggested businessmen close their stores for the day.
Militiamen locked arms and held back the crowd. Once these
"path-clearing" efforts had succeeded, Burns was surrounded
by a column of 125 special deputies and 140 United States
troops and marched to the wharf. 40
Standing at the edge of the crowd on one of the streets
en route
,
Samuel Gridley Howe watched the troops pass by with
Burns in their midst. He saw black-edged flags, unions down,
hanging everywhere. A coffin with the words "Funeral of Lib-
erty" inscribed on it hung from a window opposite the Old
State House. Howe was overwhelmed with anger and self-
recrimination, disturbed at having glibly theorized about the
necessity of using forcible means and then personally failing
to execute such theories. Howe remembered a suggestion he
made to Sumner only a few weeks earlier. At that time, he
claimed that force might be "the only means ... to save the
perishing." Now, the full implication of his failure to act
was clear: Burns was being shipped back to slavery. Howe
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"wept for sorrow, shame and indignation."
Again and again the physician asked himself why he and
so many others had failed to resist the rendition. Howe
tried to convince himself that if it had not been for "citi-
zen soldiery and armed citizen police, the people would have
routed the United States troops and rescued poor Burns."
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Ultimately he concluded that it was "the fetish of law which
disarmed and emasculated" both himself and Boston's citi-
zenry. Higginson was correct. It was difficult to find one-
self on the wrong side of established institutions when one
had been raised to respect those institutions. Howe had not
been radicalized by the Sims affair. Unlike Higginson he was
not ready to "burst down a door." 42
In his self-anger, Howe was struck by a vivid image
which eventually had much to do with his personal ability to
break through the crippling "fetish" for law. The image was
that of "a comely colored girl of eighteen" who happened to
be standing near him as Anthony Burns passed. She stood
watching the column with "clenched fists . . . flashing eyes
and tears streaming down her cheeks, the picture of indignant
despair." When he noticed how emotionally upset the girl
was, Samuel Gridley tried to comfort her. He told her not to
cry. Burns wouldn't be hurt. Immediately, the black girl
turned to him and screamed, "Hurt, I cry for shame he will
not kill himself. Oh why is he not man enough to kill him-
self." Howe was stunned by the vehemence and power of her
words. In future days, he thought of the incident again and
again. By 1858, the issue of black manhood and the necessity
of black violence would allow Samuel Gridley Howe briefly to
resolve the paralyzing tension between the theory and prac-
tice of legitimate force. It would carry him and others
43beyond Higher Law.
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The Burns rendition is a significant episode in the
chronicle of the antislavery movement. It is especially
important in understanding the attitudes of Howe, Parker and
Higginson toward the use of force, and it provides a context
for their future activities in the movement. Higginson moved
rapidly down the road of practical abolition as a result of
his participation in the assault. The failures of Howe and
Parker accentuated their personal struggle to resolve the
discrepancy between the theory and practice of forcible
resistance
.
But for all his commitment to violent means, Higginson
was still a novice when it came to using the public sentiment
his attack produced. In this respect, he learned much from
Howe and Parker who were sophisticated practitioneers at the
art of manipulating public opinion. Neither Howe nor Parker
could bring themselves to use forcible means but both knew
how to milk the emotion stirred by the Burns affair. When it
came to exploiting the "martyrdom" of Anthony Burns or pro-
moting a crisis mentality in the populace, each man was an
expert; quite as unscrupulous in the name of Higher Law as
slaveholders were in defense of their institution. Both men
knew how to win converts to the antislavery faith and their
activities in the aftermath of rendition are as important for
understanding their future abolitionist efforts as is their
failure to forcibly resist the Fugitive Slave Law.
50
IV
Parker used his Sunday sermons as a device to relieve
himself of responsibility for the Burns failure and to whip
up popular anger about the rendition. In his May 2 8 dis-
course, given only two days after Higginson's attack, he
spoke of such attempts as "wholly without use." Then, he
deftly side-stepped blame for the crowd's failure to rein-
force Higginson by praising Wendell Phillips. According to
Parker, it was Phillips whose words "hardly restrained the
multitude from going and by violence storming the Court
House." Parker didn't mention that Phillips was only trying
44to do what he himself could not.
The Sunday after Burns had been returned Parker was less
restrained with his remarks. He incited his audience by
speaking with disdain about Massachusetts' failure to act.
"We deserve all we have suffered. We are the scorn and con-
tempt of the South. They are our masters and treat us like
slaves. It is ourselves who made the yoke." Parker wondered
aloud if men would always come to a rendition "with only the
arms God gave," then claimed to want "no rashness," only calm
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considerate action.
While Sunday sermons had their effect, other techniques
were also necessary to maintain aroused antislavery senti-
ment. Soon after the rescue attempt Howe had written to
Parker saying "I have long made up my mind not to avoid a
struggle with this law
—
perhaps my children are the reason
[I have avoided the struggle].
. . . Something must be
attempted." No new rescue effort was made. But soon after
rendition Howe was again writing to Parker with a suggestion.
Confessing his feelings of "disgrace," Howe thought one way
to redeem the honor of the "degraded community" of Boston and
at the same time feed antislavery emotion, was to remove Com-
missioner Edward Loring from his position as Judge of Pro-
bate. Parker received the idea with glee. He had already
begun the process of discrediting Loring by suggesting that
it was the Commissioner who was responsible for deputy James
Batchelder's death. Nothing could be done about Loring'
s
federal appointment but his position as Judge of Probate was
subject to state recall proceedings. Such an issue would
certainly sustain antislavery sentiment while at the same
time shifting attention from antislavery violence and the
failure to prevent rendition. Such a tactic personalized the
institution of slavery in negative terms as Burns had person-
alized it in positive ones. Commissioner Loring became the
institution of slavery; his removal the symbolic triumph of
antislavery men over the institution. Loring' s ordeal would
be another lesson in antislavery ' s continuing struggle to
win the public mind of the North. Undoubtedly Parker
recalled the words he spoke in the aftermath of the Sims ren-
dition. Seeking to locate responsibility for Sims' return,
the minister wished "it was some single man . . . some
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official of the City ... so we could make him a scapegoat
of public indignation." 46
The effort to make Loring a "scapegoat" began on July 4
at an abolitionist picnic in Framingham. A petition was cir-
culated calling for Loring' s removal as Judge of Probate. By
early February, 1955, the effort began to succeed. Indica-
tive of the hostility generated against Loring was the defeat
of his appointment as permanent lecturer at Harvard Law
School. Then, in late February, the House of Representatives
began hearings on the removal petition. Loring was accused
of conducting the examination of Burns unfairly, hurrying the
proceedings, and not maintaining free access to Court for the
prisoner's counsel. Loring defended himself by protesting
that he had handled the proceedings impartially and by
reminding the legislative committee that his duties as Com-
missioner were not incompatible with those he rendered as
Judge of Probate. If they were, why hadn't objections been
raised when he was appointed Commissioner? Despite his
forceful plea, Loring 's position was in jeopardy when the
hearings were recessed in late March. But he was soon
.
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receiving support from an unexpected source.
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., was profoundly disturbed by the
effort to remove Loring. He had hoped the whole Burns epi-
sode was behind him. It had been a painful experience. Now
he was forced to rekindle unpleasant memories because he had
decided to testify in Loring 's behalf. While Dana condemned
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the Commissioner's decision as morally wrong, he defended
Loring's actions on the basis of the legal principles
involved. Dana argued convincingly for the independence of
the judiciary. if Loring were removed judicial independence
would receive a severe blow. Dana believed Loring was not
guilty of official misconduct. In fact, he had encouraged
Burns to make a defense and had postponed the hearings long
enough for counsel to make adequate preparation. The Commis-
sioner had demanded Phillips and others be allowed free
access to court. Loring had even cooperated with efforts to
4 8purchase Burns' freedom.
Dana's defense of Loring seems to have been effective.
Although the legislature voted for removal, Governor Gardener
vetoed the measure. It would be three more years before abo-
49litionists succeeded with their campaign to remove Loring.
Theodore Parker was furious with Dana. He was certain
the lawyer's influence had destroyed the removal effort.
This, coupled with Dana's condemnation of Higginson's Court
House attack, led the minister to claim he had long "despised"
Dana's scruples against violence and was "disgusted [when]
Dana withdrew fr[om] the Vig[ilance] Committee because of
contempt for the use of force." Considering his own role in
the affair, Parker's criticism was tainted. But his vehe-
mence is also suggestive. It implies the importance he
placed on the removal tactic and the intensity of his own
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personal debate about the use of violent means.
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Higginson' s lack of sophistication in exploiting the
Burns' incident is indicated in his first Sunday sermon on
the subject. "Massachusetts in Mourning" is more a projec-
tion of his own new level of consciousness than a propaganda
device. Delivered just two days after Burns had been extra-
dieted, the sermon was primarily devoted to the truths he
personally hoped to live by in the future. It was his first
formal declaration that slavery could only be ended by
resorting to "physical force." Slave laws would not be
repealed by politicians, only by "ourselves." Higginson
claimed to have "lost the dream that our land is a land of
peace and order." To "always . . . obey . . . laws" meant
"virtue must relax much of her vigor." In a land where slav-
ery was "national," law and order "must constantly be on the
wrong side." He wasn't discouraging "peaceful ins trumental-
ities"--politics should be used if they could be made "worth
using." But Higginson was suggesting that as far as he was
concerned the Burns episode signaled the beginning of "a
revolution," a period of vast upheaval when appeal would have
to be made to violent means if the complex institutional
interaction which perpetuated slavery was to be destroyed.
Perhaps the most personally revealing segment of his sermon
was his vision of the result of such a revolution. Higginson
believed the forthcoming crisis would remedy a "deeper
disease" in American society than even the institution of
slavery. Mid-nineteenth century society had grown "selfish
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and timid." Men tried to save themselves by "law and order"
and Higginson considered such efforts "idle." Men were not
perfected by "talk of liberty." They were not made virtuous
if they never had to risk physical injury to achieve liberty.
Without "physical habits" minds would grow sharp but "bodies
and hearts" were left "untrained." Mid-nineteenth century
Americans had lost the strength and conviction of their fore-
fathers, their society declined because they were "taught
they owe the world nothing and the world owes them a living."
This was the "deeper disease" in his society. This was the
source of slavery and every other impediment to progress and
perfection. In a short time Higginson would ride the plains
of Kansas and marvel at the way war disciplined men and women
and made them unselfish. He would become more convinced of
51the necessity of "revolution."
Higginson wasn't very active in the Loring removal
effort. For the most part, he just watched and learned.
Besides, more immediate personal concerns demanded his atten-
tion. He was stung by the adverse reaction to the rescue
attempt voiced by a number of antislavery proponents. Then
too, his pending trial demanded time and energy. But any
feelings of anxiety about imprisonment were soon dissipated
when he realized what a fragmentary case had been constructed
by the state. Only one person could identify him as a par-
ticipant in the attack and that individual was unsure of his
. .
. 52testimony
.
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Eventually a growing confidence in the certainty of his
own acquittal and new insight into the techniques of manipu-
lating popular opinion convinced him that this trial might
serve the same tactical purpose as the Loring removal. It
could be an "additional stimulus" to antislavery sentiment.
Realizing the others arrested in connection with the attempt
were "obscure men," Higginson hoped his new found reputation
would make his indictment a lesson. He began to relish
arrest. He even considered the possibility of pleading
guilty and asking acquittal on moral grounds. But he dropped
such notions once he received expert legal advice and started
listening to Wendell Phillips whose theories on popular opin-
ion governed even Howe and Parker. Phillips was still smart-
ing from the Faneuil Hall episode when he wrote to Higginson
a few weeks later. He was upset that he had not been "given
a chance to help . . . instead of making a fool of myself."
Phillips advised Higginson (in rather cynical terms given
Burns' rendition) that he must plead not guilty because "the
opportunity of preaching to that jury is one of the things
you fought for perhaps the most important object." Phillips"
view was restated by Albert Browne a youth who had been
arrested, questioned, and released in connection with the
rescue attempt. He told Higginson that "agitation on the
subject is good for the cause. Keep this inequity [Burns'
rendition] . . . before the public (and) it cannot fail of
producing a good effect. God knows I feel for Burns but I am
sure it is a thousand times better for our cause that he
was sent back." In the future Higginson would make excellent
use of these "lessons." 53
By the end of the summer of 1854, the state seemed
unable to gather enough evidence to bring most of those
arrested in connection with the attack to trial. Only Martin
Stowell seemed in any serious trouble. But in November after
a number of postponements, new names were added to the list
of those to be indicted—including Parker and Phillips. When
this occurred the slight strains already existing in the
relationship of Higginson and Parker were increased. Parker
wanted to make a stout defense but by late fall, almost six
months after his own indictment was handed down, Higginson
was impatient to conclude the episode. He had been threat-
ened with trial too long and was in no mood to carry the
farce any further by arguing the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Law. The main legal fight should be "on the
evidence" and Higginson outlined his position to Parker in
concise terms slightly tinged with antagonism. He wanted to
"go for victory" if he plead not guilty. Yet, "there must be
nothing unfair and no compromise in my opinions." He wanted
"to combine a successful defense with an honorable one."
Higginson jabbed subtly at the colleague who had abandoned
him that humid evening in May. The next time they quarreled
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over broken commitments Higginson v/ould be less delicate.
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Parker was dismayed when in April, 1855, charges were
dropped against all people indicted in connection with the
Burns rescue effort. Parker claimed he "should have liked
the occasion for a speech." Never one to lose an opportunity
to agitate the antislavery cause, he eventually published an
elaborate defense of his role in the affair although avoiding
any careful analysis of his speech before the Faneuil Hall
crowd
.
V
Regardless of the personal animosities or philosophical
tensions that arose over the Burns "kidnapping," W. H.
Channing was pleased with the results of the incident. He
wrote Higginson about his feelings. According to Channing,
events like the Burns arrest would "raise higher the growing
desire to break our yoke by awakening the consciousness of
the power to do it ." Channing was certain the fullness of
this sense of "power" could be managed in a "single season."
Given the right events and the proper use of those events by
abolitionists, men could be awakened from "their drunken
dreams of gain and ease." Higginson must have been impressed
for Channing also seemed to recognize that the abolition
movement could be used to deal with an even "deeper disease"
in American society than the institution of slavery: it could
be used to discipline the chaos and flux of mid-nineteenth
century America. Traditional values could be returned. And
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Charming had another idea in case men weren't "awakened" by
events like the Burns episode. He advised Higginson that
"the next thing to do is guerrilla war at every chance. They
shall not sleep whether they pull down their caps or not."
News from Kansas must have pleased Charming greatly. 55
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CHAPTER II
On May 30, 1854, in the midst of the Burns hearings,
President Pierce signed the Kansas-Nebraska Act into law.
News of the signing prompted Theodore Parker to suggest that
the Burns episode was merely a diversionary tactic contrived
by the Slave Power for the purpose of turning Boston's atten-
tion away from efforts to institute slavery north of the
Missouri Compromise line. Parker, like so many other anti-
slavery men, opposed the Stephen Douglas-sponsored measure
from the first day it was introduced in the Senate. He felt
it was a fraudulent use of the popular sovereignty issue to
expand slavery into the territories. 1
In the next two years, Kansas and the attendant problems
of proslavery Missouri "border ruffianism," inept federal
territorial office appointments, and ballot-stuffed election
victories, stimulated a new wave of antislavery protest and
became the keynote of northern political activity. Harriet
Beecher Stowe organized 3,050 New England preachers to sign a
petition condemning the Kansas-Nebraska measure. William
Lloyd Garrison denounced the act at an Independence Day pic-
nic and then torched copies of the Fugitive Slave Law, Burns
decision, and United States Constitution. At least partially
aided by reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Know-Nothingism
swept into office in Massachusetts. Popular indignation also
assisted antislavery men in their efforts to enact personal
liberty laws designed to protect fugitive slaves. Sermons
were preached and protest meetings organized in an attempt to
stop Kansas from becoming the newest bastion of slavery. 2
But by March 1855, antislavery men and women began to
see it would take more than angry words or political protest
to prevent a proslavery takeover in Kansas. They began to
see the necessity of subsidizing freestate settlement of the
territory. A number of relief committees were set up
throughout the North (particularly in Massachusetts) for the
purpose of collecting funds and supplies to assist people who
were emigrating to the territory. The committees were non-
profit models of Eli Thayer's Massachusetts Emigrant Aid
Society. Their purpose was to provide freestate Kansas emi-
grants with enough food, clothing, homes teading supplies, and
money to insure successful settlement. Antislavery reformers
hoped to prevent slavery in Kansas by subsidizing the growth
of a population willing to vote the institution down when it
3came time to prepare a constitution for statehood.
One individual who became quite active with the
Middlesex County Kansas Committee in the late fall of 1855
was Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, a recent Harvard graduate, and
son of Aaron Sanborn, town clerk of Hampton Falls, New
Hampshire. Aaron Sanborn understood the value of proper
religious and educational training for his children. He
made sure they were thoroughly familiar with the Bible and
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received as much public schooling as Hampton Falls had to
offer. Because young Frank excelled in his studies, Aaron
Sanborn was even persuaded to pay J. G. Hoyt to prepare him
for college. Hoyt, a Dartmouth graduate and an "ardent anti-
slavery man," began tutoring Frank in 1850 and within a year
was sufficiently impressed to suggest further studies at
Phillips Exeter Academy where young Sanborn could receive
rigorous training in the classics. At Phillips Exeter,
Sanborn continued to excel, passed Harvard's stiff classics
admission examination and by July, 1852, entered the College
4
as a member of the sophomore class.
During his tutelage by Hoyt, Sanborn was tremendously
impressed by the Dartmouth graduate's commitment to antislav-
ery. After a few months at Cambridge where he regularly read
the National Era and New York Tribune and frequently attended
abolitionist lectures, the young college student proudly pro-
claimed his own engagement to the movement. He was certain
"slavery was wrong" and convinced that "some of the North
were governed by a minority small in numbers but powerful in
wealth and influence." This minority was composed of "slave-
holders and their commercial allies at the North and West."
Slavery must be destroyed in order for the "mass of people"
••5
to be free from this "dominating aristocracy.
Despite such strong views about the Slave Power, regular
attendance at antislavery lectures, and routine abolitionist
reading, young Sanborn had relatively little time to devote
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to the movement while at college: there were too many other
things to do. Daring his years at Harvard, Sanborn began
attending Unitarian services, took long walks out to Concord
in hopes of meeting Emerson or Thoreau, and constantly wor-
ried about what career he would pursue once he had graduated.
In early July, 1853, he and his friend Edwin Morton sat
enthralled as Emerson addressed himself to a question of
vital importance to each of them. They wondered "whether
literature in America could be a young man's occupation and
bread winner?" Sanborn also worked very hard at his studies,
earned excellent grades, and became editor of the school
paper. He even won an election bid to Phi Beta Kappa but
declined the offer because he felt the society to be an
"unjustifiable intellectual aristocracy."
While at Harvard, Sanborn also became a disciple of
Theodore Parker. He first heard Parker when the minister
gave his famous Fast-day sermon on April 19, 1852, after
Thomas Sims had been returned to slavery. Sanborn was amazed
by Parker's political wisdom, religious fervor, and intense
abolitionism. Eventually the young scholar was granted per-
mission to exchange Sunday services in the college chapel for
Parker's preaching at the Music Hall. As a senior, Sanborn
presented a series of lectures on Parker's writings before
7
fellow members of the Hasty Pudding Club.
More than anything else, though, Frank Sanborn's college
days were dominated by his relationship with the beautiful
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and frail Ariana Walker. He first met Ariana in 1850 while
visiting a cousin and was charmed by her grace. After a few
more meetings, Sanborn was certain of his love for Ariana.
For her part, Ariana liked Frank because he thought "more
wholly for himself" than anyone she had ever met, but she
wasn't really attracted to the dark-haired young man. She
liked him for his "intellectual and spiritual nature" but
"not himself , " and claimed she was "never interested in one
o
where feeling was so little personal."
Sanborn could hardly be as dispassionate. He hoped to
nurture their friendship and win the love of the woman whose
feelings were "so little personal." The young man cast their
relationship in typically nineteenth century terms. He
believed Ariana could be a guiding force in his life; an
infallible source of advice and comfort. Surprisingly, there
does seem to be some justification for his view. Ariana was
two years older than Sanborn, exceptionally intelligent, and
possessed an uncanny ability to analyze the people around
her. She often amused herself by predicting people's actions.
In addition, Ariana does seem to have been quite helpful to
Frank during moments of indecision. He repeatedly unburdened
himself to her and she calmed him with wise counsel. She
always claimed his success was "sure" as long as he bent his
"whole energies" to whatever he hoped to achieve. It was
Ariana who encouraged Sanborn to attend Harvard and devote
his college years to "severe study." When Sanborn wondered
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aloud what he could do with his Harvard education it was
Ariana who suggested that while he was at college it was the
discipline of education he wanted and "not to be fitted for
9
any particular profession."
In time, Ariana began to love the friend she so often
counseled, and during the early spring of 1854, as Frank fin-
ished his junior year, they announced their engagement. The
relationship had grown from one in which Ariana had "no per -
sonal feelings" into something much deeper. Frail Ariana
Walker became fascinated with the handsome young man who was
like a "kind of book in which I like well to read." When
she turned to her journal to "review" the "book," a loving,
perceptive, and highly revealing character analysis poured
* 4-1, 10forth.
Ariana knew of Frank's weaknesses, knew that he worried
about everyone "overrating" him. She knew that the young
scholar viewed himself as "quick" but "confused," and totally
lacking in "strictness and steadiness." She also understood
the paradoxes of his character. Frank valued highly his
"independence" and thought of himself as "capable of living
alone and . . . apart from all others," yet in his "inner-
most soul" looked for "some authority upon which to lean" and
was "influenced more than he is aware by those whose opinion
he reflects." Sanborn was a man of many "noble aspirations,
yet unsatistified." He was constantly "seeking, seeking,
grasping in the dark." The young man wanted a
" definite end
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for which to strive heartily" and he believed that if he had
such an end "success would be sure." Ariana had confidence
in Frank because he had "much executive power," though she
also realized he often "executed better than he planned."
Ariana Walker loved Frank Sanborn because he had "great
pride/' was "gentle" in spite of a certain coldness, and had
"strong passions." She loved Frank because he was a man
whose nature would not allow him to find rest, a man who
regarded "struggle" as a "native element," and who "must
work" and "must have a great motive for which to strive." 11
In the summer of 1854, Ariana Walker became seriously
ill. She had battled recurring, short-lived, "nervous
attacks" almost every year since 1846 when she first con-
tracted "a painful lameness" which kept her from walking
freely. But previously she had always recovered her health.
Now, in the humid weeks of June and July, her condition con-
tinued to deteriorate and her periods of debilitation length-
ened. Shattered and disconsolate, Sanborn turned to Parker
for comfort. He told the minister that Ariana had "the
marks of ... a settled consumption" and that "unless some
change for the better" took place, she could "not survive
another year." He found it difficult to accept that only "a
few months" before it seemed he and Ariana " should live
together the life to which we have long looked foward."
Ariana meant so much to him, was "so woven in my being," that
he couldn't "think of life without her." He wondered what
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would become of himself in "so great a desolation." He won-
dered what work he could put his hand to, "what study I
could pursue, what pleasure I could feel in anything." 12
In spite of her illness Frank and Ariana decided to
marry. Eight days later, on August 28, 1854, the sickly
young woman died. Sanborn was devastated. In the midst of
his grief he again turned to Theordore Parker. Sanborn
asked that a short note be read in Ariana' s memory before
the minister's congregation and went on to say that he felt
sure "God had some great work" for him to do or "he never
would have given me such a wealth of love." In the near
future, Sanborn would meet a powerful authoritarian person-
ality who had a "definite end" in mind and a belief that he
also had been given a "great work" to do by God. 1 "^
Sanborn was too emotionally upset to continue his stud-
ies during the fall semester. But by December of 1854, he
had recovered sufficiently to return to Cambridge and begin
the last year of work for his degree. The somber young
scholar applied himself diligently throughout the spring and
summer of 1855 and completed his courses by late August. He
was certain his success that year could be attributed to
"less worldly ambition than before . . . and a greater abil-
ity to work." After all, it was the "work of two" he was
finishing
.
The Harvard senior was given an added incentive to com-
plete his studies by Emerson and other Concord residents.
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The transcendental sage had been so impressed with Sanborn
in previous encounters that he offered the young man a posi-
tion as schoolteacher in Concord. The idea appealed to
Sanborn, so in the early spring of 1855 he and his older sis-
ter, Sarah, moved to Concord and began developing an educa-
tional program for the coming school year. The young New
Hampshire native made acquaintances rapidly and in the pro-
cess was induced to join the Middlesex County Kansas Commit-
tee.
Membership on the committee proved to be an important
step in Sanborn's abolitionist career. Within a year he
gradually turned away from teaching and began spending more
and more time on Kansas aid work. He was soon appointed
secretary and put in charge of directing committee affairs.
The ambitious young man, looking for a "great work" to do,
became an extremely effective organizer. As Ariana suggested,
he had "much executive power." Sanborn scheduled lectures,
managed fund raising campaigns, and searched desperately for
"recent news from Kansas" so he could keep fellow committee
members well informed. It was an ideal position for young
Sanborn, providing him with a meaningful purpose in life, a
new circle of fascinating friends and some influential asso-
ciations. He was beginning to understand Ariana' s advice
that he not worry about a career. He was thankful for her
suggestion that he concern himself with the "discipline of
education." No Harvard course work could ever have prepared
him for the effort in which he was now engaged. it was "dis-
cipline" and "organization" that made for successful manage-
ment of committee business.
The beating of Charles Sumner in late May of 1856, fol-
lowed in rapid succession by a Missouri "border ruffian"
attack on the frees tate town of Lawrence, and the killing of
five antislavery men on Pottawatomie Creek, increased
Sanborn's desire to "do something" for Kansas. The young
secretary became so intoxicated with the thought of Kansas
as a battleground of freedom that he even debated giving up
his organizational activity and going to the territory to
fight. "Armed settlers" were desperately needed and Sanborn
seriously believed he should be one of them. He would soon
1 7disabuse himself of such notions.
In August, 1856, Sanborn was asked to visit the terri-
tory for the Middlesex County Kansas Committee and find out
whether funds and supplies collected by the committee were
arriving at their proper destination. He was also to inves-
tigate how the material was being used and what settlers
would need in the future. It was the perfect opportunity to
test his enthusiasm for "armed settlement." But once out
west, Sanborn realized the substantial difference between
the organization of settlement and the actuality of living
and fighting in Kansas. Like Howe and Parker during the
Burns episode, Sanborn began to understand the distance
between theory and practice in the abolitionist campaign
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against slavery. The young secretary scrupulously avoided
entering the strife-torn area and, with a twinge of defen-
siveness in his words, claimed to his sister that his trip
was "only to inspect the emigrant route through Iowa in order
that it might be kept open for men, arms, and ammunition."
When offered a revolver for protection by Samuel Gridley Howe
who was on a similar inspection tour for the newly formed
Massachusetts Kansas Committee, Sanborn took the gun reluc-
tantly. He claimed he did "not expect to run any risk."
Though he felt strongly he should "go into Kansas" and use
the weapon, he realized his own inability to do so and hoped
it was "for the best" that he didn't "go in." Sanborn was
awed by the romance of "Western Life," awed by the courage
and heroism of armed settlers, and he wished that he pos-
sessed the leadership qualities of men like James Lane,
Charles Robinson and John Brown. But the trip had taught
him a lesson: his forte was "executive power" not "armed
settlement. 1,18
Upon his return to Massachusetts Sanborn spoke of Kansas
as the "most practical form in which the struggle for free-
dom has ever presented itself." It would "justify any exer-
tion." Even if he couldn't bear arms there was much to
accomplish in the way of organization. More and more the
"struggle for freedom" in Kansas and his urge "to do seme-
thing" merged. His own "success" and feelings of accompli.sh-
nt became synomomous with his participation in the Kansasme
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aid movement. Providing aid for the territory became his
"career." By early fall of 1856, Sanborn entrusted his
Concord school to Sarah and committed himself to committee
work on a full-time basis. 19
His rationale for this decision was contained in two
letters to Theodore Parker. Both provide a revealing
glimpse at his motivation and values. Sanborn claimed that
he was concerned because the aid movement had suffered from
"the want of men
. . . devoted wholly to it." The movement
depended too much on "transient excitement and activity."
Someone must give it "system and perpetual order." Sanborn
felt even his "inexperienced labors" were "great" when com-
pared to those of many others who professed interest in the
movement. Kansas (and by implication abolitionism) needed
men who would make it "their study and business." Until that
happened antislavery men had "no right to hope for any good."
When Parker mildly objected to Sanborn's decision, the former
school master reaffirmed his contention and replied, "I see
in almost every person traces of indecision which is fatal to
any good settlement of the difficulty. Instead of coming out
and facing the real evil we are all . . . held back . . . for
some personal reason. " Sanborn was "determined ... to cut
through all these meshes and do thoroughly what I have been
so long talking about." It was a telling rebuttal from one
who knew nothing of Parker's hesitation during the Burns res-
cue attempt. Frank Sanborn saw himself as an "example," a
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person who would convince friends to leave "business and
pleasure" and work "wholly for the cause." His efforts would
cause men to "attach more importance to the movement." He
realized he couldn't expect such a commitment from others
unless he was willing to make it "as soon as any.- He was
"really ready to give up everything." 20
Such assertions were highly idealistic if not wholly
accurate. Certainly Sanborn believed in the moral necessity
of ending slavery but he also had personal needs to fulfill
that were entirely apart from such a goal. By the fall of
1856, the young man saw that his committee activity could be
an important vehicle by which to obtain a "place" in Boston
society. Indeed, it was a bit dishonest for him to condemn
men for being held back from work for the "cause" because of
"personal reasons." He really had no "personal reasons" to
hold him back. All his instincts told him that his own self-
interest would best be served by joining the movement on a
full-time basis. His need to free Kansas and secure a posi-
tion became the same thing. It was rather easy for Frank
Sanborn to advocate leaving "business and pleasure" and work-
ing "wholly for the cause." His own self-interest and the
freestate triumph in Kansas had been completely harmonized.
He didn't need to be altruistic. As he said to Parker at the
end of his second letter, it was not a violent step to leave
teaching for a few months because there was always a chance
his "place" might prove to be "an important one." If his
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efforts didn't work out he could always "abandon" them and
"take some other place— if I can get it." 21
The position Sanborn referred to in his letter to Parker
was secretary of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee. The job
had been offered to him in late September by George Luther
Stearns, a Medford businessman who was serving as chairman of
the committee. Stearns was overwhelmed with Sanborn's enthu-
siasm for the aid movement, impressed by the young man's
effective fund-raising efforts and eager for his first-hand
knowledge of the Kansas situation. Most important, Stearns
was tremendously pleased by Sanborn's awareness of the need
for "system" and "order" in committee business. Since both
men also believed that substantial portions of all funds
gathered for Kansas should be used to purchase firearms for
settlers, it was agreed that Sanborn should join Stearns,
Howe, P. T. Jackson and George Russell as a full-time commit-
22tee member.
On June 3, 1856 a public meeting of Massachusetts abo-
litionists voted "to raise funds for the Free State settlers
of Kansas." The men selected to lead the state-wide effort
were originally called the Faneuil Hall Committee. The com-
mittee was chaired by Samuel Gridley Howe (who was available
for "any plan to beat down the Slave Power") and it sought to
combat the "systematic and extensive conspiracy "against
freestaters in Kansas. By June 25, 1856 the group was
renamed the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, had acquired a
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new chairman, Stearns, and proceeded to raise money with the
avowed intention of "going beyond" what had already been done
for settlers by way of supplies and funds. The committee
membership was convinced that guns were as important in sav-
ing Kansas as clothing and farm tools. And Stearns wasted
no time in looking to fill this need. In the first four
months of his tenure, he gave numerous speeches about the
necessity of supplying Kansas settlers, he communicated what
the settlers needed and raised 10,000 dollars worth of sup-
plies. Stearns was business-like, organized, and very effec-
tive. He never hesitated to use his influence throughout the
state. Tinmen, plumbers, and other craftsmen who purchased
goods from his lead-pipe factory were employed as a kind of
agency by which to raise funds. Between August and December
of 1856, Stearns and his "agents" gathered 48,000 dollars
worth of equipment for the territory. 23
Stearns and Sanborn worked well together. The two men
shared very similar views and backgrounds. Each came from a
family which traced its ancestry back to the first days of
the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Each came from a family with
modest economic resources. Each man had to exert great
energy to fashion a place for himself in Massachusetts soci-
ety. This was particularly true of Stearns. George's
father, Luther Stearns, graduated from Harvard in 1791 and
"quickly obtained a good reputation as an obstetrician."
George never got to know his father well because in 1820
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Luther Stearns died and left the responsibility of caring for
the eleven year old boy, his brother Henry and sister
Elizabeth, to Mary Hall Stearns, his wife of twenty-one
years. Mary Hall Stearns undertook the task with great
strength. She was an inspiring woman who not only saw to the
needs of her family but became a "power in the community."
The large, broad-shouldered woman walked with a cane, had the
disposition of a justice of the peace, and faced the family's
financial difficulties with courage. She was a staunch
no-nonsense Calvinist who refused to accept "optimistic the-
ories" of religion and probably would have preferred to see
her children dead "rather than grown up in idle vicious
courses." George saw such discipline as "severe and unrea-
sonable" but his mother saw it as a necessity if she was to
hold the family together. She was probably correct. Con-
tinual financial problems, sickness, and Elizabeth's death
in 1828 strained the family bonds but never broke them.
When George was sixteen his mother sent him to
Brattleboro, Vermont, where he trained for a career in busi-
ness at his uncle's country store. Three and a half years
later in 1828, he returned to Boston and spent the next few
years working as a ship's chandler, salesman, and bookkeeper.
Then, in 1835, Stearns saw an opportunity to start his own
business manufacturing linseed oil, an article used exten-
sively in shipbuilding. After borrowing money from rela-
tives, mortgaging the family home (Mary Hall Stearns backed
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her son completely), and obtaining a loan of 10,000 dollars
from Medford businessman Deacon Train, he invested his funds
in the necessary equipment. Because of careful management,
Stearns soon prospered. in the first five years of produc-
tion the company's assets grew substantially and George
Luther repaid all the debts incurred when he began the enter-
25prise
.
Shortly after repaying the last of his debts and reward-
ing himself with a vacation at some hot sulphur springs in
Virginia, Stearns experienced personal tragedy. His wife of
five years, Mary Train Stearns, died of a heart condition.
For the next three years the grief-stricken young business-
man occupied himself with various community efforts while
working almost obsessively to improve his linseed oil busi-
ness. Then, in the spring of 184 3, he met the charming and
headstrong Mary Preston, daughter of a Maine circuit court
judge and cousin of the prominent abolitionist, Lydia Maria
Child. They were married that fall.
Mary Preston Stearns had very set ideas about her fam-
ily's life style. From the beginning of the marriage fric-
tion developed between her and George Luther's mother. Their
clashing personalities proved such an emotional drain for
Stearns that by 1345, he was building his palatial Medford
home on the south side of town in order to "look after his
mother without having his wife see too much of her." Mary
Preston Stearns was disturbed about more than a mother's
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influence over her son. She also disliked the long hours he
husband worked. Nor was she completely satisfied with th
kind of business George Luther conducted. By 1845, Stea
had pooled capital from his linseed oil business and financed
a venture in lead-pipe manufacture. To Mary's mind "the
lead-pipe manufacture" was "not a fine sounding profession."
She often criticized her husband for refusing to adopt a more
"stylish appearance." Socially ambitious, Mary was particu-
larly annoyed at what she considered her husband's failure
to "advance his own interests." Steams seems to have been
stung by such criticism. Unlike his wife, he had endured
economic hardships as a young man, knew the economic distance
he had traveled, and was proud of his efforts. He attempted
to blunt his wife's outbursts by defensively suggesting that
"considering all things" had had "done very well." People
trusted him because he had "no interests of my own to fur-
ther." But Mary was not to be deterred. She was determined
to achieve a name for her family in Massachusetts society or
27know the reason why not.
Whether because of Mary's incessant promptings to
"advance his interests" or because of his own personal desire
to continue "doing well," George Luther Stearns began to take
a more active role in Massachusetts politics after remarry-
ing. As early as 1840 he had voted for the Liberty Party and
it was even rumored that he had been read out of a cousin's
will because of his antislavery views. But up until 1848
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when he attended the Conscience Whig Convention in Worcester
and "gave liberally" to the campaign, he was a political
novice. In 1850, he continued these political efforts by
promoting Charles Sumner's candidacy for the United States
Senate. 28
Stearns' campaign activity was paralleled by a seemingly
compulsive philanthropy. in 1848, he gave large sums of
money to Irish famine relief funds and rescued his father-in-
law from bankruptcy- when he was duped out of his judgeship.
About the same time he was working for Sumner, Stearns loaned
money for rebuilding the homes of Medford shipbuilders and
mechanics which had been destroyed by fire. George Luther
and the ever-prodding Mary were also part of a group of prom-
inent Bostonians who hosted Louis Kossuth on his American
tour. Stearns purchased a number of Kossuth's ten-dollar
"freedom certificates" and raised a considerable sum in sub-
scription for the Hungarian leader's entourage of exiles.
Among this group was a young pianist named Zerahelyi. The
young man's career had been destroyed by shattered nerves
resulting from a six-month jail term he had served for being
a member of Kossuth's army. Mary was captivated his
"pathetic expression" and her empathy translated into her
husband's largesse. Several months after Kossuth left Boston
the young ex-pianist was still residing at the Stearns man-
sion in Medford. At Mary's prompting, George Luther also
raised a subscription for Kossuth's sister when she was
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deserted by her husband and left to care for three children.
In 1858, Stearns gave one of her sons, Casimir, a job in his
factory's counting room only to find a short while later that
the youth was stealing company funds. Such a discovery was
upsetting but of minor significance. For by 1858, Stearns
was too busy with another "philanthropic enterprise" which
consumed all of his attention. It was a venture he vaguely
referred to as "the wool business" and it was being promoted
by a failed businessman who captivated Mary Preston Stearns
every bit as much as the "pathetic" Zerahelyi. 29
Ironically, Steams' intensified social and political
activity, facilitated at least partially by his sense of
economic security, was followed in 1853 by a personal eco-
nomic disaster that nearly ruined him. During that year
Stearns tried to corner the New England lead market. The
attempt was ill-conceived, badly managed, and cost the
Medford businessman nearly all his capital. Desperate,
Stearns made a last-ditch effort to save himself by borrowing
from Peter Butler of Boston and Benjamin Collins of New York.
Luckily, both men had confidence in Stearns and were willing
to cover his debts. In the next three years, the would-be-
lead-pipe-magnate worked strenuously, regained his financial
30fortunes, and repaid his benefactors.
The trauma of economic misfortune, coupled with two
incidents which occurred during his struggle to regain a firm
financial footing, intensified Stearns' desire to continue
80
Philanthropic activity and focused that activity in the anti-
slavery movement. Shortly after the passage of the Fugitive
Slave Act in 1850, Stearns purchased a revolver and vowed
that "no fugitive would be taken from his premises." But up
until 1853, the Medford businessman took no part in the
resistance to the law. Then, in the fall of 1853, he was
asked to shelter the runaway slave, William. Talbot. For six
days Talbot was hidden in the basement of Stearns' Medford
mansion. When it was safe for the fugitive to leave, Stearns
paid for his journey to Montreal. Conversations with Talbot
deepened the manufacturer's awareness of the brutality of
slavery and began his movement into antislavery reform activ-
ity. 31
The incident that confirmed Stearns' intention to devote
himself to the antislavery cause was Charles Sumner's beating
by Preston Brooks. The Medford businessman reacted angrily
to news of the assault. He was sure it would "make a million
abolitionists" and vowed "to do what one man can and devote
my life and fortune to the cause." He did not take the vow
lightly. In two weeks he had joined the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee and by the end of June, 18 56, was directing the
32
committee's affairs.
Stearns came to the antislavery movement with some
definite theories about the nature and tactics of reform. He
fully understood the necessity of carefully cultivating
favorable popular opinion. Saddened by Sumner's beating, he
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was also well aware that it could "make a million abolition-
ists" if properly exploited. As a businessman his success
had depended upon the ability to market his wares effectively
and he correctly assumed the same held true for abolitionism.
Stearns was also convinced that the "idea of abolishing slav-
ery in America by moral suasion" was a "delusion." He hoped
the institution could be dismantled by political compromise
but was willing to experiment with other methods. He never
hesitated to use funds raised by the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee for purchasing arms when other means of ending
slavery seemed destined to fail. Stearns also had a keen
sense of the disillusion that often plagued reformers. No
reform "could be made with the unanimous consent of the com-
munity." Anyone "who stepped forward must be ready to meet
the fate of a reformer"—must be ready to be disappointed by
33the public.
The Medford businessman- turned-antislavery-activist fre-
quently discussed his theories with the man he replaced as
chairman of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, Samuel
Gridley Howe. The two men first met in 184 8 at the Con-
science Whig Convention. Later they worked together for
Sumner and cooperated with each other in Kossuth's behalf.
Stearns was deeply impressed by Howe's intense commitment to
Kossuth and his willingness to "cheerfully make any sacri-
fices" to aid the Hungarian leader. When Charles Sumner
asked Howe whether the famous Hungarian exile was demanding
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more money than "reasonable," Howe replied he was not at all
moved by any suggestion that Kossuth's desire to war for
Hungary's freedom would cost too much. If a cause was
"right," it could never cost too much. Howe agreed that wars
were "bad" but also suggested that "when the lower propensi-
ties are so active in a race they must occasionally be beaten
down by muskets." Stearns marvelled that Howe was never
disturbed by Kossuth's exaggerated claims. The physician
contended that Kossuth "like all enthusiasts" overdid his
claims and attempted "more than is possible to perform." But
Howe felt it was necessary to indulge such exaggeration.
Kossuth could "do much" for the cause of freedom and needed
"a chance to try a struggle." If collecting funds or endur-
ing overstatement was a way of "keeping" a great man like
Kossuth, Howe was all for it. 34
Howe and Stearns also shared a similar theory of educa-
tion, one which would have a profound effect on their future
antislavery activity. Early in his career, Howe had pushed
for the institutionalization of persons suffering from vari-
ous mental or physical handicaps. As the director of Perkins
School for the Blind he worked diligently to establish an
institution which would prove the validity of that theory.
His reputation in the Boston community owed much to the seem-
ing success of these efforts. By the late 1840 's, however,
the physician began to have doubts about the effectiveness of
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institutional rehabilitation. Experience had "lessened the
enthusiasm" he once felt about "such establishments." 35
Howe now began to believe that the "leading principle"
in treating those afflicted with a mental or physical handi-
cap should be " separation and not congregation ." He called
this his "theory of diffusion." It was based on the assump-
tion that while handicapped people did need special training
at places like Perkins School, prolonged exposure to simi-
larly handicapped persons could be detrimental to an individ-
ual' s growth and improvement. Isolation with similarly dis-
abled peers led to a deteriorating condition. Instead of
such practice, Howe now pushed for increased exposure to
"normal" persons. The blind, for example, should not stay
at Perkins all the time. They should "go among normal per-
sons, adjust to a normal world, and not develop a separate
class feeling." Howe favored boarding Perkins students out
in the community, using the school only for the purpose of
teaching compensatory educational skills. The ideal to
strive for was "normal existence among normal people." One
3 6
should learn by doing as other "normal" people did.
Stearns 1 work for the Medford Sunday School Association
led him to a somewhat similar conclusion. As secretary of
the association, he was concerned with the seeming failure of
religious instruction: it didn't seem to be making much of
an impact on the children. He and other members of the group
engaged in long debates over which form of instruction would
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best promote true "Christian living" by the youngsters. His
own conclusion was that religious instruction depended "too
much on teaching theology, Scripture, History, etc." if
Medford parents expected their children to learn what they
themselves had only "imperfectly mastered," then it was time
for Sunday-school teachers to start depending "more on them-
selves" and less on their "immediate preparation." A teacher
could only legitimately enforce the portions of christian
truth he had realized in his own life. Only then could he
speak from "soul to soul." Stearns was looking for those
people who applied the truths of Scripture to "everyday
life." The "proper christian teacher" had to be the "proper
Christian disciple." The teacher had to be someone who would
"enforce precept by example." The Medford businessman wanted
to conduct religious education on Sunday as Howe conducted
remedial education at Perkins. Stearns wanted to expose
children to "normal persons," to "living Christians." 37
In 1858, both Howe and Stearns would be asked to subsidize
the effort of a "living-Christian" who hoped to lead a group
of black men and women out of the oppressive and debilitating
institution of slavery. This "living-Christian" would prem-
ise his own work on the assumption that any "normal" person
had a right and duty to strike a violent blow for freedom
and that black insurrection was the first step in breaking
down "class feeling" and inculcating "normal" values.
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Besides sharing similar reform theories, Howe and
Stearns seem to have had a genuine affection for each other.
It was partially on the basis of their firm friendship that
Stearns had been willing to take over the reins of the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee when Howe's poor physical and
mental health prevented him from conducting the committee's
affairs. Howe claimed to be "fairly broken down" in attempt-
ing to "pull the laboring oar" of the organization. He was
tremendously relieved when Stearns offered to shoulder the
burden.
^
Howe was also beset by other problems that spring. He
frequently argued with Julia over family finances and her
desire for a literary career. He was shocked by Sumner's
beating and deeply disturbed by his good friend's failure to
properly respond to medical treatment. And, as always, the
tremendous tension of such problems made an impact on his
physical health and led him to entertain notions of impending
death. More important than all these problems, however, was
the fact that in the spring of 1856, Samuel Gridley Howe was
undergoing a crisis of character. Doubts, fears, and guilts
engulfed him. He wasn't sure of who he was or v/hat he was
doing. In a confidential letter to his close friend, Horace
Mann, Howe revealed the agony of this crisis. He claimed to
be a "mistake; an abortion." The character people attributed
to him was "a humbug." His reputation as a philanthropist
was undeserved, because he had nothing more than "average
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benevolence." The latter years of his life showed "a great
selfishness" and "loss of the adventuresome spirit." He
longed for a return to his youth when he had been governed
by principle and ignorant of "what course would have been
profitable." Howe was worried about his manhood, worried
about having no more than "ordinary courage." He admitted to
Mann that he was even afraid to board trolley cars. He was
forever worried about "getting into danger; though able to
appear decently cool." The doctor felt there was only one
way out of his agony; only one way to recover confidence in
himself. He needed one more chance to prove himself, one
more chance to recapture the happiness of early life when
"health, a good course and clean consicence" were all that
mattered. He was looking for an escape to a time when he was
"unconscious of any purpose . . . called selfish." He longed
for a simpler more certain existence— one that wasn't filled
with marital problems, financial concerns, and too many pro-
fessional responsibilities. The same society that caused the
"deeper disease" Higginson so loathed, had placed too many
exhorbitant demands on Sameul Gridley Howe. He longed for
the days of his imaginary past when he didn't care about what
39
he ate or what he wore or "whether anybody knew about me."
As his depression deepened in the summer of 1856, Howe
looked to Kansas for a reprieve. He believed a trip there
could help him recapture his lost confidence and purpose.
Howe hoped to use a Kansas reconnaisance mission for the
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committee to re-experience his "adventuresome spirit."
First-hand knowledge of the "great ground swell" of "freedom"
was just what he needed. After sending Julia and the family
to Newport, Howe started west in mid- July. He melodramatic-
ally viewed the experience as the "most dangerous" he had
undertaken but claimed he felt "bound to go." The "Kansas
mission" seemed "a duty, the last of my life that I should
ever be called to fulfill." Faced with the problem of alle-
viating a profound personal crisis, Howe (like Sanborn) pro-
ceeded to fuse his quest for relief with the claim of assist-
ing the freestate cause. In the name of seeing himself as
something more than a "mistake" and "an abortion," he made
Kansas into a fountain of youth, a fountain where he might
recapture the "unselfish" ways of the past and shed the con-
cerns of his urban, professional existence. Howe was con-
fused. He grasped for an ordering experience; something that
could return a sense of himself to himself. In the end, the
Fr£ 4 0trip only served to deepen his guilts and fears.
Incredibly, Howe never did enter Kansas. He never did
experience the happiness of a "good course." At Mount Tabor,
Iowa, he learned of the critical condition of the freestate
forces. Missouri border ruffians had driven into northern
Kansas and left only two ways to enter the territory. Howe
could go into Kansas with a body of armed settlers, or he
could go in alone on horseback. He claimed to have neither
time for the first nor energy for the second. But whatever
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his reasons, Howe's failure to enter Kansas only added to his
romantic view of the territory and those men and women who
were settling there. Howe imagined Kansas to be a reenact-
ment of the English Civil War. He saw "southerners" as "all
bad" and northerners as "good, God-fearing, temperate, and
honest." Like Sanborn, however, Howe resigned himself to
organizing the "God-fearing," instead of joining them. He
still had a deep-seated fear of personally engaging in phys-
ical violence. 41
The doctor spoke with as many settlers as he could,
telling them what their "friends in the East" expected. They
should maintain their "constitutional right to bear arms" and
never lay those arms down while they had "strength to bear
them." But Howe was a bit uncertain about just what settlers
should do with the arms they weren't supposed to lay down.
When they found themselves "opposed by U.S. troops," the
Boston physician suggested they "stand still and insist on a
Free State
,
still bearing arms." It was also important that
they preserve their image as law-abiding citizens, and he
suggested they "ought not oppose the civil process in the
uncertainty and disunion of counsel." If they did resist
"the civil process," he was sure "mischief" would arise.
Then, whether they were beaten or victorious they would
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"stand wrong before the country.
"
Howe was most upset with the actions of one of Kansas'
foremost military leaders, James Lane, a lean and sinewy man
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Lon
of careless dress, and raspy voice. Lane was a combinati<
of "principle and opportunism" who had come to Kansas looking
for the "main chance." He had organized a freestate militia
and cooperated with Iowans in establishing the Lane Trail
through which settlers could move into Kansas and circumvent
the Missouri blockade. Howe wasn't impressed by these cre-
dentials and felt the man was guilty of "extreme indiscretion"
when he visited Mount Tabor. Lane failed to remain "incog-
nito," and, thus, gave federal marshals in the area the idea
that the emigrant train leaving Tabor was a filibustering
expedition—not a body of legitimate settlers. Howe made
Lane's departure from camp a condition for granting committee
4 3funds and supplies.
Soon after that departure in early August, Howe began
his trip back to Boston. Once home, he found that word of
his visit to Kansas had spread quickly. During late August
and early September he was deluged with requests for funds by
groups heading west. The fact that he had been able to open
a channel of communication between the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee and freestate settlers consoled him. He was also
pleased at having been able to "hamstring the adventuresome
Lane." Generally, however, his "mission," his quest to
recapture his own "adventuresome spirit" had "not turned out
the way proposed." The doctor realized he had given in to
his "fear of danger" by not going into Kansas and in the pro-
cess forfeited any chance to regain the happiness of
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dedication to a "good cause." it simply wasn't enough to do
organizational work for freestate settlers. He was still
ill, still filled with nagging doubts about his own character,
still feeling like an "abortion." The trip merely exascer-
bated Howe's self
-recrimination
. It again forced him to face
the discrepancy between his theori zations about heroic, self-
less behavior and the reality of his own practical capabili-
ties. He could advise people to maintain their constitu-
tional right to bear arms but couldn't quite bring himself to
pick up a gun. He was lost, confused, and still looking for
something "dangerous" to which he could commit himself. Nor
had the trip done anything to alleviate the difficulties
between himself and Julia. They continued to argue about
family finances and her career. Howe's relationship with
Sumner was actually strained further by his travel out west.
One of the reasons Howe had not journeyed to Washington to
visit Sumner after his beating was because of the pending
Kansas trip. When he returned to Boston, Howe feebly
attempted to defend his behavior and tried to excuse his
failure to stay by a friend's side in time of need. He wrote
Sumner saying "I now learn my presence might have been pleas-
ant and useful to you. I cannot reproach myself, for when I
would have gone I could not and when I could, it did not seem
to us here that it was well for you to have any visitors."
But Howe did reproach himself. He continued to look for a
"good course," continued to look for something beyond his
normal philanthropic interests. In four months, he would
find that "course" in the form of a Kossuth-like hero named
44Brown.
II
In October, 1855, just before major hostilities had
developed between freestate and proslavery forces in Kansas
and just seven months after the state of Massachusetts had
finally dropped prosecution in the Burns case, Thomas
Wentworth Higginson decided to take a vacation. His reform
activities, lectures, and Burns activities had exhausted him.
The Worcester Free Church also became a burden. The congre-
gation had flourished under his tutelage but as a result
demanded much of his time and energy. Another thing that put
stress on Higginson was his wife's poor physical condition.
Mary Channing Higginson had always been subject to chronic
ill-health. Then, in January of 1853 she suffered from an
attack of "violent rheumatisim. " Whether this illness was a
severe form of arthritis or even an early symptom of muscular
dis trophy is unclear, but throughout that spring she could
hardly walk. Though Higginson was upset he did not restrict
his reform activities. Indeed, he sought relief by avoiding
the issue of his wife's health and spending long periods of
time on the lecture circuit. Their relationship became quite
strained. Mary needed more and more attention but showed
none of the "reverance" for her husband that he admittedly
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craved. Added to this was Mary's "undisguised repugnance for
children and her husband's solicitousness . " Finally, by
October of 1855, Higginson, in obvious discomfort about his
marital situation and exhausted by the reform work that had
helped him escape it, planned a trip to the semi-tropical
island of Fayal in the Azores. After requesting David Wasson
(a friend of George Luther Stearns) to take over the respon-
sibilities of the Free Church, Higginson and his wife set
sail from Boston harbor at the end of the month. 45
A warm climate and relaxed daily routine refreshed the
Massachusetts couple considerably. By the spring of 1856,
Higginson became impatient to return to his reform work.
Before the Burns episode he claimed to be "just waking up to
Kansas - Nebraska" and ready to preach a sermon on it. Now
as news trickled into the isolated island about the increased
hostilities raging in Kansas, the Worcester activist wanted
to do more than preach a sermon. 4 ^
Immediately upon his return from Fayal in June,
Higginson began efforts in Worcester to organize and supply
people who wanted to settle Kansas as a free state. These
efforts earned him an agency with the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee. Then, when a group of forty-seven Worcester men
led by Calvin Cutter rejected instructions to enter Kansas by
the land route through Iowa and were "summarily disarmed" by
a few Missourians, Higginson was asked to investigate the
incident. He jumped at the chance and headed west in early
July. After all, Higginson felt he was living in a "great
historic period" and he was sure "the future" would "leave no
true man unhonored." As he traveled west, Higginson hoped
people would begin to understand the "eminent need" to sup-
port freestate settlers and indulged himself by exaggerating
his own efforts. To that end, he was convinced that if he
hadn't begun organizing the aid movement in Massachusetts
"nothing would have been done." The Worcester activist still
found it necessary to be first among equals. 47
In September, 1856, he had a second chance to experience
first-hand, the conditions in Kansas. He contracted to write
a series of articles for the New York Tribune but traveled
west fearing his mission would not be a very "manlike one."
Unlike Howe, Higginson had "only a sense of general danger"
about entering Kansas and wasn't really certain it would be
enough of a test of his "manlike virtue." When he reached
Chicago, Higginson was further disheartened to find that his
itinerary called for him to be "employed more out of Kansas
than in Kansas." Higginson felt little consolation in the
fact that people he met in the city who had been out west
were "very glad" to see him and to know he was promoting the
freestate cause.
Like Howe, Higginson was immensely impressed with those
men and women who were settling Kansas. Indeed, they were
larger than life. They were romantic figures of heroic pro-
portions. Ever since the rendition of Burns, Higginson
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claimed that he had been "looking for men." He "found them
in Kansas." They proved the "virtue of courage" had "not
died out in the Anglo-American race." Like Howe and Stearns
who understood and theorized about the influence of environ-
ment, Higginson began to realize that all the Anglo-American
man needed to prove his manliness was the proper "circum-
stances." One day in Kansas made the "American Revolution
more intelligible." If one could change "circumstances," one
could change character—black or white. If men would fight
for the right they could recapture character. 49
Higginson vehemently disagreed with Howe's view of James
Lane, probably because the frees tate leader went out of his
way to patronize the minister. Lane appointed Higginson
brigadier general of Kansas freestate forces "because of his
past courage and ability," and even arranged for Higginson to
join a group of twenty settlers who were traveling to Topeka.
The journey wasn't all that Higginson expected. Some danger
did exist but the trip proved to be "discouragingly safe."
He claimed the group began "to fear marching in without a
decent excuse for firing at anything or anybody." He was
intrigued with the "wild manly looking riders around him,
"
and a bit disillusioned by the "dirty" life he was leading.
"Death" for freedom was "all very fine" but when it came to
"dirt for freedom" the sacrifice became "unexpectadly hard."
Higginson didn't know how to romanticize dirt. 50
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One of the members of the group Higginson traveled with
was James Repath, a frenetic young journalist-adventurer who
was also covering the Kansas struggle for Greely's Tribune.
Higginson and Repath got along very well. They shared simi-
lar views on the moral evil of slavery, the necessity of arm-
ing freestate settlers, Lane's staunch defense of freedom,
and the right to use violent means to preserve freedom.
Repath had been in Kansas a number of months and stimulated
Higginson' s curiousity about the place with a detailed exam-
ination of the politics and leadership of the freestate cause.
He seemed to know all about men like Lane, Charles Robinson,
and the mysterious John Brown who was quickly becoming a
minor legend in the territory. Higginson was also impressed
with Repath *s exceptional boldness. When both men were
arrested and interrogated by John Geary, the newly appointed
territorial governor, about the intentions of the settlers
they were riding with, Repath refused to be cowed and,
instead, lashed out at Geary for attempting to conquer "the
Free State cause by arresting Free State leaders."
Higginson himself fully believed Geary intended to maintain
peace in Kansas "at the price of obedience to a false legis-
lature." 51
Soon after his arrest and interrogation, Higginson was
released and started back to Worcester. He was certain the
brief pause in hostilities that settled upon Kansas after
Geary's arrival was "only the prelude to a severer struggle."
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Both sides made preparations for renewed fighting and neither
desired peace. Such a state of affairs further convinced
Higginson of the correctness of his theories about the
effects of war on men. "War" he claimed "always educates men
to itself, disciplines them, teaches them to bear its fatigue,
anxiety and danger and actually enjoy them." War made men.
Just as his own attack on the Court House had crystalized his
own commitment to "practical abolition"; just as it had dis-
pelled his own personal confusion about life goals and the
means to achieve them, so too would violent confrontation
discipline the men of Kansas. It would strip away their
uncertainties about the immorality of slavery. it would cure
the "deeper disease" inflicted on men by American society.
Righteous violence purified men. It returned them to manli-
ness and Anglo-American virtue. Yes, war made men and men
never stopped fighting until they achieved their goals.
Since Kansas was not yet free, Higginson knew hostilities
must continue.
Upon his return to Worcester the minister confessed that
he really enjoyed himself while in the territory. In spite
of the near state of seige that existed there (perhaps
because of it) Higginson claimed that things and people were
"very real there." What was that reality? To Higginson, it
was like "waking up some morning and stepping out on the
Battle of Bunker Hill." Kansas was the reincarnation of
eighteenth century revolutionary America. It was a place of
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morality, courage, and freedom- loving simplicity. it was
tradition and idealism freed from a "mainchance mentality."
It was a place where discipline had replaced the chaotic
uncertainty of his own society. Kansas was a place where
people were dedicated to fighting for freedom and need not
concern themselves with the anxiety of selecting a proper
career. The people of Kansas weren't only fighting to pre-
vent the imposition of slavery. They were also rejecting a
mentality—a mentality that not only enslaved four million
black men and women but also destroyed the "virtue" and "man-
liness" of revolutionary America.
Kansas was more than a battleground of freedom for
Higginson and Howe. It was a refuge, a vacuum apart from their
own society, and, at the same time a model for their society. In
that imaginary vacuum Higginson fared better than his Kansas
committee colleague, Samuel Gridley Howe. While out on the
plains of Kansas , Higginson experienced a tremendous sense of
uplift. He enjoyed "sitting in a hotel and hearing men talk
about me
. . . while I know I have incurred the penality of
death for treason under the U.S. Laws and for arming fugitives
to Kansas." Yes, these men and women who were settling Kansas
were indeed "fugitives." They were men and women seeking
release from a "diseased" society. Once home, Higginson
despaired of ever having left Kansas and its "fugitives."
When he finally discharged his revolvers and put them away in
his trunk there occurred "a curious reaction from the feeling
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with which I first loaded it e nu a .
. .
. lt fully came hQme tQ ^
that all the tonic of life was ended and thence forward if
any danger impended the proper thing would be to look meekly
about for a policemen, it seems as if all the vigor had sud-
denly gone out of me and a despicable effeminancy had set
in." Kansas illicited a rugged individualist
"vigor," while
Worcester could only summon "despicable effeminacy." 53
Higginson soon met a person who symbolized the "vigor"
of Kansas. He was one who believed that white America could
recapture the values of revolutionary days only when it saw
the black man as man, one who embodied all the values
Higginson longed to have restored to American society. iro-
nically, Higginson failed to realize that the values he rev-
erenced were the same values that drove the expansionism and
development of the so-called "diseased" society he despised.
99
CHAPTER III
Frank Sanborn prefaced his autobiography with the creed
he believed had governed his life's work. He set himself
against the "mainchance
" psychology of the nineteenth century
by claiming never to have yearned for "great wealth" nor
sought "leadership or high place in the world." Sanborn
maintained that whatever leadership he had acquired owed to
"character and not ambition." He was always filled with
"contentment in station" though firmly resolved not to be
"domineered over by others, either individuals or classes."
But Sanborn's activities as secretary of the Massachusetts
Kansas Committee belie such assertions; they indicate he
vainly sought for recognition among the intellectuals and
reformers of Boston society. Indeed, Frank Sanborn was a
very ambitious administrator who continually tried to widen
the scope of his authority and leadership. Like Stearns, he
was displeased with the haphazard organization of Kansas aid
efforts and tried to remedy the situation. He changed the
committee's voucher system, demanded that many accounts be
"explained," asked for careful itemization of all expenses,
and constantly prodded agents to fulfill their obligations
in these fiscal matters.''"
During his tenure as secretary of the Middlesex County
Committee, Sanborn learned that the amount of responsibility
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he acquired rose in direct proportion to the time he put into
his committee work: to gain power in the bureaucracy one had
to become an indispensable bureaucrat. And, as secretary of
the Massachusetts Kansas Committee this was his first rule of
operation. Within a few weeks after joining the committee
his exertions earned him recognition and respect from fellow
-committee members, As a result, his opinions were more fre-
quently solicited and receptively considered. This, in turn,
lead to Sanborn's increased self-confidence and assertive-
ness. In late December, he composed an article for the
Middlesex Journal and boldly requested the Massachusetts Leg-
islature to appropriate 50,000 to 100,000 dollars for "relief
of our brethren" in Kansas. The state should place the sum
"in the hands of a committee of good men" who would spend it
only with "reliable information" about Kansas needs. A
large appropriation would "encourage emigration, promote
investment of capital," and prevent a proslavery takeover in
2the territory.
More than anything else, though, Sanborn's importance to
the aid movement and to Massachusetts abolitionism was estab-
lished by his three year relationship with the gray-haired,
steely-eyed, fifty-six year old Kansas freedom fighter who,
shortly after New Year's Day in 1857, walked into the com-
ttee offices on Bromfield Street in Boston. John Brown
lmly introduced himself tc Sanborn and then presented the
young committeeman with reference letters from New York
mi
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philanthropist, Gerrit Smith, Kansas freestate leader,
Charles Robinson, and abolitionist politician, Salmon Chase.
In measured and controlled tones, Brown told the secretary
that he had recently returned from the territory after spend-
ing fifteen months fighting for the freestate cause. During
that period he and his sons had skirmished with proslavery
settlers in the so-called "Wakarussa War," played a major
role in defeating Henry Clay Pate and his Missouri border
ruffians at the Battle of Black Jack, and fought along side
James Lane at Ossawatomie. Brown also remarked that his
experiences had confirmed his belief in both the moral evil
of slavery and the injunctions of retributive justice found
in the Old Testament. Force was the only language proslavery
men understood.
Brown came to Boston physically and mentally exhausted.
He was out of money and harried by his family's desperate
financial state— they were scraping a living out of a small,
soil-poor farm in North Elba, New York. He was looking for
supplies to continue his freestate efforts and, most impor-
tant, gently testing Massachusetts abolitionist attitudes on
the use of violent means to overthrow the institution of
slavery. He told Sanborn that Gerrit Smith believed his
chances of getting materials from the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee were "middling good." Brown also informed Sanborn
that just before coming to Boston he stopped at Springfield,
Massachusetts, where he had spoken to George Walker, Ariana's
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brother. Walker suggested Brown go straight to Sanborn for
any information about obtaining frees tate supplies. 3
As Brown spoke, Sanborn carefully read the letters of
introduction and was quite satisfied. Actually the young
secretary didn't need testimony about Brown's heroism. He
had been reading about the Kansas warrior's exploits for over
a year. Abolitionist newspapers were filled with articles
heralding the actions of this Bible-quoting freedom fighter.
While in Kansas, Sanborn himself listened to the settlers'
speculations about the self-sacrificing colonist. Such sto-
ries about Brown reaffirmed Sanborn's own notions of the
singularly courageous spirit of Kansas emigrants. When he
finished reading the letters, Sanborn was immediately struck
by the recollection of a note he had recently written to
Thomas Wentworth Higginson. In it, Sanborn replied to
Higginson's call for the formation of an independent northern
_mili.tia to assist Kansas freestaters. The committee secre-
tary assured Higginson that Kansas fighting and James
Buchanan's election that fall had convinced him of the need
to do "something different." Submission to the Slave Power
for another four years was "out of the question." Sanborn
fully supported the idea of an independent militia. But up
until his meeting with Brown, Sanborn was unsure what "some-
thing different" was, in spite of his advocacy of that mili-
tia. Nov/, as the intense, imposing, freedom fighter stood in
front of him waiting for a response, the young secretary's
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instinct told him that John Brown was that "something differ-
ent" in a manly form. 4
As soon as the two men began discussing Kansas, Sanborn
knew his instincts were correct. Brown was a man who
impressed you with his "seriousness of mood." Often empha-
sizing his ideas with Biblical quotations, one also sensed
his unwavering Calvinism. Brown seemed hardened by his expe-
riences in the "wild regions" of Kansas and the young aboli-
tionist admired the qualities of leadership these experiences
seemed to illicit. Brown knew what needed to be done to stop
slavery in Kansas and he knew how to do it. He was a man
used to "directing other men" and not being "guided or
trained by them." Sanborn, whose desire for his own family
had been tragically disrupted by Ariana's death also per-
ceived Brown's tremendous reverence for family. Brown spoke
sorrowfully about his son Frederick's death in Kansas, his
other sons' imprisonment, and the hardship Mary had to endure
because her men were off fighting for freedom. It was obvi-
ous to Sanborn that with such an acute sense of family, Brown
thoroughly understood the debilitating effects of slavery.
In fact, after listening to Brown during this first discus-
sion, Sanborn claimed he was certain "History" would give the
man a "proud place on her pages" and "posterity would pay
homage to his heroism." Ironically, in the future, Sanborn
made a career out of seeing to it that "history" performed
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the task. In later years, promoting Brown's image and legend
would also be "something to do." 5
For the next few days Brown and his young admirer dis-
cussed the Kansas struggle. Scrupulously avoiding any men-
tion of his role in the Potawatomie Massacre, the warrior
outlined his plans for defense of the freestate cause. He
spoke of organizing "every able bodied free-state man" into
military companies and gathering the necessary materials to
supply these cadres. A cooperative effort could "inspire
.
. .
confidence and courage" in men who would ordinarily be
only "dead weight" on the hands of those who possessed "more
fortitude and presence of mind. " The leaders of these compa-
nies had to be men of "impeachable moral character
. . .
ardent devotion to . . . liberty, gentlemenly
. . . demeanor,
great practical industry and energy of character." Brown
hardly needed to press such views on a young man whose ambi-
tion and industry had earned him a place with the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee and who believed it was "char-
acter" that made for distinguished leadership. Sanborn also
heartily agreed with Brown's Higginson-like notions about the
beneficial effects that military discipline had on weak men.
Sanborn was overwhelmed by Brown's unselfishness, dedi-
cation, and organizational sense. All the man wanted was
enough money to arm settlers and "the means for defraying"
his "ordinary expenses." The request seemed quite reasonable
to one who had advocated a huge legislative grant for Kansas
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and its defenders. In addition, the young secretary was
impressed with Brown's desire for a regularized payment
schedule and a "fair and full account" of all expenditures.
Brown's attitudes toward the necessity of proper fiscal
organization were precisely in line with what the efficiency-
minded secretary had tried to implement as basic committee
procedure. Like so many of Brown's past business associates,
Sanborn was led to believe that the Kansas warrior understood
the value of "system and perpetual order" in any financial
aid program. Sanborn wrote to Higginson, explained that
Brown needed 30,000 dollars, and asked the Worcester activist
to come and meet the man. The secretary also sent notes to
Garrison, Howe, Phillips, and other well-known Boston aboli-
tionists suggesting they meet Brown on January 5 at an infor-
mal reception to be held in Theodore Parker's home. 7
For his part, John Brown was equally impressed with
Frank Sanborn. Sanborn was not only enthusiastic and orga-
nized, but was also in an ideal position to help Brown make
vital financial connections. The young committeeman really
understood the economic elements involved in resisting Slave
Power encroachments. Sanborn also understood that men had
to be willing to make antislavery activity their "business
and study. " While Sanborn had very limited knowledge of what
slavery was like, he was angered by the institution's debili-
tating effects, seemed ready to fight for a state appropria-
tion to assist Kansas, and was more than willing to commit
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Kansas Committee funds to Brown's use. Besides, afte
lifetime of experiences trying to get men to invest in his
own ill-fated economic ventures, Brown quickly recognized
young Sanborn's ambition and strong desire to succeed in his
work. This intensity, when joined with the young man's obvi-
ous inexperience and deferential attitude toward anyone will-
ing to actually fight for freedom, made him more easily man-
ageable than other committee members might be. In the ensu-
ing weeks and months, Brown tried to exploit that manageabil-
ity. Like Ariana Walker, he realized that in spite of
Sanborn's perfunctory protestations about the need for inde-
pendence, the young man was quite ready to be led. And, as
Sanborn himself had suggested, Brown was "used to leading."
John Brown looked forward to the meeting scheduled for
Parker's home. While living in Springfield some years ear-
lier, he had often traveled to the Music Hall to hear the
fiery abolitionist minister. Though Brown disagreed with
Parker's Unitarian theology, he claimed to be "wonderfully
taken up" with the minister's "discourse." And Brown's
appreciation for Parker's violent rhetorical flourishes
against slavery "constantly increased." The difference
between Brown's Old Testament Calvinism and Parker's Unitar-
ianism was partially reflected in the controlled but heated
debate which erupted between Garrison and the Kansas warrior
during the meeting. Garrison's dry rationalistic doctrines,
New Testament pacifism, and hopes of ending slavery by moral
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suasion were anathema to Brown who based his religious con-
victions on the Old Testament. Brown literally interpreted
the Bible's many injunctions and believed there was a wrath-
ful God in Heaven who took an active part in human affairs
through Divine Providence. Some men were even called to be
God's instruments on earth and to mete out the severe and
sometimes violent punishment of sinners. 8
Parker listened attentively to this religious debate.
Of course he was doctrinally sympathetic with Garrison, yet,
his brand of Unitarianism sought to incorporate the emotion
Brown conveyed. Throughout his ministry, Parker hoped to
demonstrate rational Unitarianism with intuitive and emo-
tional proofs. Intellectually he agreed with Garrison but
his sentiment lay with Brown. Religion existed long before
the Bible, Christ, or Christianity. The natural laws of
religion had existed from creation. They were infinite and
self-evident. The Bible merely reflected such laws. Still,
Parker knew that to believe in laws one had to know them in
more than a cold intellectual way— they also had to be felt.
The Emerson-Norton debate of the late 1830's had left this
9
matter clear for him.
But regardless of religious differences or similarities,
Parker liked Brown- The warrior believed slavery to be a
crime against, humanity and understood the necessity of meet-
ing force with force. While Brown was careful not to press
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his views on violence, Parker was glad he accepted its
necessity.
^
Parker noticed many of the same qualities in Brown that
Sanborn had. Brown was a good family man, seemed to be very
careful about his physical appearance, and spoke in measured
tones. Undoubtedly, Brown's talk of the value of family
inspired the minister. He and Lydia had never been able to
have children and both revered those people who understood
their worth. Like Sanborn, Parker recognized Brown's disci-
pline and self-control as he presented his case for the for-
mation of military cadres in Kansas.
More than any of these considerations, however, was the
kinship of class which Parker felt for Brown. Unlike Brown,
Parker had had the advantage of a Harvard education, was
financially secure, and had earned an outstanding reputation
throughout New England. But the minister still felt an
affinity of origins with Brown. Like Brown, Parker was well-
born but poor; he was decended from a distinguished ancestry
but had no funds to pay his way. As the minister looked at
Brown and sensed his bone-weary exhaustion, he knew it was a
product of more than the man's sacrifices in Kansas. Parker
was reminded of his own exhaustion after hours and hours of
reading scholarly tracts and discourses. It was an exhaus-
tion acquired in the name of selfless learning but Parker
never forgot that his place in society also depended on such
efforts. Brown's exhaustion also seemed to be born of the
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struggle for survival in nineteenth century America. Parker
was flooded with memories of poor youths who were trampled by
the exclusionary class system they encountered while attend-
ing Harvard. Like these young men, Brown had to sacrifice
"pleasure, comfort ... eye sight and health" to achieve his
goals. Without the proper cultural background these youths
were forced to learn "ail by . . . soul." They, like Brown,
needed "iron" bodies as well as "iron" intellects in order to
overcome their backgrounds. They needed stamina or they
would "die in that experiment of the Cross." And like these
well-born poor boys at Harvard, Brown had "attained a supe-
rior culture" at the expense of a crippled body. In a sense,
Parker was familiar with Brown before he even entered his
home. Both men had struggled with the handicaps of similar
origins. One man had "succeeded;" the other had "failed"
until entering Kansas one year earlier. 11
Three days after the meeting at Parker's, Brown met with
Sanborn, Stearns and Howe. He had just returned from a visit
with wealthy industrialist Amos A. Lawrence who was serving
as director of the New England Emigrant Aid Society. When
Howe heard this he was prompted to share some remarks he had
recently made to Lawrence with the warrior. Howe wanted the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee to suspend operations. In
its place the doctor suggested the state of Massachusetts
should "come out and take the high ground" by making an
appropriation for Kansas. The legislature should "break
110
through
... the miserable trammels of statecraft" and do
"what we would have a brave and generous man do in his own
capacity." Such an appropriation would stimulate "fear" in
slaveholders. Howe was still ambivalent about the use of
force and did not specifically advocate direct attacks on
slaveholders but he did believe that if the slaveholders'
"fear" could be increased they would be brought to "terror."
Kansas must be kept free from the "curse of slavery." slav-
ery had always "beaten freedom" and it was about time anti-
slavery men acted as if "sons of our mothers and children of
our wives were among the four million bondmen." Brown com-
pletely agreed and could scarcely contain his excitement. If
Howe seriously believed what he said about "terror," Brown
knew how to induce it. In a year, he would ask Howe's assis-
tance to implement a scheme for "practical abolition." 12
For all Howe's talk of legislative action, by early
1857, he was deeply disenchanted with politics. No doubt he
lectured Brown about his belief that the Republican Party
was "falling far short of its high mission." Men solely con-
cerned with the acquisition of political office ran the
party. They were "disreputable" and used "disgraceful" meth-
ods to get elected. Even Henry Wilson wasn't above trading
in politics. He had become the supreme political opportunist,
talking with his mouth and "not his eyes." He was "without
. . . the heroic element." Howe wondered why men of charac-
13
ter were constantly being displaced in party ranks.
Brown fully agreed with Howe's observations. He could
cite numerous examples of political ineptitude hindering the
freestate cause. The Kansas warrior acknowledged the need
for a state appropriation but was not optimistic that it
would be approved. As Howe listened to Brown's response and
watched him discuss Kansas affairs, he was impressed with the
man's "capacity." Indeed, Brown "spoke with his eyes" and
possessed "the heroic element." Howe saw Brown as the pro-
duct of a frontier life that could bury talents, sacrifice
taste, and throw away human accomplishment but, at the same
time, could illicit by its "courseness and hardness" all that
was noble and righteous in the human spirit. Occasionally
Brown's version of his role in the Kansas struggle seemed
overstated and aroused Howe's skepticism. But in the end,
Howe considered such exaggerations as insignificant. After
all, as the doctor himself suggested some time before:
"Enthusiasts were prone to exaggerate what they had or could
accomplish." The important thing to remember was that a
great leader could be "used" and therefore should be
•'kept." 14
Howe saw a number of reasons why this potential leader
of the Kansas freestate cause should be "kept." During the
debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, he called upon Sumner
to "send a blast through the land." There was a need to
"seize an opportunity" while public sentiment wasn't yet
formed. Now in the wake of Buchanan's election and continued
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Kansas fighting, public sentiment was again ready for shap-
ing. Howe clearly understood there was a need for a "steam
prophet to awaken mankind." And Brown seemed like just such
a prophet. With his penchant for quoting the Bible and his
erect, puritanical disposition, he might be just the man to
"awaken" a slumbering North. Then too, the prospects of
Kansas being lost to slavery looked very real to Howe in the
first weeks of January 1857 and he was "willing to aid anyone
who would fight for freedom." 15
Perhaps the most intimate personal reason for the physi-
cian's support of Brown lay in the sad conclusion he brought
home from his Kansas trip. Howe realized he was no longer
able to actively fight for freedom. The best he could hope
to do was to participate in the struggle by organizing and
subsidizing someone else's efforts. Soon after the meeting
adjourned, Howe wrote to Lawrence asking him to push hard for
the state appropriation. 1 ^
Throughout the entire meeting, George Luther Stearns
remained silent, carefully watching and listening to the
interaction between Sanborn, Howe, and Brown. He saw how
impressed his tv/o colleagues were with the man but also knew
that as chairman of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee he
bore the ultimate responsibility for dispensing funds. It
was absolutely necessary that he determine for himself the
reliability of the men dealing with the committee. Stearns
had to be certain his confidence was not misplaced. Having
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been raised by a staunch Calvinist who had rejected "optimis-
tic theories" of religion he was quite familiar with the
tenor of Brown's religious convictions. What interested him
even more, however, was whether or not Brown understood the
demands of careful organization. Could he make a business-
like analysis of his material needs? Did he understand that
waste and inefficiency jeopardized the whole aid movement?
By the end of the meeting Stearns had his answer. He
was sure Brown was thoroughly convinced of the need for
proper management, regularized payment schedules, and "full
and fair" accounting of funds. Stearns felt Brown could be
trusted and suggested the freedom fighter take possession of
200 Sharpe* s rifles recently purchased with committee funds
and turned over to the National Kansas Committee. On the
following day (January 9) Stearns led the committee in voting
Brown 500 dollars for "necessary expenses." Brown was also
made a committee agent. At the end of this second meeting,
Stearns invited Brown to dinner at his Medford home. Two
days later on January 11, John Brown rode out to the Stearns
17
mansion.
Stearns hoped the informal dinner would allow him to
test the validity of his favorable first impressions, obtain
more information about other "prominent Kansas men," and help
convince Mary that in his own way he did look out for the
interests of his family. Indeed, Mary Stearns was pleased
that her husband had invited the celebrated Kansas freedom
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fighter to their home. By the end of the evening she sat
enthralled as Brown entertained her young sons with a
description of the Battle of Black Jack. She was so con-
vinced of the righteousness of Brown's conduct that she
proved to be one of the Kansas warrior's closest allies in
Boston. For his part, Stearns continued in his favorable
assessment of Brown's character. The Medford businessman was
particularly impressed by Brown's "very clear ideas in regard
to Lane, Robinson and others." Stearns now felt much better
about the men who would take possession of funds and supplies
sent to Kansas by the committee. Though Brown probably
didn't discuss his numerous business ventures with the
Stearns, it is unquestionable that the committee chairman
sensed his guest's experience in the business world. Only a
man who understood the importance of dealing with trustworthy
and competent associates could have constructed such an
insightful analysis of the personalities directing freestate
affairs. John Brown spoke like a true professional. 18
Quite as important to Stearns, as Brown's analysis of
Kansas leaders, was his painful understanding of what Kansas
work did to family life. Stearns was particularly sensitive
on this point. He spent long hours away from home because of
his Kansas efforts and his absence had become a further
source of friction with Mary. But here was a man of heroic
stature advocating the necessity of family sacrifices for the
cause of freedom in Kansas. Brown's theories made a deep
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impression on Mary and George Luther. He convinced Mary that
she should be more tolerant of the demands on her husband's
time. Brown also stimulated Stearns' feeling that his boys
were being over-indulged and spoiled. After listening to
Brown's rather romantic assessment of how Kansas had
strengthened his own sons' manhood, Stearns was con-
vinced that his boys, Frank and Henry, "should be sent away
from home for a year or two to prevent them from becoming
soft and effeminate." 19
The most touching moment of Brown's visit came just
before he left. Young Henry Stearns boldly stepped up to
Brown and offered his savings for Kansas. Brown took the
contribution. Then, when Henry asked him to write and tell
"what sort of a boy you were," he promised to send a brief
Of)
autobiographical letter.
Brown left the Stearns home confident the chairman would
"hold up his hands" with committee funds. He also believed
the wealthy businessman might be willing to personally sub-
sidize his future abolitionist activity. The Stearns visit
had been rewarding and in pleasant contrast to the meeting he
had with Thomas Wentworth Higginson two days earlier.
Higginson arrived in Boston on January 9, just after the com-
mittee had voted funds to Brown. Sanborn had requested the
appearance, feeling that if Higginson had confidence in Brown
he might serve as a conduit to the substantial sums of money
reputedly held by the Worcester County Kansas Committee.
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Sanborn had good reason to believe Higginson and Brown would
take to each other. Only a few months earlier at a West
Indian Emancipation Day speech, Higginson had hailed "the
glory intrinsic to the white man fighting with arms to end
slavery." And Brown was certainly willing to fight.
Higginson had also suggested that in a war against slavery
"the northern white man's present selfishness and money grub-
bing would be replaced by disinterestedness and self-
devotion." Brown seemed the perfect example of those quali-
ties. To Sanborn, Brown's disposition and personality per-
fectly reflected Higginson' s contention that the "most
favored race" found its "highest priviledge" in aiding the
"weakest," "most ignorant race." 21
But while Higginson did hold notions which suggested
that he would be immediately interested in aiding Brown, a
number of conditions unknown to Sanborn prevented the
Worcester activist from committing himself to the warrior.
In November, 1856, Higginson recommended to Gerrit Smith that
an "independent militia" be raised to fight in Kansas. How-
ever, Sanborn did not know that Higginson had already rejec-
ted a plan to organize such a militia group while touring
Kansas. Higginson had not been confident of the group's
leadership. And, as the Worcester activist would suggest in
the near future, those who knew him best realized that under
22
"apparent rashness, I have a great deal of caution."
There were other reasons for Higginson's coolness toward
Brown. While in Kansas, Higginson had spent much time with
the roving journalist James Repath. It is quite possible the
two men discussed Brown. If Repath even hinted of Brown's
role at Pottawatomie, Higginson might have been wary of
future "rash acts" by the Kansas warrior. Then too, Sanborn
had exaggerated Higginson's access to Worcester County funds.
In fact, Higginson was under pressure not to request any more
funds until accusations of Calvin Cutter had been cleared up.
Cutter blamed the Worcester committee for loosely handling
contributions. Hoping to account for funds the committee
dispersed, Higginson wrote Martin Stowell in Kansas asking
him to itemize expenditures of some 2000 dollars sent from
Worcester. When Higginson received an accounting in the late
fall of 1856, he found Stowell had lost 100 dollars because
he accepted a personal check from John Brown which was even-
tually returned "uncashed because of a closed account."
Higginson wasn't about to make further grants to an individ-
23
ual who regarded his financial obligations so casually.
Higginson was also held back from support of Brown by
his deep involvement in the disunion movement. After he left
Kansas in the fall of 1856, Higginson seriously believed that
if the cause of freedom were crushed there, the United States
would separate into "two nations of North and South." The
Constitution would not hold them together and the drama of
"Union and Disunion" would come closer every day. Higginson
118
resumed his ministerial duties fully convinced of an "impend-
ing crisis." in fact, he wanted to do all in his power to
promote it. By late December, there was no doubt in his mind
that freemen and slaveholders were living in "two nations." 24
Early in January he began sending out letters requesting
attendance at the Worcester Disunion Convention. In the
midst of the effort, Sanborn called him to Boston. The time
was inopportune. Higginson had too much of himself invested
in the convention. Disunion was the country's "destiny and
duty," its "only hope." He would not be distracted. As with
the Burns rescue attempt and the Kansas trips, Higginson felt
good to know he was in the forefront of a cause. From his
early days in divinity school he had always wanted to be a
"leader of men." Symbolically, by his disunion efforts, he
was again battering down Court House doors. It made him feel
"so much younger." Sanborn's request and Brown's presence
were as much of an imposition as Parker's and Howe's failure
to send the Faneuil Hall crowd scurrying to his aid. He
couldn't be bothered with Brown. Unlike his fellow Kansas
committeemen, Sanborn, Stearns, and Howe, the minister
reserved judgment on Brown. He was unsure of the man's char-
acter and was busy organizing the convention. The possibil-
ity of help from Worcester could be discussed at another
25
time
.
Higginson' s attitude stunned Sanborn and disappointed
Brown. Still, the lack of commitment was not an outright
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refusal and a brief examination of the views Higginson
expressed during the convention indicate, at least partially,
why it was inevitable that the minister eventually allied
himself with Brown.
At the convention, held on January 15-17, Higginson
openly clashed with Garrison. He rejected pacifism and
political antislavery, he asserted that abolitionists must
use "armed force" to thwart slavery and held that "two antag-
onistic nations could not live together any longer."
Higginson was certain disunion must take place. The sooner
it did, the better it would be for the North to "prepare for
a peaceful and dignified policy." The Worcester abolitionist
agreed with Wendell Phillips' contention that "peace between
sin and servility" was not a benefit. Even if abolitionists
gained control of the United States government it would take
"two or three generations" to rectify the abuses of the Slave
Power. Political reform was too slow to "effect a cure."
Violent, disruptive, disunion was a "lesser evil" than the
2 fi
"gradual dying out of slavery."
In his own speech to convention delegates, Higginson
logically extended Phillips' position. He asked the audience
why prior disunion efforts had failed, then answered his own
question by pointing out that those movements had drawn a
"glittering blade" only to tuck it back into a "neat little
scabbard" after waving it for popular effect. This time
things would be different. Higginson wanted a "convention of
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ten men who had drawn the sword for the right and thrown away
the scabbard." All they needed was a "chance to come face to
face with the United States government" and they could "revo-
lutionize the world." 27
Ironically, at the conclusion of his speech, Higginson
dismissed the importance of the very convention he had helped
organize and convene. He also foreshadowed his commitment to
Brown. Higginson said it was "vain" to speak of difficulty
in promoting disunion. The time would be drawn soon enough
by the "passions of men." At best, conventions could only
partially prepare the way. By the spring of 1858, Higginson
began to believe that John Brown was just the man to arouse
such "passions" and it was Higginson more than anyone else
who supported Brown and embraced his plan to foment a black
2 8insurrection
.
Except for Higginson* s reticence, the first month of
John Brown's presence in New England proved entirely success-
ful. He had acquired 200 Sharpe ' s rifles, 500 dollars for
"necessary expenses," and, above all, solidly established his
personal character with those abolitionists in a position to
help him in Kansas and with future antislavery efforts. He
was viewed as a man of intense religious conviction, high
moral character, and great physical self-control; a man who
was unafraid of using forceful means to stop slavery. Brown
had not attended Harvard but as Parker indicated he seemed to
have "attained a superior culture." Most important, Brown's
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personal value system was not foreign to Sanborn, Parker,
Stearns, Howe, or Higginson. His values were essentially the
same as their own. He was neat, courteous, and disciplined.
He preached industry, ambition, and calculation at the same
time that he spoke of "character" as the ultimate prerequi-
site of leadership. Brown also had a strong commitment to
family. And like all of the men he met, Brown was concerned
with "conventional civic repute." As has been suggested,
Brown's "ideal person was comfortably within the nineteenth
century mainstream." No doubt this gave great solace to the
five urban, middle class, professionals v/ho interviewed him.
The one man most profoundly affected by Brown's person-
ality was Franklin Benjamin Sanborn. In particular, Sanborn
was moved by Brown's obvious dedication to family. To a
young man whose own family life had been cut short because of
his wife's premature death, such a dedication illicited deep
sympathies. Sanborn also revered anyone who left business
and pleasure to "make a study" of Kansas and abolition. When
Brown asked the young man to accompany him to New York for a
January 24 meeting with the National Kansas Committee,
Sanborn quickly accepted. At the meeting, Sanborn requested
the committee to relinquish control of the 200 rifles turned
over to them by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee. This
request was honored but the committee, led by chairman Henry
B. Hurd, balked at Brown's desire for "all the guns it had
and over 1000 dollars worth of supplies." They also rejected
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Sanborn's plea for a pledge of 5000 to 10,000 dollars. Hurd
and the others initially felt Brown was "too violent and
unpredictable" to be trusted because the Kansas warrior
refused to be pinned down by questions about what he intended
to do with the arms and supplies. All he would say was that
the committee men knew him and his work in Kansas. if they
wished to give him anything, he wanted them to "give it
freely." Finally, at the urging of its eastern membership,
the committee decided in Brown's favor by pledging 5000 dol-
lars to help implement any "defensive measures" he considered
necessary to preserve a free Kansas. Brown was also author-
ized to immediately draw 500 dollars from the committee trea-
surer as a portion of that sum. 29
Both men were pleased by the committee's action. Before
leaving New York City, they discussed strategies which might
force an appropriation out of the Massachusetts legislature.
Such a grant coupled with the national committee's pledge
would leave Kansas freestaters amply supplied to resist pro-
slavery attacks. Upon returning to Boston, Sanborn wrote
Brown and informed him of the schedule for legislative hear-
ings on the appropriation. He advised the freedom fighter
that his appearance at the hearings would improve the possi-
bility of passage and force a quicker consideration of the
bill. Sanborn realized that Kansas had been relatively
peaceful, under the strong leadership of Governor John Geary
but saw the proslavery legislature's recent attempt (January
as an
12, 1857) to set up a rigged constitutional convention,
incident that could trigger renewed hostilities. Brown
should raake it a point to attend the hearings. His traveling
expenses would be paid and Sanborn even hoped to "do some-
thing more . 30
II
After leaving New York City, Brown journeyed to his
North Elba home. On the way he stopped off in Peterboro, New
York to visit Gerrit Smith. During a previous stopover,
Brown had been led to believe that Smith might make a contri-
bution to his Kansas efforts. Brown also hoped the wealthy
landowner had some information about the possibility of pur-
chasing additional acreage near the North Elba farm. The new
acreage would help relieve some of the financial strain on
his family. Brown was elated by his acquisition of guns and
money for freestate forces but his elation was tempered by
tremendous anxiety about his family's poverty.
Actually the warrior was quite confident that Smith
would have money for the Kansas cause. The two men had known
each other since 184 8 when Brown came to New York to visit a
number of black families who had settled 140,000 acres of
land donated to them by Smith. The land was scrubbed and
almost impossible to cultivate but Smith believed it would
help blacks improve their material condition. It was also
an attempt to help "colored people give up notions of being
124
servants and become independent mechanics and farmers." By
cultivating their own land, they could avoid relationships
with those who hated them. m the end, the land's poor qual-
ity doomed the project. Still, Brown was impressed with
Smith's desire to do something more than talk about helping
black people. Then, in 1849, Smith helped Brown purchase
land in the North Elba area and for the next few years the
two men maintained a harmonious, if relatively superficial,
friendship based primarily on the mutuality of their anti-
slavery sentiment. In 1855, Smith invited Brown to a conven-
tion of "radical political abolitionists" in Buffalo. At the
convention Smith read two letters from John Brown, Jr., which
reportedly "drew tears" from many delegates. 31
But besides hoping that their friendship and similar
antislavery views would stimulate a Kansas contribution,
Brown had specific information which led him to believe Smith
was ready to assist the cause of freedom in the territory.
In his conversation with Higginson, Brown learned Smith had
given full support to the minister's call for northern state
governments to enlist "militia volunteers" for Kansas.
Despite Smith's view that government was primarily estab-
lished to protect property and over-stepped its jurisdiction
when going beyond that activity, Brown also knew that Smith
supported Vermont's state appropriation to Kansas. Then,
too, in his brief meeting with Lawrence, Brown discovered
that Smith, in the early spring of 1856, had contributed 250
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dollars to the New England Emigrant Aid Society, authorizing
Lawrence to use the money as he saw fit. Smith didn't even
mind if the contribution was used to purchase arms for free-
state settlers, claiming that there were "instances in which
the shedding of blood" was "unavoidable." in March of 1856,
Smith had also pledged 3000 dollars to Kansas asserting that
"we must stand by Kansas resistance." While Brown did not
know the extent of Smith's Kansas aid (it is estimated at
16,000 dollars), he was certain his information indicated a
willingness on the philanthropist's part to subsidize the
violent defense of the territory. 32
Brown's assumptions were justified. In fact, just
before the Pottawatomie Massacre, in early May, 1856, Smith
made very strong statements about his commitment to the vio-
lent defense of freedom. At that time, he asked an aboli-
tionist convention assembled at New York City to go with him
in "voting slavery to death." If the assembled abolitionists
weren't ready to vote slavery to death, Smith announced he
was personally ready to put "slavery to a violent death." He
no longer opposed the "bloody abolition of slavery" and was
ready to have it "repulsed by violence" and "pursued even
unto death by violence." Two months later, in the heat of
Kansas fighting, Smith asserted that where government didn't
exist or when it had failed, men had to obey the "necessity
of the case," recognize themselves as government, stop "look-
ing to ballots" and start "looking to bayonets." Those who
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were truly antislavery men should be "mustering armed men and
none but armed men." if "all manhood" had not left antislav-
ery men, they would not leave Kansas settlers to be slaugh-
tered. He was no "bloody-minded man" but felt the South must
be "dispossessed" of the idea that northern people were
"cowards.
"
33
Shortly after arriving at Peterboro, Brown described his
successful fund-raising campaign in New England. Smith was
pleased to hear so many abolitionists had not lost "all man-
hood." When Brown discussed his family's difficult economic
situation, Smith empathized and said he would see about the
possibility of Brown's acquiring additional acreage in the
North Elba area. But when Brown finally asked Smith to
assist his fund-raising effort he received a sharp rebuff.
The philanthropist claimed his previous efforts to "save
Kansas to Freedom" had "exhausted his current means." He
could not give more money. The refusal jarred Brown but he
wisely refrained from pressuring Smith to reconsider his
decision. Long years of negotiating various business schemes
had taught Brown when a decision was final. Further badger-
ing would only antagonize Smith. It might even jeopardize
Brown's plan to request Smith's financial aid for a future
assault on slavery. One year from now Brown would return to
Peterboro and unveil a scheme (already focusing in his mind)
which sought to demonstrate the power of blackmanhood . He
34
would wait until then to press Smith.
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If Brown had really understood Smith's personality he
probably would have been more prepared for the abrupt refusal
Smith was an individual of "paradoxical intellect" whose
fierce denunciation of the Slave Power and emotional out-
bursts in defense of violence were often inexplicably contra-
dicted by his actions. From the beginning of his participa-
tion in the abolitionist movement, Smith never hesitated to
advocate the use of force against slavery. At Utica, New
York, in 1835, during one of the first abolitionist conven-
tions he attended, Smith responded to mob threats against the
meeting by calling himself a "poor peace-man" and demanding
the use of "deadly weapons" to protect the right of assembly.
Four years later, when he was again disillusioned by the
seeming fruitlessness of his abolitionist efforts and again
feeling it was "almost hopeless" to spread "correct views,"
Smith determined that slavery could only be abolished by
"force" and never by "peaceable" means. He reasoned that if,
as all antislavery men understood, violence was one of the
products of slavery, the country would go on with "proslavery
wickedness" until the institution had come "to a violent and
bloody end." You fought fire with fire. When Higginson
attacked the Court House during the Burns rendition, Smith
applauded the attempt and was reminded of his own efforts to
thwart the Fugitive Slave Law. He belonged to Syracuse's
Vigilance Committee, helped establish an underground rail-
road, and took an active part in the successful rescue of
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escaped slave William (Jerry) Henry. When "Jerry" was
arrested in early October, 1951, Smith asserted that a judi-
cial release was not good enough. Such an "acquittal" would
be as "nothing" when compared to a "bold forcible rescue"
which clearly demonstrated the "strength of public opinion." 35
Yet, in spite of forwarding these views, Smith always
stayed within the mainstream of abolitionist reform efforts.
Like Sanborn, Parker, and Howe, he had much personal ambiva-
lence about violence. Rhetorical flourish was one thing,
actually killing slaveholders was quite another. During the
Jerry Rescue for instance, Smith advocated the use of force
but was terribly afraid one of the policemen holding Jerry
might get hurt in the attempt. He cautioned those partici-
pating in the rescue not to do bodily harm to anyone guarding
the fugitive. Always an office-seeker, Smith finally won
election as an abolitionist candidate in .1852 on a platform
that acknowledged "no law for slavery" but also asserted that
"national wars" and "the violence" to which misguided and
frenzied individuals" were prompted was "unnecessary." 36
Smith's term in the House of Representatives is also
suggestive of his paradoxical behavior. The Peterboro squire
voted against a homestead bill because he claimed it confined
the "homestead priviledge to white people," then he turned
around and refused to back Republican efforts to table the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill by asserting that tabling was a politi-
cal tactic which infringed on democratic principle. It was
an odd position for one who had long claimed that the Slave
Power controlled the political fortunes of the country. 37
Actually from the moment of its introduction in December
of 1853, Smith opposed the bill. He didn't take part in
"un-official efforts" to defeat it or sign petitions circu-
lated by Salmon Chase against it but he did make a speech
condemning the measure in early April. Before the full mem-
bership of the House, Smith claimed that he hoped slavery
would "not end in blood" but "feared that it might." He con-
sidered the institution a "conspiracy of the strong against
the weak" but he admitted having no plan to end it except
"unconditional" and "immediate abolition." Finally, he
argued that any institution that reduced a man to a "thing"
had committed the "highest crime" against humanity. 38
When Smith would not join efforts to table the Kansas-
Nebraska Bill he rationalized his behavior by claiming that
in rescuing a fugitive slave he took his stand "outside gov-
ernment" whereas in his role as a member of Congress he was
"bound to the will of the majority." If the will of the
majority called for enactment of a measure perpetuating the
"highest crime" against humanity, Smith felt bound to obey
it. Eventually the measure was put on the floor of the House
and Smith voted against it but by that time it was too
, . 39late
.
Smith's behavior was censured by many abolitionists.
The New York landowner was particularly upset by resolutions
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offered at the National Convention of Colored People meeting
in Cincinnati. The convention heartily regretted his refusal
"to serve the cause of the oppressed." Such criticism stung
Smith. When it was coupled with his hatred for "fixed rou-
tine," the feeling his "talents were being wasted," continual
subjection to charges of being "out of order" while on the
floor of the House, and little "admiration" or "applause" for
his efforts, it prompted, in August 1854, his resignation
from Congress. The resignation was the final paradoxical
gesture of his congressional career because, in one way or
another, Gerrit Smith sought political office throughout his
entire life. 40
For over a year after leaving office, Smith retreated
from antislavery activity. He even remained aloof from ini-
tial efforts to organize and supply freestate settlers in
Kansas. And, in the wake of his political rejection, Smith
swung back to the position he had espoused intermi ttantly for
twenty years. Smith now claimed to entertain "slight hope"
that American slavery would come to a peaceful conclusion.
There wasn't enough "virtue" left in the American people.
Law, education, politics, and religion conspired to blind men
on the subject of slavery. Traditional institutions and tra-
ditional methods would no longer work. Slavery had to die a
"bloody death.
"
41
By late spring of 1856, Smith's wounded sensibilities
had begun to heal. He cautiously returned to the traditional
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arenas of antislavery activity. Though not entirely giving
up his thoughts that slavery must be violently overthrown, he
nevertheless reversed his assessment of the American people.
He now felt they were "entirely ready" to destroy slavery.
All they needed were "leaders" to direct them on the work of
destruction." It was a pity that "cowardly statesmen" would
not forget their caution and "bid the masses to march— not
with bayonets but with ballots." 42
In Smith's refusal to give money for Kansas, Brown
caught a glimpse of his rapidly shifting and sometimes out-
rageously paradoxical behavior. Perhaps after their meeting
ended Brown instinctly understood that personal slights and
disturbing emotional experiences often had a profound impact
on the wealthy landowner's ideological posture. In any case,
Brown left Feterboro satisfied that Smith would try to find
land for his family and optimistic that Smith could be
counted on for a contribution at some later time.
Ill
After spending a few days in North Elba, Brown again
traveled to Boston for his February 18 appearance before the
Massachusetts legislature's Committee on Federal Relations.
The committee was charged with investigating the idea of a
state appropriation for Kansas. Sanborn had suggested
3rown's appearance before the group and worked hard prodding
its members to quickly consider the appropriation proposal.
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His efforts were more than rewarded by the speech Brown gave.
While poorly structured, haltingly delivered, and, at times,
a simplistic assessment of the Kansas situation, the brief
address revealed Brown's uncanny ability to make a calculated
emotional appeal. He was a failed businessmen who spoke with
a monotonous cadence but he had not forgotten the essentials
of salesmanship. He knew what symbols resonated the empathy
of his listeners. Brown stood before the committee and dis-
cussed the great sacrifices of time and energy made by him-
self and other freestate settlers in defense of Kansas. He
spoke of farmers' lost crops, settlers terrified by contin-
ual violence, and the tremendous loss of life and money in
the territory. In a dramatic gesture, he held up the trace
chains which proslavery men had used to imprison his sons
and then lashed out at the "barbarous treatment" they had
received. Near the end of the speech he lamented his son
Frederick's death. It was an impressive performance filled
with uplift maxims, Biblical allusions, and the unstated but
implied contention that though John Brown had sacrificed much
he was willing to do more if supplied with the necessary
funds
.
When Amos A. Lawrence heard about Brown's speech he
immediately contributed 70 dollars for Brown's "personal
use." Lawrence also confided that although he had "no defi-
nite knowledge" on which to base his suspicions, he felt sure
Brown would be disappointed if he relied too heavily on the
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Pledges of the National Kansas Committee. The committee had
"not inspired confidence." it would be difficult for them to
raise funds. Lawrence's words were not taken lightly by the
canny Brown. Many times in the past his own business ven-
tures had been ruined by poor management and lost confidence.
He and his oldest son, John Jr., often discussed the best way
to preserve trust among financial confederates. 3rown
thanked Lawrence for his "kind hints" and suggested they were
an "exact expression" of his own "private conjunctures."
Brown had come to Boston with a lifetime of experiences at
requesting funds for one enterprise or another. This letter
to Lawrence, his performance before the Massachusetts legis-
lature, and, in fact, the whole tenor of his efforts with
Massachusetts Kansas Committee members suggests that he
applied the lessons of these experiences to the task of fund-
ing his Kansas work- He was quite adept at calculating the
effect of his own actions and could quickly evaluate, as well
as, deftly manipulate the personalities of the men and women
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around him.
Clearly, the man most influenced by Brown was Franklin
Sanborn. After attending the legislative hearing and listen-
ing to the Kansas warrior's speech the secretary was a bit
overwhelmed. Ke was so caught up with Brown that he claimed
to be certain "we shall get a bill"— even though a more care-
ful assessment of the legislature's attitud-.. would have sug-
gested otherwise. Sanborn's use of the wor .;e" in his note
.nee
is highly suggestive. it had been almost three months si:
he began work as a full-time committee member. At first,
despite protestations to the contrary, he had been plagued
with serious doubts about the wisdom of his decision. He
made vigorous efforts to overcome the anxiety, prove his
worth, and expand his authority. But since Brown had come to
Boston those doubts had disappeared. His belief in Brown and the
correctness of his decision developed symbiotically— each
nourishing the other until Brown himself had become a kind of
living symbol of Sanborn's secure sense of place in the move-
ment. Brown was not only a person to commit himself to but
also a kind of prototype for all the personal qualities
Sanborn imagined to be prerequisite for success. Brown was
someone to be studied as well as followed. The young man
who spoke of the need for independence yet "looked for
authority" had finally found "something to do." Brown served
Sanborn's need for cause, career, and identity. 45
Brown was less certain about the state appropriation
than Sanborn. This uncertainty and the "hints" in Lawrence's
letter prompted him to begin looking for funds in other
places. For the next three weeks he rode rattling trains all
over New England in that quest. These weeks were difficult
ones for Brown. People were interested in his tales of
Kansas life but had little cash to spare. Kansas remained
quiet, Geary seemed in full control of the territory, and
people were just beginning to feel the pinch of financial
panic that would sweep the country that year. At the same
time that funds for his Kansas work dried up, the reality of
his family's desperate financial condition pressed in upon
him. The condition also affected his sons. They didn't want
to "learn and practice war" anymore. Despite Brown's
reminder that it was they not he who had engaged in fighting
"in the first place" and that he had no "love for the busi-
ness/' they all seemed ready to leave Kansas and return home.
Some pressure was lifted off Brown when, in the first week of
March, Samuel Thompson (one of the men who owned the North
Elba land Brown was negotiating for) loaned a small sum of
4fi
money to the family.
In spite of a growing sense of desperation, Brown occa-
sionally felt moments of accomplishment. He sent newspaper
clippings to his wife Mary showing the "different stories"
being told about him but cautioned her that " none of them
tell things as I tell them ." Brown believed he could make
people realize their "duty" even though they stubbornly clung
to the delusion that they had a "right to give or not to
give." Hoping to promote this conception of people's "duty,"
he published a broadside in early March which appealed to the
"friends of Freedom." In it, he asked people to "hold up his
hands" with contributions and suggested that it was with "no
little personal sacrifice " that he came before the public
"in this manner." He felt that the appeal, when taken
together with Buchanan's election, Taney's Dred Scot decision,
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and Buchanan's seeming foreknowledge of it, would clearly
underline the price of freedom in Kansas. 47
At this critical moment in his search for money Brown
welcomed an invitation from Sanborn to speak at Concord
before an audience certain to be receptive and generous.
Sanborn hoped it would prove how much "he regretted" that "so
little" had been done for Brown and how much he understood
what it was like to "suffer from the false confidence of the
public." Besides, Sanborn was sure "the ladies would be
glad" if Brown would speak.
On the afternoon of March 11 Frank Sanborn paced ner-
vously on Concord's train station platform awaiting Brown's
arrival. When Brown did appear, the two men greeted each
other warmly and went directly to Ellery Channing's place.
That evening Brown had dinner at Thoreau's home and afterward
narrated his role in the Battle of Black Jack where he had
relieved Henry Clay Pate of his magnificently mounted Bowie
knife. The second night of his visit Brown was invited to
Emerson's home. When the meal was finished the party
adjourned to the Town Hall where Brown addressed an assem-
blage of about 100 people. During his speech the freedom
fighter again exhibited the chains that bound his sons in
Kansas and spoke of Missouri proslavery "ruffians" as having
the "perfect right to be hung." For those who listened care-
fully to 3rown during the speech and throughout his visit in
Concord some hint of his wish to confront slavery in places
other than Kansas would have revealed itself. Emerson, in
particular, should have been forewarned. Earlier that eve-
ning Brown remarked that "it was better that a whole genera-
tion of men, women and children pass away by violent death"
than to have a word of either the Bible or Declaration of
Independence violated. 49
Concord residents missed Brown's hints. But they did
not miss the personal qualities which convinced certain abo-
litionists he should be given a chance to confront slavery in
a place other than Kansas. Those qualities were eloquently
described by Thoreau when, some years later, he composed his
"Plea for Captain John Brown." What impressed Thoreau was
Brown's rare gift of "common sense." He was a "man of
action, ideas and principles" yet one who did not yield to
"whim or transient impulse." Brown's essence was reflected
in his speech: he always spoke "within bounds." Thoreau
remembered how Brown referred to his family's sufferings
"without ever giving the least vent to his pent-up fire."
Brown was a "volcano with an ordinary chimney flue." He was
an "experienced soldier" who "kept a reserve of force and
meaning." Listening to Brown was like listening to Cromwell.
His puritan virtue and Old Testament enthusiasm moved Concord
and Boston audiences alike. But it was his fantastic con-
trol, his unswerving discipline, which inspired their confi-
dence in his capabilities. Discipline and control, these
were the virtues reverenced by many reformers in
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mid-nineteenth century America. Properly applied, they could
help abate the social chaos stimulated by industrialization
and emigration. Properly applied, they could help resolve
economic uncertainty, dismantle the institution of slavery,
and win freedom for settlers on the plains of Kansas. Prop-
erly applied, they could bring the return of traditional
American values. Higginson claimed his trip to Kansas was
like revisiting the Battle of Bunker Hill. Those Concord men
and women who listened to Brown speak that evening felt the
same way. But Brown was more than a religious prophet, more
than a reincarnation of America's revolutionary spirit, he
was also a model of virtue for a newly developing urban mid-
, 50die class.
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CHAPTER IV
In spite of the enthusiasm and sympathy which Concord
residents expressed for Brown and the cause of freedom, they
donated very little money. The Kansas warrior left town tre-
mendously dispirited and determined to change his tactics of
request. Up until the Concord address, Brown had traveled
widely throughout New England speaking with large numbers of
antislavery men and requesting them to "help fill his hands"
for freedom. He based the plea on the virtue of his own
character, his willingness to fight for freedom, and his
first-hand knowledge of the Kansas situation. These efforts
earned him only a modicum of success. He was given guns and
money by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee, a tentative com-
mitment of funds from the National Kansas Committee, and a
number of small donations from Connecticut citizens. But
from mid-February to mid-March Brown had not added substan-
tially to these contributions. In fact, he heard rumors that
Massachusetts would not make a state appropriation and the
National Kansas Committee was going to renege on its January
agreement. When these fund-raising failures were linked to
his family's deteriorating economic situation and his sons'
growing reluctance to fight unless something could be done
for the family, Brown felt compelled to change his methods.
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In the weeks following his Concord address Brown pursued
funds more aggressively. He showed less of the calm demea-
nor that made men wonder at his discipline and became more
demanding. He accentuated the self-sacrifice of his own and
his family's efforts. He applauded the New England abolition-
ist community less and chastised them more for failing in
their moral obligation to assist the Kansas freestate move-
ment. Most important, the Kansas warrior focused his appeal.
He spent fewer hours traveling all over New England and more
time applying pressure on the three people most receptive to
him, Frank Sanborn, George and Mary Stearns.
Immediately after his Concord appearance, Brown went to
the Stearns mansion in Medford and outlined the poor response
to his efforts. Stearns and Brown discussed the possibility
that the National Kansas Committee would try to back out of
its agreement. They both felt that chances for a state
appropriation were slim. Brown mentioned that the only peo-
ple who had shown any concern were the citizens of
Collinsville
,
Connecticut, who contributed 80 dollars and
promised to ship his grandfather's gravestone to North Elba
where it could be "faced and inscribed" in the memory of " Our
Poor Fred " who "sleeps" in Kansas. For the first time, Brown
also spoke at length about his family's desperate economic
condition and the need to purchase more land around the North
Elba farm site in order to relieve that condition. While
Brown admitted his needs more openly and discussed his
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efforts in greater detail it seems unlikely that he told the
lead-pipe manufacturer everything. He certainly did not
reveal his contract with the blacksmith Charles Blair, while
in Collinsville, Brown met Blair and agreed to buy 1000 steel
pikes for a dollar a piece. As part of the deal, Blair also
agreed to apprentice Brown's son Jason for one year providing
the young man with training, room, board, and 200 dollars for
his services."''
Stearns was sympathetic and understanding but not very
helpful. He could make no personal commitment of funds
because of his own pressing financial obligations. And he
told Brown that the Massachusetts Kansas Committee didn't
have any more cash to spare. Stearns does seem to have sug-
gested that Brown write to Amos A. Lawrence about starting a
subscription for the North Elba land purchase. After all,
Lawrence had already contributed 70 dollars for Brown's "per-
sonal use" and Stearns believed it was quite probable he
2
would be willing to do more.
Brown was encouraged by Stearns' suggestion. A few days
later while soliciting funds at a March 19 meeting in New
Haven, he took Stearns' advice and sent a short note to
Lawrence. He asked the industrialist to assist some New
Haven friends who had pledged to raise 1000 dollars to help
purchase additional tracts of land around his North Elba
farm. Lawrence balked at the request claiming he had just
spent over 14,000 dollars to aid the construction of public
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schools in Kansas and did not want to involve himself in yet
another fund drive. He would think about "heading" such a
subscription but couldn't possibly do anything else.
Lawrence assured Brown that if something happened to him
while he was engaged in the "great and glad cause" of free-
dom, he could assume that his wife and children would be
cared for "more liberally than you now propose." Such guar-
antees were good to hear but weren't negotiable. Brown still
needed funds. He refused to give up on the demand that a
subscription be raised and in the next few weeks put intense
pressure on Stearns and Lawrence to help him purchase the
acreage. For the moment, he hoped to appease his family by
sending them 150 dollars from funds he had already received. 3
By the last week in March Brown was exhausted from trav-
eling, discouraged by the continued fruitlessness of his
efforts, and irritated by Sanborn's recent note hinting that
the legislative appropriation would not pass. Summoning what
little energy he had left, the Kansas warrior asked the young
committee secretary to accompany him to Easton, Pennsylvania
for discussions with ex- Kansas governor Andrew Reeder. Brown
hoped to persuade Reeder to return to Kansas as an agent for
the National Kansas Committee and leader of freestate forces.
Charles Robinson, who along with James Lane initially orga-
ized the freestate militia, had lost the confidence of many
antislavery men in the East because of timid and conservative
policies. Brown was certain that this loss of faith had
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affected his own fund-raising efforts. With Reeder in a
position of leadership perhaps some of that faith could be
restored and his own efforts enhanced. 4
Sanborn was just preparing for a trip to Washington,
D.C., when he received Brown's invitation. He immediately
wrote and told Brown that he would be happy to assist and
would meet the Kansas warrior at Easton upon his return from
the nation's capital early in the first week of April. 5
Upon arriving at Easton, Sanborn received a summary of
Brown's reasons for trying to persuade Reeder to return to
Kansas. Then, both he and Brown entered into discussions
with the ex- governor. They urged Reeder to take the commit-
tee agency claiming that a man of his "great ability . .
foresight, boldness and prudence" would be an immeasurable
aid to the cause of freedom. Reeder was flattered and
thanked his guests for their expressions of confidence but he
refused, saying simply that he did not want to return to the
territory. Both Sanborn and Brown were disappointed by
Reeder 's reply and asked him to reconsider. When he stood
firmly by his decision the two men thanked him for the cour-
tesy of hearing them out and started back to Boston.
There is little doubt that Brown was sincere in his
request for Reeder' s help. But the Kansas warrior was as
interested in isolating Sanborn for a few days in order to
thoroughly discuss his own financial difficulties, as he was
in obtaining the ex-governor's assistance. Brown used their
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trip back to Boston to gently pressure Sanborn into exerting
his influence to obtain more funds for the Kansas compaign.
In very emotional terms, he discussed the sacrifices of his
family with the overly sympathetic young man. Brown even
admitted that his sons wanted to leave Kansas because of the
privation their absence caused the rest of the family. The
Kansas warrior claimed he wanted to make the "best provision"
he could for his wife and children. Brown also spoke of his
own disillusionment and uncertainty, his belief that Buchanan
was a tool of the Slave Power, and his conviction that Robert
Walker's recent appointment as governor of the territory
would jeopardize freestate exertions. Hoping to persuade
Sanborn how much his trust and help was needed, it is quite
possible Brown revealed his belief that even if freestaters
gained control of Kansas slavery would continue in the United
States until the day black men and women rose up and vio-
7lently destroyed it.
Sanborn was moved by Brown's expressions of confidence.
And though he was unsure about the necessity of black insur-
rection, he completely agreed with the warrior's contention
that there was no possible political solution for slavery in
either Kansas or the United States. His recent experience in
Washington, D.C., fully convinced him of that proposition.
While in the nation's capital he was terribly upset by what
seemed to be a very cumbersome process of government and he
was thoroughly dismayed by "what sort of men rule us." The
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city was an incredibly "odd place," inhabited by a group of
men whose character was a "matter for tears." As far as
Sanborn was concerned, of all the "creepy things" an "office
seeker" was the "most loathesome." How could such men be
expected to legislate slavery out of existance? They didn't
have enough character. Washington itself was an "absurd
sanctuary" of that very institution; it was the home of the
Slave Power and "full of abomination." 8
Sanborn was also confused and at a loss about what he
personally could do to alleviate Brown's financial headaches.
He had used as much influence as he had to get Brown
Massachusetts Kansas Committee funds and weapons. He had
pushed the Massachusetts legislature to act quickly on the
Kansas appropriation bill, set up Brown's meeting with the
legislature's Committee on Federal Relations, journeyed to
New York with Brown to appeal for National Kansas Committee
help, and hurried to Easton for consultations with Reeder.
Now Brown was pressuring him to do more and even vaguely
hinting about a plan to start a black insurrection. It v/as
all very disconcerting for the young secretary who, until the
trip to Easton, had not fully realized the demands Brown
hoped to make on him and other committee members. Sanborn
could only suggest they check on the progress of the
Massachusetts appropriation.
When the two men finally arrived in Boston they were
confronted with more bad news. The National Kansas Committee
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had decided to cancel its pledge to Brown because of the
state of "public opinion." Lawrence had guessed correctly.
The committee lacked the confidence of the northern anti-
slavery community and this, added to the relatively stable
condition in Kansas that spring, made it impossible to col-
lect the cash necessary to meet their commitments. Along
with the notification of cancellation, Brown also found a 50
dollar contribution from Eli Thayer and 20 dollars from
Thomas Wentworth Higginson. The contribution from Higginson
particularly irritated both men. They felt the 20 dollars
was a mere pittance compared to what might have been sent if
Higginson had made a serious effort to persuade the Worcester
County Committee of Brown's real needs. Restraining his
anger (as he had throughout the last week of February and all
of March) Brown wrote a thank you note to Higginson. He told
the minister of his anxiety to secure a "mere outfit," and
claimed he was being prevented from going to Kansas "at once"
by a lack of funds. But even more upsetting than the
National Kansas Committee's cancellation and Higginson'
s
token contribution was a letter waiting for Brown from his
son Jason which informed him that federal marshals had been
making inquiries about him in Cleveland. In the midst of
efforts to collect funds, Brown was forced to abandon even
these unsuccessful attempts by the threat of arrest. Luck-
ily, Samuel Gridley Howe and other committee members were
able to prevail on the antislavery judge, Thomas Russell, to
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hide Brown in his home. For the next week, Brown took refuge
in a third floor bedroom at Russell's place brooding about
his failure to collect substantial sums and calculating how
to stir New England antislavery men out of their lethargy. 9
A few days after Brown began his seclusion, he started
work on an essay called Old Brown's Farewell ... To
Plymouth Rock which he hoped Theodore Parker would read
before his congregation. In it, Brown discussed his personal
privations in seeking to assist Kansas freestate settlers and
asserted that "every citizen" was under "equal obligation" to
do all that he had done for freedom. Neglect of such duties
would not be forgotten. All men would be held "accountable
to God." Brown complained that even though he had asked "no
wages" he couldn't secure "the necessary supplies of a common
soldier." As far as he was concerned, New Englanders had
spurned their ancestors and their traditional support of lib-
erty: "How were the mightly fallen I" 10
The essay was similar to his broadside issued in early
March and Brown was hopeful of a positive reaction. But
before asking Parker to read the piece, Brown used the essay
(as he had the Easton trip) as a subterfuge. Claiming he was
unsure of the essay's reception, he asked Mary Stearns to
read it and offer her critical judgment. The request was not
a random gesture but a carefully calculated move to convince
Mary of the legitimacy of his financial needs. On at least
one occasion (probably many others) Brown and his son John
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Jr. discussed the role of a woman in a business transaction.
It was John Jr. ! s opinion that when a woman "got an idea into
her head" it was "very hard to get out." If properly
impressed, a "talking woman" could "exert some influence in
such a transaction." Brown could hardly have missed Mary
Steams' enraptured glances two months before as he sat talk-
ing to her boys of his role at Black Jack. Nor could he have
missed the influence she exerted upon George Luther. Now he
desperately needed funds from her husband and used her eval-
uation of the Farewell as a pretext for enlisting her hus-
band's personal financial resources. Just a short time after
Mary Stearns left the Russell home, George Luther returned
there, strode up three flights of stairs to Brown's room, and
proceeded to authorize the Kansas warrior to draw on him for
up to 7000 dollars should the need arise when Brown returned
to Kansas. Brown's judgment about Mary Stearns had been
. 11
correct.
In addition to the 7000 dollar authorization, Stearns
called a meeting of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee to
explore for other sources of funds. On April 9 the commit-
tee met and decided to allow Brown to sell 100 of the 200
Sharpe's rifles he had been given in January at 15 dollars a
piece to "reliable" freestate settlers. The moving force
behind this authorization seems to have been Stearns who had
originally purchased the rifles with personal funds. Six
days later, on April 15, Stearns notified Brown that the
149
committee had voted him a "further sura" of 500 dollars. The
Kansas warrior was so elated that he was hardly disturbed by
Stearns added stipulations to the April 9 grant. Stearns
requested that the "proceeds" from the gun sales should be
used for the "benefit of Free State men in Kansas," and that
Brown keep an account of the sales "as far as practical."
This rather perfunctory injunction from the business-minded
Stearns only served to buoy Brown's enthusiasm and reaffirm
his faith in Mary Stearns' influence over her husband. 12
John Brown immediately notified his son John Jr. of the
windfall. And it is fitting that the younger Brown shared in
his father's joy. More than any other person John Brown Jr.,
had provided his father with guidelines for the successful
conduct of business transactions. It was the younger Brown
who stressed the importance of projecting a keen organiza-
tional sense, advised his father about the use of influential
women in a transaction, and counseled his father to always
keep his business partners apprised of his comings and goings.
In his letter to John Jr., the Kansas warrior also spoke of
acquiring his grandfather's gravestone and hinted at future
plans which the younger Brown already knew about. Brown sug-
gested that the stone had "sufficient size" to contain more
"brief inscriptions" and asserted that in one hundred years
the stone would be a "great curiosity." Brown closed the
letter by thanking his son for his past advice "about the
value and importance of discipline." The advice had been
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correct and was "fully" appreciated. Brown had managed to
control his anger during the weeks when contributions had
been poor and he was rewarded for this control with substan-
tial aid for Kansas. He also gained the full confidence of
two men and one woman in a position to assist his future
insurrectionary plans. Indeed, John Jr. should be heartily
thanked for his remarks about the "importance of disci-
pline." 13
II
It is ironic and typical that after exerting such mas-
terful control over his emotions during his weeks in the
East, Brown's elation over acquiring funds stimulated an
over-aggressiveness that nearly destroyed his relationship
with the two men who had done most to insure his success.
Because of an exaggerated belief in his ability to manipulate
Sanborn and Stearns, Brown tried to force them into filling a
1000 dollar subscription for purchase of North Elba property.
And he did this in the face of their less- than- firm commit-
ment to raise the sum. Brown hoped to pressure both men into
alleviating his family's financial difficulties as they had
his Kansas needs.
Admittedly, there was some reason for Brown's overly
optimistic assumptions about his ability to move Sanborn and
Stearns. Just before he left Boston in mid-April, Brown
received a letter from Sanborn which more than justified his
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conclusion that the young secretary would continue to be as
easily manipulated in the future as he had been in the past.
Sanborn thanked Brown for "remembering me as you have done
and claimed he would "prize" anything from the warrior as a
"momento of the bravest and most earnest man it has been my
fortune to meet." The ex-schoolteacher hoped Brown would
never regard himself as an "unprofitable servant." His
Boston friends took great interest in his "future career."
If anything happened to him in Kansas, Sanborn claimed he
would see to it that Brown's family was made "more comfort-
able" and his "memory defended." Sanborn concluded his let-
ter by suggesting that if he could serve Brown in any way he
would "reckon it an honor to do so." Brown had also spoken
of his family's difficult situation with Mary Stearns when
she came to evaluate the Farewell and he felt she could be
counted upon to press her husband's efforts on their behalf.
Then, too, Brown had discussed the possibility of a subscrip-
tion with Stearns throughout the spring. It was Stearns who
first suggested Brown seek Lawrence's help in raising the
sum. Before Brown left Boston he and Stearns had also talked
about the possibility of the Medford manufacturer's purchase
of some 200 revolvers for the Kansas effort. At the time,
Stearns didn't seem pressed for funds and Brown assumed he
was both willing and financially able to take on the burden
of filling out the land subscription. Brown did not antici-
pate (perhaps refused to anticipate) the possibility that the
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primary task of collecting money for the land purchase would
stretch Stearns' generosity to the limit. 14
After remaining in North Elba for two weeks Brown began
his concerted effort to pry funds loose from his Boston
friends for the purchase. On April 29 he wrote to Derrick
Foster, a Boston State House clerk, asking him to inquire
about the subscription. Foster talked to Stearns then wrote
back to Brown. In his letter, Foster told Brown that Stearns
said the aid for Brown's family (which had only been "partly
promised") would be made up with as "little delay as pos-
15
sible. ,,±D
Foster's inquiry taken in conjunction with a letter
Brown had sent a few days earlier greatly angered George
Luther Stearns. Stearns disliked the tone of both. Brown
was hoping to make a deal with T. W. Carter of the
Massachusetts Arms Company for 200 revolvers and had written
Stearns to tell him Carter was willing to sell the guns for
1300 dollars as long as the sale was "not made public." Near
the end of the letter Brown tersely suggested that "if Rev.
T. Parker and other good people at Boston would make up that
amount I_ might at least be well armed . " The insinuation was
obvious to Stearns: the subscription had been slow in coming
and Brown was angry.
Brown had been granted over a 1000 dollars by the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee, placed in charge of 200
Sharpe's rifles, 100 of which he could sell, and he had been
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authorized to draw on Stearns for up to 7000 dollars once in
Kansas. Now he was pressuring Stearns for an additional 1300
dollars for revolvers and 1000 dollars for a land purchase.
The volatile Stearns became enraged. He saw Brown as nothing
more than a hard-driving businessman. No firm commitment had
been made to Brown for either the purchase of land or the
revolvers. Stearns would not be prodded further. He
responded to Brown with two stinging letters of rebuff. On
May 4 Stearns told Brown that he and Lawrence had not been
able to raise the full subscription. As a result, Lawrence
had written to Gerrit Smith asking him to "accept the 600
dollars now raised" and take a mortgage from Brown for 4 00
dollars. Smith had agreed to these conditions. Two days
later Stearns suggested Brown accept the proposition "to
mortgage for 4 00 dollars" and advised the Kansas warrior that
the committee would try to raise the rest of the money at
17
some other time
.
In these two letters and his response to Foster, Stearns
had firmly presented his case. The subscription had only
been "partly promised" and it had been difficult to fill.
The committee was not reneging on its agreement and Brown
should understand the great difficulty in procuring funds.
He should settle for partial payment. The Medford manufac-
turer believed his frank discussion of the matter would stop
Brown from making any more unreasonable demands. In fact.
Stearns was so sure he had resolved the problem that he felt
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well enough to make a staunch appeal in the Kansas warrior's
behalf before the National Kansas Committee on May 10 in New
York City. In his brief address to committee members, Stearns
spoke of his personal acquaintance with Brown and his "great
confidence" in the man's "courage, prudence, and good judg-
ment." Stearns begged the committee to reconsider its deci-
sion to withhold funds. The men of the committee must keep
uppermost in mind Brown's "control of the whole affair."
Stearns stressed that Brown's discipline and experience would
give even the most timorous freestate men "confidence in
1
8
their cause."
But if George Luther Stearns thought his frank discus-
sion of the subscription would placate Brown, he was wrong.
The letters only relieved Stearns' anxieties, Brown was still
irate. He determined to have every penny of the land sub-
scription made up. On May 10, he met with Smith and the
Thompsons at Peterboro, notified them of his intention to
obtain the full subscription, and dismissed Smith's sugges-
tion that he settle for what had been offered. Three days
later, he wrote a long letter to Stearns explaining his posi-
tion. He prefaced his remarks with a biting introduction.
Brown felt he "must have" the 1000 dollars "made up at once."
The Kansas v/arrior claimed he had not started the measure
though he was "sufficiently needy" and, in rather surly
tones, apologized if his demands were "hindering" either
Stearns or Lawrence. The Kansas fighter then discussed the
155
nature of his intended purchase in detail hoping it would
give greater validity to his demand. Brown claimed he had
agreed to purchase the land from "two young men" named
Thompson. They had previously obtained the acreage from
Smith and had made a number of improvements on it. The
Thompson's still owed a balance of 200 dollars to Smith which
Brown intended to pay. Then, he would use the remaining 300
dollars to complete the deal. The Thompsons were expecting
that sum and had already negotiated for another nearby farm
on the basis of that expectation. 19
Brown also pushed young Sanborn to see to it that the
money was "promptly raised." Invoking the secretary's pledge
that it would be an "honor" to serve him or his family in any
way possible, Brown wrote Sanborn on May 15 and suggested
that a full subscription was "much the cheapest" and "most
proper" way to provide for his family's welfare. It would
also be "far less humiliating" for his wife. Aside from
highlighting the intensity of his campaign for funds, the
letter to Sanborn suggests how well Brown gauged the person-
ality of the secretary and how deftly he operated in terms of
that assessment. He knew Sanborn had a strong sense of fam-
ily and would have a hard time backing down from his pledge
to "take it on himself" to see that Brown's family needs were
met. To the businessman Stearns, Brown had sent a detailed
analysis of the purchase agreement, to young Sanborn an emo-
tional plea about family needs. Brown knew his men well and
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operated on his knowledge, In addition, Brown knew how sen-
sitive Sanborn was on the issue of organizing aid for Kansas
but not actually participating in settlement. And he
exploited the guilt fully. Brown closed his letter to
Sanborn by claiming that he would never have uttered a sylla-
ble about the land purchase were he " not conscious that I am
performing that service which is equally the duty of millions
who need not forego a single hearty dinner by efforts they
are called to make." The lines stung the sensitive young
committee secretary so much that he hardly noticed Brown's
concluding assertion that he really didn't want to burden
Stearns and Lawrence nor "ride free horses" until they fell
A A 2 0dead.
Brown's letter caused Sanborn much discomfort. Brown
was forcing him to push Stearns on the land subscription
issue and it was a task Sanborn did not relish. Sanborn
realized how much Stearns had already done for Brown and what
difficulty he was having in filling up the subscription.
Brown was unfairly pressuring the Medford lead-pipe manufac-
turer. After debating his course for a day, Sanborn went to
Medford on May 16 still undecided about whether or not he
should broach the issue with Stearns. Sanborn had not
resolved where the bounds on his loyalty to Brown began and
his friendship with Stearns left off.
21
By the time he arrived at Stearns' Medford home, Sanborn
had decided to at least show Brown's letter to the committee
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chairman. After reading it Stearns reciprocated by showing
Sanborn his own letter from Brown and denying that he and
Lawrence had ever committed themselves to the subscription as
fully as Brown implied. Stearns claimed he had originally
refused outright to undertake the responsibility and advised
Brown to seek aid from Lawrence. When Lawrence refused, it
had been Brown who kept the subject alive not Stearns or
Lawrence. But even though the Medford businessman was upset
by Brown's insinuations Sanborn sensed that he was not angry
enough to sever his affiliation with the warrior. During the
remainder of the meeting Sanborn began to understand why this
was so. Stearns showed the young secretary a letter he had
recently received from Martin Conway, one of the committee's
agents in Kansas. According to Conway freestate efforts to
organize their own legislature at Topeka were likely to be
"supressed by corruption." Freestate men were "increasingly
. . .
entering all around into business with proslavery men."
James Lane and Charles Robinson were trying to counter the
fraudulently elected proslavery legislature at Shawnee Mis-
sion with their own extra- legal freestate legislative body
but if Conway's views were correct the project was doomed.
There would be no counter- force to proslavery political
efforts. And when Stearns tied this possibility to the real-
ization that a rigged, proslavery constitutional convention
was to meet at Lecompton in June and would surely vote a pro-
slavery document, he was pessimistic about political efforts
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to win freedom in Kansas. Brown's words were biting, unfair,
and partially untrue but his valor and desire to fight for
freedom in Kansas were beyond doubt. Stearns had resolved to
continue his support of the warrior. Sanborn was further
convinced of Stearns' willingness to continue aiding Brown
despite the friction over the North Elba land subscription
when the committee chairman showed him a reply he had
recently drafted to T. W. Carter of the Massachusetts Arms
Company. In the reply, Stearns presumed Carter wished him to
be "responsible" for the purchase price of the 200 revolvers
"until
.
. .
paid by Captain Brown." Stearns notified Carter
that he "cheerfully" assented to the wish. Before he left
Stearns 1 home Sanborn also helped the chairman draft a letter
to Brown explaining that he (Stearns) had agreed with
Lawrence to make up the full subscription. Stearns told
Brown that he would inform Lawrence that he "must fulfill the
agreement." Four days later, Sanborn wrote a letter of his
own to Brown. In it he assured Brown that he need have "no
fear" about the money. It would be gathered up and put in
the "right hands." Sanborn agreed that it would be a "sad
thing" if Brown's family were not taken care of while he was
exposing himself to danger in Kansas for "the good of oth-
ers." But the secretary did have some disappointing news.
The "arts of politicians" had defeated the Massachusetts
22
appropriation for Kansas.
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Sensing a distinct change in attitude about the sub-
scription, Brown sent a temperate response to Stearns. His
letter of May 23 was an attempt to do his part to ease ten-
sions which had arisen over the issue and to prevent any
further misunderstandings. Once again he explained the North
Elba deal to Stearns, assuring him that there had been no
collusion between himself, the Thompsons, and Smith and that
he had no "previous arrangement" with Smith about the land
purchase other than to say he wanted Smith's contract with
the Thompsons' made over to himself on payment. Brown wished
to demonstrate that he had pressed for the full subscription
only because it was promised and not because he was bound to
a prior contract. Brown swore that Smith had given him "no
encouragement" about the purchase and had simply agreed to
the "arrangement." Brown also hoped to prevent any mistaken
assumptions about how much Smith had pledged to him in Kansas
aid. He preferred Stearns' annoyance in knowing Smith-
refused to give money because the previous year's effort had
"embarrassed him," to Stearns' anger at being deceived.
Brown told Stearns that rumors about Smith assisting his
Kansas work were false. All Smith promised was that he
2 3
would do "all he could" when the "struggle was renewed."
The letter does seem to have reassured the Medford busi-
nessman. He forgave Brown's insinuations and believed
Smith's behavior in the affair was proper. In fact, Stearns
vigorously prodded Lawrence's efforts to fill the
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subscription even though Lawrence continued to assert that he
had never intended to do any more than "write a 'heading'"
for the fund. Before leaving Medford that June for a vaca-
tion in New Hampshire with his family, Stearns exchanged let-
ters with Martin Conway. The letters further explain his
willingness to continue support of Brown. Conway was certain
that the new territorial governor, ex-Mississippi Senator
Robert Walker, would attempt to disband the freestate Topeka
legislature. Although Conway claimed to have confidence in
the "instincts of the masses," he confessed that he agreed
with Stearns 1 evaluation of the situation. If freestate men
were defeated in the "Topeka business" they should, as
Stearns had suggested, "marshal armed forces for further
action." George Luther Stearns' fears about the destruction
of freestate political efforts, Walker's proslavery leanings,
and the likely possibility of a proslavery constitution from
the Lecompton Convention, prompted his support of Brown in
spite of his irritation over the land subscription. Polit-
ical antislavery had been defeated too often by the Slave
Power. Only men like Brown who were willing to fight for
freedom could prevent a proslavery takeover in the territory.
24
Brown must be supported.
Near the end of June, Gerrit Smith also became convinced
that "fighting for Liberty" was the only way to assure the
survival of a free Kansas. Smith watched with mounting anger
as freestate efforts to form a legislature were ruled illegal
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by Walker and proslavery delegates debated the Lecompton Con-
stitution. Addressing a Milwaukee personal liberty law meet-
ing, the Peterboro philanthropist also lashed out at the
Supreme Court for the "naked despotism" it displayed in hand-
ing down the Dred Scott decision. A government that didn't
"promise protection in return for allegiance" was "not a
government at all." When asked if he would let the decision
"arouse people to rebel against the Supreme Court," Smith
labeled such a question as "foolish." The Supreme Court was
the "rebel." It had refused to consider the Higher Law. 25
Smith met John Brown in Chicago late in June as the
warrior moved west to Kansas. It was a month since the two
men had spoken and in the interim the ever-changing Smith
decided he would contribute to Brown's Kansas work. Despite
his claims a few weeks earlier that his means were
"exhausted," he insisted Brown draw on him for 350 dollars
and left Chicago believing that freestate men "must not
shrink" from fighting for freedom even if federal troops were
used against them. 2 ^
Ill
When Brown finally returned to Kansas in early July
after an absence of almost eight months he saw a number of
hopeful signs for the triumph of the freestate cause. A
large emigration that spring swelled the ranks of freestate
settlers in the territory to the point where they vastly
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outnumbered their proslavery counterparts. Lane, Robinson,
and other leaders had accepted Walker's call to participate
in legislative elections scheduled for the territory that
October. They firmly believed frees tate men could gain
political control of the territory and displace the bogus
Shawnee Mission assemblage. While there were still isolated
outbreaks of violence, most freestate men agreed with their
leaders about resolving the issue of slavery in the territory
27by political methods.
As he assessed the situation and recuperated from a
debilitating attack of the ague. Brown realized that there
was an excellent possibility for the peaceful resolution of
the slavery problem in the territory. As a result, he spent
more and more time thinking about and preparing for his
insurrectionary strike. Brown also realized that he might
soon have to prevail on his Massachusetts "friends" for
financing and so made it a point to keep them informed of
his movements. Some years before at the time of his failure
in the wool business, Brov/n and his son, John Jr., had dis-
cussed the reasons for that failure. John Jr. felt that one
of the habits which had done "much injury" to them while
engaged in "business connections" was their failure to main-
tain proper communication with business partners. They
should have given a "narrative . . . detailed account of all
transactions of interest as well as plans and bearings."
This oversight led to "groundless suspicions" or at least
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"uneasiness" among their associates. Brown's son hoped they
could "mend" the habit so as to "lessen" the occasions of
fault-finding in the future. 28
Brown tried to prevent "groundless suspicions" from
erupting with his May 23 letter to Stearns. Now, as he wit-
nessed the new direction of Kansas affairs and realized he
might soon have to call on Massachusetts "friends" to subsi-
dize his plan to attack slavery in the South, the Kansas
warrior used the autobiographical sketch he promised to
young Henry Stearns to further allay any tension which had
developed over the North Elba matter and to subtly hint of
future endeavors. Brown's letter to the Stearns boy is a
revealing biographical and psychological document but it is
also a carefully constructed tactical device which was
designed (like Brown's March broadside and April Farewell )
to cultivate confidence in his character. While the letter
tells us a great deal about the values of John Brown, it
should be remembered that the Kansas warrior was quite cog-
nizant of who he was aiming the letter at and, therefore, it
is far from being a spontaneous, free-f lowing outburst of
thoughts and emotions. Rather, it must be seen as a care-
fully constructed appeal which sought to highlight the values
Brown sensed would engender the utmost confidence in his
character among his Boston "friends." Thus, the letter tells
us as much about their values as it. does Brown's.
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Brown began the brief autobiography by speaking of the
"necessity" of a "severe but much needed course of disci-
pline" in the early years of his development. He then
quickly moved to a consideration of the origins of his abo-
litionism by describing slavery's disruptive effect on family
life. He spoke of his encounter with the brutal treatment of
a "young negro boy." The incident brought him to reflect on
the "wretched condition of Fatherless and motherless slave
children" who had no one to "protect and provide" for them.
As a youth Brown spoke of becoming "ambitious to excel in
anything he undertook to perform" and indicated that "this
kind of feeling" was one he would "recommend to all young
persons." Subtly hinting of his future plans and at the same
time extolling the virtue of having a well-thought-out direc-
tion in life, Brov/n wished young Henry Stearns to always have
some " definite plan . " Many men had none or, if they did,
never stuck to it. This was "not the case" with John Brown.
He followed up with "tenacity" whatever he set about doing
"so long as it answered his general purpose." As a result,
he "rarely failed" to effect the "things he undertook." In
fact, he "habitually expected to succeed . " And he always
united such feelings with the consciousness that his plans
were "right in themselves." Near the end of the letter,
Brown once again tried to ease any frayed sensibilities
resulting from the North Elba issue. Almost apologetically
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he suggested that his "habit of being obeyed" occasionally
prompted him to speak in an "imperious way." 29
Brown also appended a short note to his autobiographical
account which informed his Boston associates of other sums
that had been contributed to him. At Hartford and New Haven
he had been promised 1000 dollars but had only received 285
dollars. He chose to forget Smith's Chicago draft for 350
dollars and claimed the Peterboro squire had only supplied
him with 50 dollars for Kansas. Smith also loaned him 110
dollars to pay the Thompsons' while the subscription was
being filled. The Kansas warrior gently prodded his
Massachusetts readers to continue efforts to raise the land
money since the unpaid bill for the purchase had "exceed-
ingly mortified" him."^
The autobiographical account was a brilliantly success-
ful effort to prepare his listeners for his future antislav-
ery efforts and a perfect reaffirmation of the value system
which ingratiated him with Boston antislavery men that
spring. He was following John Jr.'s advice in trying to
allay "groundless suspicions" and was again restating the
values that gave his Boston friends confidence in his char-
acter. He had a keen organizational sense, was disciplined,
controlled, ambitious, and confident of success. He, like
his Boston friends, loathed slavery for its attack on the
fundamental institution of the family. Brown did not stress
his belief that violence was the only way to destroy slavery.
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The men in Boston who had contributed to his support admired
his courage and his resolution to resist slavery forcibly.
But it was not primarily this which gave them confidence in
the Kansas warrior. They were chiefly looking for someone
whose system of beliefs was similar to their own and who, by
the logical extension of that system, despised the institu-
tion of slavery. Brown's mid-July letter to Henry Stearns
reflects his own understanding of this situation and his
understanding of their ambivalence toward violence.
By early August, Lawrence and Stearns filled the sub-
scription and sent Sanborn to Peterboro with the 1000 dollar
draft. The young committeeman was happy to make the trip.
It gave him a chance to visit with Edwin Morton, the Harvard
classmate who was tutoring Smith's children, and provided an
opportunity to meet Smith himself. After delivering the
draft, Sanborn wrote to Parker and suggested that he believed
Smith to be a "greater man" than people in New England real-
ized. He was a superior individual who had "regular devo-
tion to his ideas" and "great personal influence." But the
real highlight of Sanborn's journey was his visit with
Brown's family. The young secretary gave Mary Brown a small
sum of cash left over from the subscription after the payment
to Smith and assured her that she could count on Brown's
31
Boston associates if anything should happen to her husband.
No doubt the impressionable and somewhat romantic young
man saw the Browns' poverty as a noble symbol of their
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heroic sacrifice for freedom. The deferential tone of his
next letter to John Brown indicates how much the visit to
North Elba reinforced Sanborn's desire to dedicate himself to
the Kansas warrior. Sanborn notified Brown that the autobio-
graphical letter was "well appreciated" by all who read it
and that the land purchase money had been turned over to
Smith. The secretary "regretted" that the payments had been
"delayed so long." Forgetting Brown's pressure tactics and
his somewhat distorted view of who originated the idea of a
subscription, Sanborn suggested the delay had been Boston's
fault and not Brown's. It was the result of a "series of
mistakes" on the part of Brown's Boston "friends." In some
sense, Sanborn's estimation was truer than he realized. The
"mistake" these Boston "friends" made about Brown was in
failing to recognize that the major portion of his life had
been spent as a hard-driving yet unsuccessful business man.
They failed to realize that although Brown was pleading for
the noble cause of Kansas freedom, he treated his fund-
raising efforts like any other business promotion. They
failed to realize the paradox of his own and their own value
system. That system had been created by and had, in turn,
helped create the marketplace North--a place that alternately
32
appalled and encompassed them.
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IV
It is ironic that by the time Brown received notifica-
tion of payment from Sanborn, the men who contributed most to
his fund-raising drive began to back away from even advocat-
ing force as the only solution to the Kansas struggle. They
did so for a variety of reasons, the most essential being a
belief that Governor Walker's promise to keep the October
territorial election free from fraud was given in good faith.
If freestaters could gain control of the territorial legisla-
ture they could thwart any effort to force slavery upon
Kansas. When Brown himself saw there was little chance of
"major disturbances" erupting in Kansas that August and
decided to "work back Eastward," he wrote Stearns on August
10 asking for "secret service" money with no questions asked.
Stearns rebuffed his request by flatly refusing it. Stearns
was caught up in the financial panic that struck the entire
country that summer and fall. Peter Butler, the man who had
rescued Stearns in 1853, was in desperate straits after los-
ing large sums of money investing in the Michigan Central
Railroad. It took Stearns and a number of others the entire
summer and fall to gather enough money to cover Butler's
. 33debts. Ke could do nothing for Brown.
Actually, there was much more to Stearns' reluctance
than Butler's fiscal headache. The Medford businessman was
participating in Massachusetts efforts to raise cash to
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assist frees tate political chances in the October election.
In the fall of 1857, when freestaters took control of the
legislature, Stearns reversed his springtime assessment about
the necessity of "force of arms" and became convinced that
antislavery men would triumph by political methods. And by
November 17 he wrote Brown cautioning him not to attack pro-
slavery forces unless he was attacked first. To make certain
Brown heeded his advice, Stearns wrote to E. B. Whitman, an
agent of the committee, and ordered Brown's access to com-
mittee funds and the 7000 dollar personal authorization
closed. Stearns claimed Brown had been given authority to
draw on him only "in a certain contingency." Since that con-
tingency had not occurred it would be "very unwise" to
attempt to "establish order by force . " Brown could not use
any of Stearns 1 funds for that purpose. The Medford busi-
nessman now believed the freestaters "true policy" was to
34
"meet the enemy at the polls and vote them down."
Stearns 1 retreat from the advocacy of violent means mir-
rored a similar process in Samuel Gridley Howe. In late
spring, Howe journeyed to Kansas with small sums for the
frees tate cause. On the trip he encountered Senator Henry
Wilson who was also going to the territory. Wilson hoped to
"persuade" freestaters to vote in the October election
called by Walker. At the time, Howe was "undecided" as to
whether freestaters should participate. He was still confi-
dent in Brown and the logic of force. This confidence is
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documented in a letter Howe sent to the Kansas warrior in
mid-June. Ostensibly, the doctor was concerned with Brown's
physical health, but his words reveal as much about his alle
giance to the freedom fighter and force. Howe, whose own
physical condition had been ravaged by the tensions, cares,
and the responsibilities of his personal and professional
life, saw similar signs in Brown during the early spring.
Now, in Kansas, the Boston physician heard rumors that Brown
was seriously ill. Howe wrote the warrior to give him the
counsel of someone who could "understand and appreciate you.
It was important for Brown "to live and be in health" in
order to carry out his "noble purpose." Howe was convinced
Brown could properly care for himself because Brown under-
stood his own constitution and had the "self command" neces-
sary to obey the "laws of God" when he knew them. Brown
must not let excessive activity "burn him up." He had an
"organization of rare power." The doctor, who had dabbled
in phenology, also believed Brown had an "uncommon develop-
ment" of the "moral regions." It was a "great gift" to be
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"cherished" and used in the "cause of humanity."
But despite his understanding of the energy demands of
professional life and his regard for Brown's "self command,"
by the end of June, Howe also began to look for a political
solution to Kansas troubles. He backed away from his ear-
lier, tentative commitment to the use of violence in Kansas.
At a private meeting called by Henry Wilson in late June,
Howe joined Stearns, Lawrence, and others in raising 25 0 0
dollars to help carry the October election. By mid-July the
group appointed Thomas J. Marsh to bring almost 3000 dollars
to frees tate leaders. The money was to be "judiciously" used
for election purposes. It is interesting to note that in
less than three weeks Howe and the others had been able to
raise a sum it took Brown almost four months to acquire. By
mid-November the Boston physician had fully followed Stearns
lead. In the wake of the frees tate election success, he
warned Brown not to attack Missouri border "ruffians." 36
Like Stearns, Howe was also influenced by financial rea-
sons to pull back from Brown's support. That fall, when his
good friend Horace Mann came east to collect money for a col-
lege building, Howe indicated the severity of the financial
panic griping New England when he suggested to Mann that
though Moses got "water out of granite" he doubted Mann would
be "as successful" among panic-stricken Bostonians. Howe
37himself was "cramped" and "pinched" by his falling income.
Gerrit Smith joined Hows and Stearns in their retreat.
Two months after he had given Brown 350 dollars to help free-
staters "fight for Liberty," he was attending a compensated
emancipation convention in Cleveland. In a speech before the
group, Smith asserted that since slavery was a "national
dilemma" and all men contributed to it, the North should help
the South remove the institution. He was willing to make a
"direct appeal" to the selfish slaveholder if it meant
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hurrying that slaveholder to dissolve his immoral relation-
ship with the black man. Smith was careful to avoid accept-
ing the Dred Scott decision. He was seeking to buy slaves
not because they were property but because he felt northern-
ers had a "moral right" to help "slave owner and slave."
Smith, like most abolitionists, was as worried about slav-
ery's effect on white slaveholders as on black slaves.
Though his position on compensated emancipation was not a
complete break with past ideas about force, his support for
the movement does indicate a growing willingness to try buy-
ing slavery off instead of fighting it off. 38
When William Lloyd Garrison labeled Smith's address as
"another gyration," the Peterboro squire claimed to be deeply
"pained" at so "palpable an injustice." But he soon dropped
his advocacy of compensated emancipation. Perhaps in an
effort to reestablish his abolitionist credentials with
Garrison and other less radical antislavery proponents, Smith
used his annual Jerry Rescue speech on October 1, 1857 to
reassert his belief in moral suasion and political abolition.
He also played down his advocacy of violent methods. In the
speech, Smith asked if "we would have the slaves rescued by
violence" and answered with a resounding "No'." Smith felt it
would be "wicked" to make such a request. There was a better
way. All people had to do was "vote the Federal Government
into the hands of abolitionists and every chain would fall
39
peacefully from every slave."
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V
Unlike his colleagues who quickly retreated from belief
in the necessity of forcible means as soon as the possibility
of a favorable political solution presented itself in Kansas,
young Frank Sanborn left that belief reluctantly. For him,
retreat from force was tantamount to a retreat from Brown
himself. And this was difficult for the young committeeman.
Sanborn felt his whole role in the freestate movement, abo-
litionism, and reformist Boston society depended on his rela-
tionship to Brown. To retreat from support of Brown was, in
many ways, to deny the symbol of his own significance. Nor
would the crafty Brown allow such a retreat to take place.
After Sanborn sent his deferential confirmation of the North
Elba purchase, for instance, Brown was quick to document his
gratitude and imply his great need for Sanborn's efforts.
Brown was thankful his wife and daughters would not be
"drawn to beg" or become a "burden" to his "Poor Boys" who
had "nothing but their hands to begin with." Brown was
grateful to have found friends to "look after his family;"
„40
friends who were acquainted with their "real condition."
Prompted by the confidence Brown seemed to be placing
in him and his own desire to preserve the relationship,
Sanborn, in early September, made a bold effort to tap the
seemingly untouchable reserves of the Worcester County Com-
mittee. Claiming that he had been informed that there was
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"a large sum" of money (some 3000 dollars) being held by the
committee, Sanborn aggressively asserted to Higginson that
there was "no reason" why it should be "kept idle." He
wanted it donated to Brown. Higginson was furious at Sanborn
for making such demands. He immediately wrote back and told
the secretary that he had no control over the money of the
Worcester committee. And even if he did, he wouldn't have
given it for Brown's "useless" efforts. The sharp response
flustered Sanborn and he immediately toned down his condem-
nation of the Worcester group. In the face of Higginson 's
angry reply, Sanborn admitted his "own two or three" commit-
tees had not excelled in giving Brown aid and that all free-
state committees were "culpably negligent." Worcester's
committee was "no worse than the rest." Sanborn was deeply
upset at Higginson' s assertions of Brown's "uselessness " and
defended the Kansas warrior's inactivity during the summer
by claiming that Governor Walker had knowledge of his pur-
poses and was "watching for him." John Brown was as "ready
for Revolution" as any man. All he needed was money and he
would be the "best Disunion champion" found. Perhaps hinting
at Brown's plans for insurrection or at least restating his
own resolute commitment to Brown and forceful means, Sanborn
concluded his letter to Higginson by suggesting that with 100
men raised and drilled Brown would "do more to split the
"
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Union than any man alive.
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Sanborn's letters to Brown during the late summer and
early fall also indicate his refusal to desert the warrior's
side. When it seemed that the bogus Lecompton Constitution
would not be submitted to the people of the territory,
Sanborn declared to Brown that it would be best if the offi-
cers of the proslavery government were "hung . " Sanborn was
extremely apologetic for Stearns 1 failure to send "secret
service" money. He explained that money was "very scarce"
and the committee's treasury was exhausted. When Brown con-
tinued his regular correspondence with Sanborn in spite of
the other committee member's waning interest, the young sec-
retary became even more respectful. He was glad to be get-
ting these continual reports. It made him believe that Lane
and Brown were the only "real generals" to be found in the
42territory
.
In December two months after freestate settlers had cap-
tured the territorial legislature and seemed in a good posi-
tion to prevent the Lecompton Constitution from being forced
on Kansas, Sanborn finally conceded that the situation could
be settled by politics though he claimed he would "not be
surprised" if Brown's "courage and arms" were again needed
there
.
Sanborn's absorption with Brown is not only reflected
in his seemingly die-hard commitment to force but also in the
Brown-like tones of his speech and thought. By late fall of
1857, Sanborn was exhausted with his committee work. The
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constant trips to Boston, never-ending committee correspond-
ence, and his occasional schooiteaching activity tired him.
His response to this state of mental and physical fatigue is
curiously reminiscent of Brown's. In order to regain his
strength and energy, Sanborn decided to forego the "pleasures
of visiting Boston." It was time to "deny" himself the com-
pany of "social flatterers" and retire to "regions where
everything passes for what it is." And like Howe and
Higginson who looked for simplicity in Kansas, Sanborn wanted
a place where he could "avoid the destractions of life,"
where he could order his existence, and, like his hero Brown,
devote himself more closely "to study and meditation" not
only of books "but of life itself." Sanborn wanted to rid
himself of the pressures and tensions which arose when one
made abolitionism a "business and study." Sanborn, like
Brown in his autobiographical account, felt the need to
"eradicate" certain "evil tendencies" from his "present way
of life." He was looking for the benefits of "severe dis-
cipline." He was willing to "live like a monk" for a while.
It was time to retire to his "cell." Husbanding precious
energy was imperative for the young professional--a career
44
could be exhausting.
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CHAPTER V
During mid-March 18 57, in the midst of his quest for
Kansas funds, John Brown journeyed to New York City for an
interview with an ex-soldier of fortune named Hugh Forbes
whose lecture circuit appearances in the East had earned him
a modest reputation as a military expert. Forbes, an
Englishman, had come to New York a few years earlier after
spending two years as a field commander in Garibaldi's army
of Italian volunteers. His particular expertise lay in the
use of guerrilla tactics and Brown hoped to recruit the man to
help in Kansas and with future attacks upon slavery. After
lengthy discussions, Brown hired Forbes for six months. As
soon as the Englishman could put his personal affairs in
order he was to go to Kansas and begin training Brown's
recruits. Forbes was to receive 100 dollars a month for his
services and Brown seems to have hinted that he might count
on a longer term of employment if certain "New England human-
itarians" agreed to subsidize his future efforts. Hugh
Forbes was quick to enter the arrangement. His lecture cir-
cuit appearances and part-time newspaper work had not pro-
vided sufficient funds to take care of his wife and children
who still lived in Paris. He needed money desperately.
1
Right from the beginning of their relationship, however,
problems developed between Brown and Forbes. The ex-soldier
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demanded to be paid the 600 dollars in advance and then was
slow in joining Brown out west. When Forbes did reach Mt.
Tabor, Iowa, and started drilling Brown's recruits in early
July, he urged that Brown reimburse him for money he had
spent preparing a military tactics manual. In addition to
the friction caused by his tardiness and financial demands,
Forbes argued with Brown about how the recruits should be
trained. Both men were convinced of their "unchallengeable
expertise" in guerrilla warfare and had a difficult time
accepting criticism. Then, in August, when Brown began to
reveal his plan for an attack on slavery in the South, their
arguments became even more heated. Forbes had his own ideas
about which type of foray would be most successful. He
wanted to "muster along the northern slave frontier" with a
highly trained group of "carefully selected colored and white
persons." The former field commander wanted to "instigate a
series of slave stampedes, running Negroes into Canada." In
the process he hoped to render "slave property untenable."
Brcwn firmly rejected Forbes' scheme. He had his own plan,
one which he had been working on for "many years." The
Kansas warrior prepared himself by reading numerous works on
guerrilla tactics and carefully examining topographical maps
of the southern states. Brown wanted to recruit twenty-five
well-trained, well-armed men, "colored and white mixed" and
supply them with pikes. The Kansas warrior would use this
cadre to "Beat up a Slave Quarter in Virginia." While both
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plans seemed similar, major disagreement arose over the pre-
dictability of a slave response to such a venture. Forbes
was uncertain slaves would or could respond and felt strongly
that they should somehow be warned of the impending attack.
Brown was sure a warning wasn't necessary. He was "certain
of a response." Once the attack had begun between 200 and
500 slaves would join him. He would then take 80 to 100 men
and "make a dash" against the federal arsenal at Harpers
Ferry. After the assault, Brown would lead the entire group
into the Virginia mountains and hold on there until his "New
England partisians" called a convention to "overthrow the
2proslavery administration."
Because of constant disputes with Brown about training
techniques, the plan, and finances, Forbes left Mt. Tabor in
mid-November. Brown was disappointed to lose Forbes' obvious
military skills. At the same time, he was relieved to be rid
of the only man in the small group who seriously questioned
his authority. But it was not the last Brown would hear from
the ex-soldier of fortune. Two months later, in mid-January
of 1858, the disconsolate Forbes threatened to destroy
Brown's plan before it could be implemented. In letters to
Franklin Sanborn, Forbes alleged that the "New England Human-
itarians" and, in particular, Sanborn had violated their
financial obligations. According to the soldier, Brown had
promised to pay him 100 dollars a month for a year and had
reneged on his commitment. Forbes suggested that Brown had
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not been able to pay him because New Englanders failed to
supply sufficient funds. 3
Sanborn was angered by these allegations and claimed he
"never heard of such an arrangement." The secretary assured
Forbes that if he or other committeemen had known about such
a contractual arrangement they would have made it their busi-
ness to see that it was kept. Sanborn angrily asserted that
he would never have let Forbes 1 family suffer for want of
money. The secretary further claimed that he was "not
guilty" of cheating on or lying about the agreement. And he
rebuked Forbes for his "abusive language." But it was more
than Forbes' accusations that upset Sanborn. For the first
time the young secretary doubted Brown's competence. He
began to understand, as Stearns had during the land subscrip-
tion episode, that Brown could be something less than self-
lessly heroic. Indeed, Brown could be "imperious," insensi-
tive, and mistaken in his judgments of character. Sanborn
immediately wrote to the Kansas warrior and asked what mis-
information Forbes had been given, Sanborn also wondered why
Brown had not written the soldier to defend his 3oston
"friends.
"
4
Sanborn's letter jarred Brown. He could not afford to
lose the confidence of his most dedicated and efficient
Boston "agent" at a time when he was about to request money
for his Harpers Ferry raid. Nor could the veteran allow
Forbes to threaten his plans with any further disclosures.
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Such revelations not only destroyed confidence but neutral-
ized the plan's element of surprise. Once again, in a moment
of desperation, Brown sought the assistance of his son, John
Jr., and asked him to deal with the situation by sending
Forbes a "sharpe" and "well-merited rebuke." John Jr. should
notify the disgruntled soldier that he had not been "engaged
for a year" as he claimed and that Brown did not "accept it
well" to be asked to state an "untruth." John Jr. followed
his father's advice. He wrote Forbes and berated him for his
"spiteful letters." They had done "great injury" because
they had "weakened" his father's "hands" with Massachusetts
supporters. The letter John Jr. sent was temporarily effec-
tive. Hugh Forbes became silent—but only for a few weeks. 5
Forbes' defection and his resulting attempt to seek
funds from the Boston committeemen worried Brown. It created
doubts about his competence among those he was about to ask
to subsidize an insurrectionary thrust at slavery. Yet it
was only one of a number of aggravating problems he faced in
the fall and early winter. During that period he was plagued
by recurring attacks of the ague, his funds dwindled, and he
had to watch as freestate settlers voted themselves into
power and eliminated the necessity of his violent efforts for
Kansas. The October elections of 1857 put a freestate repre-
sentative in Congress and captured 33 of 52 seats in the ter-
ritorial legislature. By early January of 1858, the legis-
lature had even blocked submission of the fraudulent,
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proslavery Lecompton Constitution to Congress before it could
be voted on by the territory's settlers. It troubled Brown
to see this political solution for he realized it would
hasten the retreat of his Boston allies from their radical
professions of the previous spring. He had to move quickly
if he wanted to capitalize on what sentiment remained for the
use of violent means against slavery. By mid-January, he had
gathered his recruits, arms, and supplies at Mt. Tabor, trav-
eled eastward through Ohio, and settled in upper New York
state. During the journey Brown continued to discuss his
scheme, slowly revealing additional segments, and preparing
his men for their "ultimate destination" in Virginia. 6
By January 28, 18 58, the Kansas warrior sequestered him-
self in the Syracuse home of Fredrick Douglass and set about
"perfecting" his "Virginia Plan." He drew up a "Provisional
Constitution" which he hoped would eliminate "anarchy and
confusion" once he was established in his mountain fortress.
He also hoped it would demonstrate the care with which he
developed his "definite plan" to end slavery. After complet-
ing work on the document, he began his effort to enlist the
support of Gerrit Smith and the Bostonian allies, Sanborn,
Stearns, Parker, Howe, and Higginson. The letters Brown sent
to his Boston friends were models of calculation and amply
testify to his acute understanding of the men with whom he
was dealing. Each request for help was carefully worded and
neatly tailored to the personality of the recipient. Brown
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appealed to Higginson (perpetually concerned with his manli-
ness) as both a "true man and true abolitionist" and sought
"secret service" money for the "most important undertaking"
of his whole life. The Kansas warrior needed 500 to 800 dol-
lars in sixty days. Claiming he had already written to
Parker, Stearns, and Sanborn about the project, Brown con-
tinued his subtle appeal to Higginson 1 s ego by noting that he
was depending on the Worcester activist because he "did not
know as either Mr. Stearns or Mr. Sanborn are abolitionists."
In view of Brown's past assistance from both Sanborn and
Stearns, his comments to Higginson were a rather cynical
assessment of both men's abolitionism. But Brown was deter-
mined to have Higginson* s participation in the venture even
if he had to flatter the minister at the expense of those who
had already done so much for him. Besides, Brown was just as
determined that this would be his "last effort in the begging
line." He would do whatever necessary to insure a successful
effort.
Higginson' s response was equal to Brown's plea.
Higginson claimed he was "always ready to invest money in
treason" but at present had "none to invest." His friends
were either unwilling or "bankrupt." The minister also
claimed to have prior obligations which demanded his atten-
tion. He was gathering funds for underground railroad activ-
ity in Kansas. However, Higginson did not want to entirely
dissuade the Kansas warrior and therefore slyly alluded to
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the very funds Brown was trying to obtain by hinting that he
might be able to interest his county committee in supporting
Brown with the "trifling balance" they had left. That "tri-
fling balance" was exactly what Brown was pursuing and he
immediately replied to the minister. Indeed, it was "Rail-
road business on a somewhat extended scale" which was the
"identical object" for which he was "trying to get means."
Brown had been connected with the underground railraod since
"boyhood" and never let an "opportunity slip." Would
Higginson meet him at Gerrit Smith's during the last week of
February? He had a "measure on foot" that he was sure would
awaken something more than a "common interest" if Higginson
g
could hear it.
Higginson did not go to Smith's and wasn ' t even sure what
"railroad business on an extended scale" meant but his dis-
cussions with Sanborn led him to believe there was a possi-
bility that Brown was contemplating a slave uprising. The
thought excited him. Recently he had read about the prob-
lems caused by the "defiant and hostile attitudes of the
Negro population in Louisianna, Tennesse and Arkansas." One
insurrection had been fomented by a white abolitionist named
Hancock who was eventually caught, tried, found innocent,
and shot. If Brown was contemplating the same sort of esca-
pade, Higginson was sure his efforts were worth subsidizing.
After the Burns episode, the minister had few scruples about
the necessity of violence to end slavery and had repeatedly
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called for its use. Then, too, along with the possibility
that Brown could free substantial numbers of blacks by such
an effort, Higginson was also intrigued by the impact such a
raid would have on public opinion. He was disturbed by the
lost influence of the "radical antislavery element." Sup-
porting Brown's effort might be a good way to reestablish
that influence. Hadn't his Burns rescue attempt, Sumner's
beating, and the bloody struggle for a free Kansas done much
to rekindle antislavery fervor? 9
John Brown also wrote to Theodore Parker during the
first week in February. He told Parker he was "perfecting
arrangements" for an "important measure" and was counting on
Parker's assistance because their "mutual friends" were not
as "deeply-dyed" in abolition as the minister. None of them
understood his views "so well." Brown's determined effort to
secure Parker's assistance is revealing. Of all the Boston
"friends" Parker had been least supportive. The minister did
little to obtain funds for Brown in 1857 and had flatly
refused the warrior's request to read the Farewell before his
congregation. But Brown sensed Parker's ability to influence
efforts on his behalf. Parker was the one that Howe,
Stearns, and Sanborn would seek in attempting to justify
their support of the plan. Brown needed the minister's seal
of approval. The importance of the meeting at Parker's home
one year earlier had not been lost on the warrior. Boston
abolitionists had not gathered there simply as a matter of
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convenience. The meeting was also symbolic. Parker was the
undeclared leader of all Massachusetts antislavery men who
entertained notions of using violent means against slavery.
Even if Parker was ambivalent about the actual subsidization
of the project, his theoretical justification was vital. 10
Brown also wrote to George Luther Stearns requesting the
Medford businessman to come to Smith's in late February and
listen to the plan. Stearns, however, had recently returned
from a business trip to New York City and was too tired to
make another journey so soon. Nor was he really sure he
wanted to do anything for Brown. In fact, the pressures of
economic panic prompted Stearns to request that Brown return
money provided for his Kansas work. The financially harried
lead-pipe manufacturer was no longer ready to "invest in
treason." Brown had received money previously but it had not
been given "under obligation." Kansas settlers no longer
needed aid in "defending themselves from marauders . " Their
"true course" was "to meet the enemy at the ballot box" and
"vote them down." And since the contingency for which
Stearns had given his "pledge" ceased to exist he wanted
remaining sums "returned without conditions." Stearns
claimed he was not "indifferent" to Brown's request but would
only aid the warrior when it was "proper" to do so. Now,
with friends being dragged under by economic panic and Kansas
ready to resolve its problems politically, Stearns doubted
the "propriety" of a contribution. Stearns was also angered
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by Forbes' accusations and wanted to know why the soldier
wrote such "abusive letters" to Brown's Boston associates.
Unquestionably Stearns reticence to contribute was also con-
ditioned by a growing skepticism about Brown's competence. 11
Frank Sanborn received two letters from Brown in the
first week of February. But quite unlike the past, this time
the young secretary was more cautious in his response to the
warrior's requests. Sanborn was still upset by the "slander-
ous and insulting tone" of the Forbes' letters and there is
little doubt he placed most of the blame for the letters on
Brown. Writing to Higginson on February 11, ostensibly to
seek funds for Brown, the secretary spoke of his grov/ing
uncertainty. Sanborn now claimed only to have enough "confi-
dence" in the warrior to trust him with a "moderate sum" for
his new venture. The young committeeman had come a long way
from his pleas for a 100,000 dollar legislative appropriation
and a 5000 to 10,000 dollar grant from the National Kansas
Committee for Brown's use. Sanborn was also upset by Brown's
manipulation of Edwin Morton. In addition to Brown's letters,
Sanborn had received a note from his Harvard classmate claim-
ing Brown needed 5 00 to 800 dollars to "overthrow slavery in
a large part of the country." Morton' s phraseology was so
reminiscent of Brown's that even Sanborn could hardly have
failed to realize who actually wrote the letter. And the
young secretary disliked the pressure. Sanborn's reluctance,
however, was precipitated by more than Forbes' letters,
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Morton's seeming manipulation, and his own scanty financial
resources. The young secretary had surmised that Brown "con-
templated an uprising of slaves" and that thought disturbed
him more than anything else. His efforts to dispel his fears
about such a scheme are obvious in the conclusion of his let-
ter to Higginson. Sanborn half-heartedly suggested that "the
Union" was "evidently on its last legs." Since Buchanan and
others were "trying to tear it to pieces" he believed "trea-
son would not be treason that much longer but patriotism."
The statement was more of a question than an assertion.
During the next week Sanborn was finally able to con-
vince himself of his own definition of patriotism. When
Brown refused the secretary's plea to come to Boston (Brown's
reasons for "keeping still" were sufficient to prevent him
from seeing his family) , Sanborn unenthusiastically prepared
for a trip to Peterboro. But it is obvious that the trip
stretched the limits of his trust in and deference to Brown.
Indeed, from now on Sanborn would continue to function effi-
ciently for the Kansas warrior but never with the robust
admiration, unflagging confidence, and unfailing enthusiasm
which had characterized the first year of their relation-
. . 13
ship.
Actually, John Brown did have an important reason for
"keeping still" at Gerrit Smith's home. The warrior hoped to
unveil his plan among those who would receive it most favor-
ably and Smith, more than any other individual Brown sought
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aid from, accepted the basic assumption on which the venture
was premised. After a week of discussions with Brown, the
Peterboro philanthropist claimed to be convinced of need for
black violence to overturn the institution of slavery. Only
in this way could white America come to a fundamental under-
standing of black manhood. This position was, however, not
solely the result of his intense conversations with Brown.
For over sixteen years Smith had debated the issue with him-
self. Brown's words merely culminated the debate. As early
as 1842, Smith addressed slaves on how best to change the
image white men had of them. Blacks were to cultivate dis-
positions which were becoming to "poor and afflicted men."
They should always display patience, trust, and hope. A few
years later the wealthy landowner advised blacks to cultivate
"self-respect" in order to "peacefully regain" their rights.
Although he gave such advice, Smith doubted whether blacks
would ever "exert an influence for the redemption of their
14
enslaved brethren."
But by January of 1851, some three years after Smith
attempted to found an independent black agricultural commu-
nity where men could "avoid" those who hated them, the land-
owner's perspective on the issue of black manhood began to
shift. While speaking at a state convention on the Fugitive
Slave Law, Smith asserted that the "days of American slavery
would be numbered" only "when white America was inspired with
respect for the black man." Smith now entreated blacks to be
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less deferential. They should "rise up" and quit themselves
like men in all "political, ecclesiastical and social rela-
tions." Smith asserted that he no longer accepted a black
man's degradation on the grounds that it was "forced." He
had "comparatively no concern" for the "degradation" that
came from "others," It was the black man's "self-degradation"
that filled him with "sorrow." it grieved Smith to know that
white men had murdered blacks but his "deepest grief" was
that black men were "suicides." As is indicated by the tone
of these words, Smith, throughout the 1850 's, gradually moved
to a position that demanded black men to actively resist
white control. The world was in sad condition "until man as
man.
. . .
for his mere manhood shall be held in honor."
Then, in January of 1856, Smith wrote a letter to Salmon
Chase and claimed that nothing but "prejudice against the
black man" sustained slavery. "Not for a moment" could the
institution "co-exist with a full sense of his [the black
man's] manhood." In the third week of February 19 57, as
Brown awaited Sanborn's arrival (none of the others were com-
ing) the warrior succeeded in convincing Smith that only
black violence could truly demonstrate that manhood. 1 ^
II
Huddled next to a small desk in Edwin Morton's third
story bedroom at Smith's mansion, John Brown roughly outlined
his proposed strike at slavery for Sanborn. The specifics of
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this February 23 meeting are not recorded. But it is certain
Brown told the young secretary that he had gathered a small
cadre of recruits for a raid on slavery in the South. He
hoped to "beat up a slave quarter," arm those slaves who ral-
lied to his banner, attack a federal arsenal in order to get
additional weapons (Brown listed a number of federal instal-
lations)
,
and then retreat to a mountain fortress in Virginia.
The fortress would serve as a station on the underground rail-
road and also as a base from which bo launch further strikes
at slavery. Brown claimed his many discussions with black
leaders convinced him he could count on a response from
slaves. To demonstrate that his plan was not hastily con-
ceived, the warrior unveiled the Provisional Constitution he
had drawn up at Douglass' in late January. Throughout the
discussion Brown repeatedly stressed his belief that it was
necessary for black men to fight for their freedom. In so
doing, they would break through the debilitating effects of
slavery and assert their manhood in the only way white men
could fully appreciate.
Though. Sanborn anticipated a plan of this sort, he was
incredulous as Brown actually revealed it. The committeeman
was amazed that the veteran "neither expected nor desired a
large force" to make his strike and he was still disturbed by
the notion of black insurrection. From Brown's hints in 1857
and the recent "intimations" of Hugh Forbes, it was obvious
Brown contemplated an "uprising of slaves." Sanborn knew
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this before he came to Peterboro. He said as much to
Higginson two weeks earlier. But when Brown actually laid
the plan before him the young secretary became confused and
uncertain. Even Brown's careful "methods of organization and
fortification" and his elaborate "theory of the way in which
the invasion would be received in the country at large"
failed to allay the committee secretary's fears. Sanborn
wasn't sure that blacks would actually fight for their free-
dom and complained of the "manifest hopelessness" of the
scheme. Brown met such expressions of doubt with quotations
from the Bible and references to his numerous discussions
with black leaders. In the end the young man felt cornered,
left only with the alternatives of "betrayal, dessertation or
support.
"
After hastily scribbling a note to Higginson in which he
suggested that the minister ought to be in Peterboro because
their "friend" was "about . . . entering into the wool busi-
ness in which he has been engaged all his life" and that he
had a "plan" which was the "result of many years of careful
study," Sanborn asked to speak privately with Gerrit Smith.
As the sun set on the snow-covered hills which surrounded the
Peterboro estate, the two men walked slowly and discussed
Brown's plan for over an hour. Smith claimed he fully under-
stood Sanborn's reservations. He, too, had some doubts about
black participation and the "slender means" with which Brown
hoped to begin the attack. He, too, feared the possibility
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that Hugh Forbes would break his silence at any moment and
reveal the scheme. But black manhood could only be demon-
strated by the black man's own efforts for freedom. Besides,
Brown was a noble individual and truly religious man. if
blacks must rise up and kill their masters what better man to
lead them in such efforts. Slowly, Smith's words diffused
the young secretary's anxiety—but not entirely. 17
The next day, February 24, Sanborn prepared to leave
Peterboro only "half convinced" that he should support Brown.
He would convey the plan to his Boston associates but would
only unveil the general outlines of the scheme. If Brown
wanted to be sure of support he must come to Boston and fill
in the details. Brown agreed and promised to be there during
the first week of March. The veteran apologized for not
being able to come sooner but claimed it was necessary for
him to travel to New York City for important meetings with
black leaders, Dr. J. N. Gloucester and J. W. Loguen, who had
"whole heartedly" approved his plan. Even though Sanborn
left Peterboro claiming to be only "half convinced" about the
venture Brown felt confident about his support and that of
the other Boston committeemen. While in the city he wrote a
short note to his family which suggests how much control he
felt he exerted over Sanborn. Brown stated that in the last
few weeks he had had a "constant series of secret discour-
agement and encouragement" but felt his discussions with
Sanborn would bear fruit. Indeed, the Kansas warrior claimed
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it would be "a very strange thing" if Sanh„ „
„18
9 born" aid not join
me
.
When Sanborn returned to BostQn he
Howe, Parker, stearns
, ana „igginson and informed ^ ^ ^
Plan Brown contemplated. He advise* them of Ms own reserva-
tions and prepared them for the warrior's arrival in the
first week of March. As promised, Brown appeared in Boston
on Maroh 4 and registered at the American House hotel. That
same day all five of his Massachusetts confederates met himm his room. Before Brown could explain his plan he was vig-
orously cross-examined about Hugh Forbes, why had Forbes
made threatening accusations
, what had Brown done about the
soldier of fortune? What was the nature of their contrac-
tual arrangement? Brown calmly addressed their questions.
He spoke of John Jr. 'a letter to Forbes, told the group why
Forbes had been contracted, and described his interpretation
of the terms of their deal. Brown said Forbes lied when he
claimed he had been promised 100 dollars a month for a year.
He had only been promised 600 dollars for six months ser-
vice. Forbes had been advanced the whole sum in order to
take care of family problems but had vainly squandered the
sum publishing his manual of tactics and then expected to br
reimbursed. Brown probably admitted that Forbes knew abour
the aid he was receiving from New England "humanitarians" b
Brown certainly denied that he ever led the soldier of for-
tune to believe his salary was contingent on that supporl.
195
Brown also denied that Forbes knew enough about his plan to
jeopardize it even if he took it upon himself to disclose
what he knew. In the end, he approached the five men as he
did the National Kansas Committee one year earlier. They
"knew him" and "knew he could be trusted." And in spite of
some uneasiness his Boston allies did renew their trust in
him. Indeed, they should have. Brown had spent over a year
carefully demonstrating that he possessed the character and
values which each one of them believed was necessary to pro-
duce a stable, ordered, and virtuous society. By now they
could hardly reject the image he had so self-consciously dis-
played and they had so self-consciously demanded. To reject
Brown on the basis of his character would have been to reject
19themselves. "
After defusing the anxiety caused by Forbes' "abusive
letters," Brown began to discuss his insurrectionary scheme.
Again, as at Peterboro, he stressed his belief in the neces-
sity of black efforts for freedom. No one could give free-
dom to anyone. Each man had to take his own. Again, Brown
asserted his conviction that blacks would fight—black lead-
ers throughout New York, New England, and Canada had assured
him of this. Only such black efforts would convince south-
ern slaveholders and their northern sympathizers that blacks
were not content to remain incarcerated by slavery.
Brown also discussed some details of his plan. It seems
certain he spoke of alternative geographical areas into which
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his select force might strike. He shrugged off assertions
that his cadre was too small by saying that the scheme
depended on surprise and not numbers. The warrior praised
the "highly moral" men he had recruited and hinted that he
hoped to obtain the services of Canadian blacks. Brown
boasted of the rigorous training his men had undergone in
preparation for their "dash" South and displayed the consti-
tution he had drawn up to govern his mountain fortress com-
munity. The warrior concluded his remarks by suggesting that
even if the proposed insurrection lasted only one day the
whole country from the Potomac to Savannah would be "ablaze."
No doubt, Brown's Boston confederates also realized they
would have a noble martyr to abolition if the escapade
failed. Wouldn't Brown positively personalize the antislav-
ery issue as fully as Edward Loring had negatively personal-
ized it? And as Sanborn had so aptly suggested, they all
felt they were faced with the question of "dissertion,
betrayal or support." Even though they had doubts, Brown had
20to be assisted.
By the time Brown had finished presenting the plan on
March 8, four days after his arrival, the five Massachusetts
abolitionists hesitantly decided to join with Gerrit Smith to
raise funds for his efforts. They formed the Secret Commit-
tee of Six, made Stearns chairman, Sanborn secretary, and
began collecting 1000 dollars for Brown's "business opera-
tions." The five from Massachusetts were to raise at least
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100 dollars a piece and more if they could. Brown would be
sure of at least 500 dollars and 1000 dollars "in all proba-
bility." While Dr. George Cabot and T. R. Russell were given
vague hints of the "speculation," the committeemen resolved
that no other member of the abolitionist community should be
"admitted to a share of the business." Brown himself contin-
ually cautioned them about the absolute necessity of secrecy
and during the meetings even vetoed Sanborn's suggestion that
Wendell Phillips be brought into the "operation." According
to Brown, Phillips was not a "man of action" and therefore
should not have knowledge of the venture. 21
Between March 8 and March 17, Sanborn pressed his col-
leagues to raise the money they had pledged. On March 18 he
called a meeting of the group at Howe's place to coordinate
their labors. At this meeting Stearns was made treasurer and
took control of approximately 150 dollars which had already
been raised. It was decided that since Sanborn and Higginson
were "less able to raise money" than the others they should
be limited to a 100 dollar contribution. Stearns, Howe, and
Parker should raise that sum and more if possible. Stearns
promised to raise an additional 200 dollars, Parker also
claimed he "would do more," and Howe hoped to raise at least
50 dollars beyond the required sum. Sanborn was pleased with
the efforts that were being made. Sometime after the meeting
he wrote Brown a letter and advised the warrior that the
enterprise still looked "hopeful" to "speculative people."
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By April 1, 375 dollars of the minimum pledge had been
22
raised.
Despite the formation of a secret committee to assist
Brown and the collection of funds to finance the raid, the
Boston members of the group felt much like Sanborn did when
he first heard the plan at Peterboro. They remained only
"half convinced" that they should support the scheme. They
were reluctant conspirators. Only gradually in the weeks
following Brown's revelations were their doubts abated by
Parker's theorizations
. There were good reasons for their
apprehension. All of them wondered about the venture's
chances of success given the "slender means" Brown sought.
The plan seemed well conceived and organized but a number of
unanswered questions still remained. Brown never did say ho
many men could be counted on to join him in the initial
foray. At Smith's, Brown had "casually asked" Sanborn what
he thought of a strike on the federal arsenal in Harpers
Ferry. But at Peterboro, and again in Boston, Harpers Ferry
was only mentioned as one of a number of places where the
raid could be started. By the. time Brown left Boston the
group had no idea which place he favored. Brown said he
expected Canadian and free northern blacks to join him in hi
Virginia mountain fortress yet never suggested whether lead-
ers of the black community had begun to recruit volunteers o
whether he was depending on a spontaneous reaction like the
one he expected from southern slaves. Sanborn's euphemistic
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vagueness in his communications with Brown and other membe:
of the secret committee (the secretary always referred to the
raid as a "business operation," "speculation" or the "wool
business") was prompted as much by the demands of secrecy as
by a lack of precise information and specific detail about
2 3the scheme.
Then, too, despite the fact that each of these men
trusted Brown and may even have reverenced his character, all
of them were forced to confront two personal convictions
which struck at the heart of Brown's scheme and raised strong
doubt about its chances for success. All of the committee
members (excluding Higginson) had ambivalent feelings about
subsidizing a violent, offensive thrust at slavery. Even
Kansas aid had always been for defense against the Missouri
"ruffians." Now Brown wanted to begin an insurrection.
Everyone except Higginson had felt relieved by the successful
political solution to the Kansas struggle, now they were
being asked to finally and firmly reject a political settle-
ment on the question of slavery. In effect, each member of
the committee was being asked to incite a Faneuil Hall crowd
and send it storming into Court Square. And each of the mem-
bers faced that request with the same ambivalence that Parker
and Howe felt four years earlier.
In addition to Brown's unanswered questions and their
own ambivalence about using violence as an offensive weapon
against slavery, all of the committee members including
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Higginson had tremendous doubts about the central premi;
which Brown's insurrectionary thrust rested: the willingness
of blacks to fight for their freedom. All of the reluctant
conspirators were imbued with a romantic racialist image of
the black man's nature and did not believe he was capable of
fighting his white oppressors. As recently as January, in a
speech called the "Present Aspect of Slavery," Theodore
Parker perfectly explicated their racial sentiment. Indeed,
Parker fully accepted the racial stereotype adhered to by the
defenders of slavery. But Parker claimed that far from mark-
ing the black race for slavery, such traits indicated that
the black man had achieved an advanced form of Christian
piety and should therefore be a free member of society.
Parker spoke almost reverently of the African as the "most
docile and pliant of all races of man." He almost applauded
the fact that the black man had "little ferocity." Vengeance
which was "instantial" with the Anglo-Saxon (as well as being
the ultimate souce of his freedom) was "exceptional" in the
black man's history. Even in their "barbarous state" Afri-
cans had never been "addicted" to revenge. In fact, the
black man was "always prone to mercy." He was strong in the
"affectional instinct," "easy," and "indolent." Unlike his
Anglo-Saxon brothers who owed their freedom to their ability
to fight for it, the black man was "little warlike." Brown
asked for far more than money from members of the committee.
He sought their trust without fully revealing his plan, he
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asked them to surmount their apprehension about using vio-
lence, and, above all, asked them to accept views of the
black man that did not square with their own conceptions of
his nature. It is no wonder that in the first days after
Brown left Boston the committee members remained only "half
convinced" about supporting the "dash" at slavery. As Parker
noted sometime later, they simply weren't sure that Brown's
plan was the "right way" of getting at slavery.
Clearly, Parker's misgivings were the greatest among the
committee membership. And this is exemplified by the minis-
ter's reaction to a request Brown made of him before leaving
Boston. The Kansas warrior asked Parker to write two addres-
ses for his use during the invasion. One was to be sent to
the "officers and Soldiers of the United States army on the
Duty of a Soldier." In it, Brown hoped Parker would "power-
fully assert" the conviction that a soldier's duty (if he
understood what was morally right) "was to desert the army
and join up with Ossawatomie Brown." The second address was
to be used by Brown to inspire his insurrectionary forces.
And his request for it is an interesting projection of the
way in which the warrior cultivated the confidence of poten-
tial allies. Brown stipulated that the second speech must be
short so as to be read and must be written in the "simplest
and plainest language." The address must not have "the least
affection of a scholar about it." Yet it should be construc-
ted with "great clearness and power." The whole tone of the
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speech, like Brown's tone with his conspirational associates,
must demonstrate that he was "'after other' and not 'after
himself, at all, at all'." Parker should also bear in mind
that "women were susceptible of being carried away by the
kindness of an intrepid and magnanimous soldier even when his
brave name was but a terror the day before." 25
Parker refused Brown's request. Instead, he sent Brown
a copy of General McClellan's "Report on the Armies of
Europe." The refusal indicates Parker's initial uncertainty
about Brown's plan. The minister like the rest of his col-
leagues (except Higginson) had begun to collect funds for
Brown but had not really resolved qualms about conspiring to
subsidize the raid. His trust in Brown's character and val-
ues carried him a long way but his skepticism about violence
and a black response prevented his entire commitment to the
project. Yes, he would raise funds for an attack he wasn't
---even sure would take place but he would not write speeches
that were premised on the fact that such an insurrectionary
thrust had already been made. Subsidizing theory was one
2 6thing writing speeches for the actuality quite another.
Yet even though Parker's tentative initial commitment to
Brown rested on a faith in the warrior's character, as weeks
passed he gave serious attention to Brown's contention about
the slave's willingness to fight. Slowly that theoretical
commitment strengthened. Slowly Parker began to dispel his
anxiety about the capability of blacks to exhibit "vengeful
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emotions." Perhaps Brown was correct. Perhaps it was neces-
sary (and possible) that black men fight for freedom.
Brown's assertions forced Parker to reflect on facts which
seemed to butress the warrior's claims.
In early February, 18 56, Parker had been considerably
impressed by the courage and initiative of Anthony Burns.
After spending two years in slavery, following rendition, the
fugitive's freedom had been purchased by leading black and
white abolitionists of Massachusetts. When Burns returned to
Boston to express his gratitude he spoke of his future plans.
The ex-slave claimed that he eventually wanted to work "in
the South" as a minister. He realized many black men didn't
wish to go back there once freed from slavery but said he
felt compelled to do so in order to help his people "out of
bondage." Burns' courageous stand seems to have prompted
Parker to make inquiries of William Wells, a leading black
literary figure and historian residing in Boston, about black
contributions to the American revolutionary effort. Accord-
ing to Wells these contributions had been substantial.
Wells' contentions inspired Parker to write the historian
George Bancroft and ask that more attention be given to the
valiant role played by blacks at Bunker Hill. 27
When Parker linked the memory of Burns' statements with
Wells' assertions and efforts of Boston blacks to free the
fugitive slave Shadrach in 1852, Brown's contentions about
the black man's willingness to fight for his own freedom
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helped stimulate some new theorizations
. in early April of
1858, Parker asserted that it was time for a re-assessment of
white "out-door charity." Parker was now convinced that sev-
enty percent of these charitable efforts had only a "reflex
good action." That is, only thirty percent of white chari-
table activity actually helped the intended "receiver." Most
of the time it was the "giver" who benefited himself with a
sense of "his own righteousness." Parker believed it was
necessary to "reverse" these percentages. The best way to do
this (as Brown intended) was to make efforts which were
geared toward helping people help themselves. Parker's
assertions about "out door charity" on the heels of Brown's
revelations say a good deal about the growing impact of the
warrior's statements. After first being met with unspoken
skepticism, Brown's words forced Parker to re-evaluate the
effects of white reform efforts. Parker now conceded that
such efforts were "mainly bad" and did "more harm than good."
The Unitarian minister even formulated a new law. He hypoth-
esized that "charitable demand" was often "equivalent to the
organization to meet that demand." When organized "depen-
dence" became "institutionalized" both giving and receiving
were simultaneously bureaucratized. In the name of perfect-
ing society reformers might be inadvertantly thwarting the
one thing that could bring about such perfection: the indi-
vidual's own effort for perfection. No one could have made
this clearer to Parker than the highly disciplined,
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self-controlled, autonomous, Kansas warrior, named John
Brown. If Parker dared carry his new theories to their log-
ical extreme (and the minister seems to have done just that),
he must have begun to suspect the highly organized and insti-
tutionalized efforts of abolitionism. Maybe such efforts
weren't helping blacks. Perhaps, as Brown contended, such
efforts only provided white antislavery advocates with a
sense of their own "righteousness." Perhaps Brown was cor-
rect when he suggested that only black self-help could be
effective. Parker's slowly developing enthusiasm for a ven-
ture he initially listened to with serious doubts is at
least partially attributable to this reasoning. It counter-
balanced Brown's lack of specific detail about the venture,
as well as, the minister's ambivalence to violence and his
2 Q
romantic racialist prejudice.
There was also another reason why Parker gradually
embraced Brown's plan. A "revival of religion" was taking
place in Massachusetts and throughout the country that
spring. But the radical Unitarian minister was not at all
pleased. He felt it was a "false revival" especially when
ministers in the Boston area attributed it to "prayer." To
Parker it wasn't "prayer" that brought religious reawakening
but "effectual fervant work" for the right. The "head-work"
and "hand-work" of "a righteous man." Simply gossiping
before bedtime, "tattling mere words," and then asking God to
do one's own duty was not true religious revival. Uncertain
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as Parker may have been about Brown's plan, the minister
could not overlook the fact that in "Ossawatomie Brown" reli-
gion had an "effectual" and "fervant" worker. Brown wanted
action not mere words. He not only spoke for the right but
demanded that black slaves cease praying for salvation and
start striking for it with their own hands. In addition,
Parker viewed Brown as more than a righteous man. In his own
way, the man from North Elba was an intensely dedicated and
emotional minister of the gospel and Parker had always con-
tended that it was a minister's duty "to awaken, strengthen
and quicken the religious power" of men. It was the minis-
ter's duty to "diffuse ideas" which "molded society" so that
it could develop well under the direction of men of great
"natural powers." Wasn't this precisely what Brown wanted to
accomplish by his insurrectionary efforts? The warrior hoped
to change white views of the black man and thereby remold
white attitudes toward the institution of slavery. At the
same time, he was asking slaves to assert their manhood.
Could there be a more competent "minister" to "diffuse" the
proper ideas and values to both black and white society?
Weren't Brown's values precisely those which Parker and his
colleagues hoped to impart to their fellow Americans?
Higginson felt there was something much more "real" about
Kansas settlers than there was in the rest of the "diseased"
American society. Wasn't Brown a "real" American, who embod-
ied the ideals of Bunker Hill? Couldn't Brown bring the
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con-
proper values to black men-maybe even impart the "vengeful"
emotions so necessary for freedom? 29
Parker's speculations calmed the fears of the "half
vinced" Sanborn and his Kansas committee sponsor, George
Luther Stearns. Each of these men shared Parker's ambiva-
lence toward violence and his doubts about black capabilities
In addition, they still wondered if they had heard the last
from Hugh Forbes, they wondered if the convulsion Brown hoped
to induce could be controlled, and they pondered their
responsibility if the warrior was caught. In the face of
these and other doubts, Parker's theorizations were reassur-
ing.
Samuel Gridley Howe was particularly influenced by his
good friend's notions. Parker's views resonated his own the-
ory of diffusion. When he thought about it, Howe realized
that he and Stearns had actually made a similar case for
self-help in their discussions about the handicapped. If it
was important for the handicapped to be exposed to "normal"
people, wasn't it just as important that the black men, hand-
icapped by the institution of slavery, also have that oppor-
tunity. Could blacks be exposed to a better man than Brown?
Howe also conjured up a four-year-old memory as he debated
the necessity of black violence. He could still hear the
shouts of a young black woman as she watched Anthony Burns
being taken back to slavery. He should "kill himself" she
cried as Burns walked by, "kill himself" rather than be taken
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back into slavery. At that time Howe had realized that this
ultimate gesture of self-sacrifice was really the only thing
which would disabuse white America of the notion that blacks
were suited for slavery. Perhaps Brown was correct, perhaps
a fight to the death for freedom was the only way for the
black man to demonstrate his manhood and hatred for slavery.
Wasn't the willingness to fight to the death for freedom the
central racial trait of the Anglo-Saxon? Didn't the black
man have to adopt the trait in order to demonstrate his right
to freedom? 30
Parker's thoughts on "out-door" charity also caused Howe
some guilt. His own trip to Kansas had been an effort to do
more for the "giver" then the "receiver." The excursion had
been as much a way of resolving personal doubts about his
character as it had been an attempt to assist Kansas settlers.
It was a "last chance" to test the purity of his motives, to
overcome his fear of danger, and to recapture a romanticized
past. In the end, the trip only served to compound the uncer-
tainty he felt about his character. He began to believe that
if slavery was to be actively resisted it would have to be
done by someone other than himself. Now, ironically, he not
only had the chance to subsidize someone else's effort but
also, in a somewhat less extravagant way, to recapture a sense
of his own self-worth. All Brown asked was a chance to act.
Howe and his committee associates grew more certain each day
after Brown's departure that they could not refuse him.
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III
While Brown's Boston allies collected money to subsidize
his "dash" at slavery and gradually dispersed their apprehen-
sions about the advisability of the scheme, the Kansas war-
rior went to Philadelphia with John Jr. for discussions with
black leaders in that city. His conversations with Rev.
Stephen Smith, William Still, and the militant black minis-
ter, Henry Highland Garnet, reaffirmed his convictions about
the willingness of free northern blacks to assist the plan.
Brown left Philadelphia full of confidence. He then traveled
to North Elba and recruited the services of his sons Henry,
Watson, and Oliver before quickly moving on to Syracuse.
There he visited black minister James Loguen who suggested he
seek the assistance of famed underground railroader Harriet
Tubman. Brown sought the black woman out in St. Catherines,
Ontario but she made no commitments to his venture although
she suggested he might obtain assistance from Martin R.
Delany the black nationalist who was living in Chatham,
Ontario. Indeed, Delany was helpful. He suggested they set
up a convention in early May where Brown might outline his
plan to radical abolitionists residing in Ontario. Hopefully
Brown could also recruit interested parties. After a trip to
Springdale, Iowa to advise his Kansas recruits of the state
of his plans, Brown returned to Chatham, May 8, and prepared
for the convention. Everything seemed to be proceeding
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smoothly. Brown had the financial backing of the Secret Six
the approval and support of militant black leaders, and an
opportunity to recruit more men for his "dash" at Chatham. 31
CHAPTER VI
211
As John Brown prepared for the Chatham meeting, new out-
bursts by Hugh Forbes shattered the confidence of the Secret
Six and forced postponement of the raid. Once again Forbes
lashed out at the New England "humanitarians" ("especially"
Sanborn) for their negligent treatment. This time he made it
clear that he would refuse to allow Brown's "speculation" to
"go on." The letters Forbes wrote to Howe and Sanborn did
not indicate the soldier knew of the secret committee but did
suggest he had greater knowledge of the scheme than Brown had
led the group to believe during the March meetings. Sanborn
had hoped to attend the Chatham convention and bring Brown
600 dollars. Now, in the wake of the Forbes ultimatum, there
was no chance of traveling to Canada. The committee had to
act swiftly to prevent Forbes from "giving statistics" and
"quoting prices" to newspapers while they were "trying to
start a march on buyers and sellers." 1
And act they did. On May 5 Sanborn, Stearns, Parker,
and Howe met to consider their proper course. A careful
reexamination of the contents of Forbes' letters indicated
that the soldier knew "details of the plan" and also knew
that Stearns, Howe, and Sanborn were "informed" about it.
Parker and Stearns were quick to react. They decided the
plan had to be "deferred." Sanborn claimed to be "in doubt"
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though "inclining to their opinion." Only Howe balked. He
wasn't at all sure postponement was necessary but could not
persuade his fellow conspirators to change their view and
ultimately acquiesced in their decision. In addition to this
temporary withdrawal of support, it was also decided that
Stearns should go to Chatham and speak to Brown. In the
meantime, Sanborn was to write to Gerrit Smith informing him
of the situation and asking his assistance in explaining the
secret committee's action to the Kansas warrior. It was
hoped that Smith would also go to Chatham to discuss the
Forbes' threats and to help re-evaluate the project. 2
Two days after the meeting Sanborn received another let-
ter from Forbes in which the soldier of fortune indicated
that he would stop at nothing to destroy Brown's effort.
After reading the letter Sanborn no longer "inclined" to
postponement but clung to it in panic-stricken desperation.
The committee secretary immediately wrote to Higginson saying
that Forbes had "exact knowledge" of the secret project, that
there was "a leak" somewhere in the secret committee's boat,
and that since everything was so "uncertain" the plan was
best terminated "for the present." Before they did anything,
the secret committee must "get rid" of Forbes. He had a
"grudge" against all of them. Sanborn also openly questioned
the competence of John Brown, the source and symbol of his
"place" in Massachusetts abolitionism. After asking
Higginson to make discreet inquiries about Forbes and
requesting the minister to go to Canada ™h i-t and discuss matters
with Brown (Steams now claimed he was unable to do it),
Sanborn flared angrily at his erstwhile warrior patron/ The
secretary told Higginson that he fully realized news of post-
ponement would be "hard" for his "old friend" but suggested
that the delay was entirely Brown's fault. The warrior's
"too great confidence in Forbes" had forced such a decision
"upon the speculators." Sanborn had been a bit upset by
Brown's "imperiousness
" during the North Elba subscription
effort, was occasionally disappointed when he didn't receive
news of Brown's whereabouts, and was annoyed by the "abusive-
letters Forbes wrote in January but he was never tempted to
quit Brown's side. Now, however, even as Parker's theoriza-
tions nourished his own and the others confidence in the
advisability of the scheme, Forbes' behavior created very
serious doubts about the wisdom of supporting "Ossawatomie
Brown .
"
3
Thomas Wentworth Higginson was the only member of the
Secret Six who would not be stampeded into postponement.
Higginson was irate when Sanborn notified him about deferral.
He was determined not to go to Canada to appease Brown. He
rejected the committee's decision outright and immediately
wrote to the Kansas warrior stating his position. The
Worcester activist was absolutely "against postponement." If
the plan was postponed, it was "postponed forever." After
all, couldn't Hugh Forbes "do as much harm this year as
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next?" Higginson believed everything had gone "too far"—
hesitating at this moment meant "certain failure." When
Theodore Parker tried to placate his protege by suggesting
that if Higginson "knew the extent" of "Forbes' knowledge" he
would "not council" continuation, the activist refused to
4listen.
Nor was Higginson the only member of the secret group
who had to be sold on postponement. Parker also found it
necessary to convince Howe of the propriety of the May 5
decision. Howe certainly "knew the extent" of Forbes
threats, since he had received one of the soldier's letters.
And initially the physician flew into a "tempestuous rage"
over the matter. He was particularly angered by Forbes*
vague effort to inform Henry Wilson, Charles Sumner, and
William Seward of Massachusetts' plans "to overthrow slavery
at the South. " But Howe had not panicked like his colleagues
and still hoped to continue the project after Stearns,
Parker, and Sanborn settled on deferral. Instead of abandon-
ing Brown, Howe felt it would be possible to confuse and
divert Forbes. He fired off a "blistering" note to the sol-
dier of fortune claiming his accusations were based on "utter
fallacy." Howe said it was "absurd" for Forbes to infer that
the committee's (Massachusetts Kansas) relationship with
Brown invested them with "any responsibility for his acts."
As far as the doctor knew there was no legal or moral con-
tractual arrangement between the two soldiers. Even if Brown
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had entered into an agreement, the committee "never delegated
power to anyone to bind it by legal and moral obligation."
Howe hoped to "dissolve" Forbes of any "lingering notion"
that he or "any members" of the "late committee" had "any
responsibility for Captain Brown's actions." Howe falsely
suggested that in the "last communication" sent to Brown the
committee had urged him to go "at once" to Kansas and assist
in the coming elections. In his letter Howe also made a
great effort to keep Forbes from any further meetings with
Charles Sumner who was still suffering emotionally and phys-
ically from his beating on the Senate floor two years ear-
lier. Howe told Forbes that he had personally notified
Sumner of Brown's "integrity" and "ability." And the doctor
asserted that any future attempt by Forbes to convince Sumner
of negligence by his Boston friends would be wasted. 5
A few days after Howe wrote Forbes, he also sought to
"dissolve" the suspicions of Henry Wilson. Forbes had
approached the junior Senator from Massachusetts with vague
references to Brown's plan and accusations about possible
misuse of Massachusetts Kansas Committee funds. Wilson was
shocked and immediately contacted Howe hoping to determine
the truth about the soldier's statements. Wilson was afraid
that if Forbes' revelations were true and were made public
they would jeopardize the Republican Party's election chances
in the fall. Wilson demanded to know what was going on in
Massachusetts. Howe was quick to reply. He assured Wilson
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that the Massachusetts Kansas Committee had given "no counte-
nance" to Brown for "any operations outside of Kansas." Mea-
sures had been taken "to prevent any such monstrous perver-
sion of a kind as would be the application of means raised
for the defense of Kansas to a purpose which the subscribers
to this fund would disapprove and vehemently condemn." Tech-
nically, Howe was being "truthful" with Wilson. Forbes did
not realize Brown's subsidization had been taken over from
the Kansas Committee by the Secret Committee of Six. Also,
in the days immediately following the May 5 conference, pos-
session of the guns originally donated to Brown by the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee and later reconfirmed in his
possession by the Secret Six had been transferred back to
George Luther Stearns whose personal funds had paid for them
in the first place. Bureaucratic subterfuge allowed Howe to
"truthfully" tell Wilson that the Massachusetts Kansas Com-
mittee had not "countenanced" the plans Forbes alluded to in
his statements. But the Boston physician had stretched the
limits of truth considerably. And he well knew it. 6
While Howe diverted Forbes and Wilson, Sanborn again
tried to bring Higginson into line with the views of the
other secret committee members. He notified Higginson that
even Gerrit Smith agreed that postponement was the wisest
policy. The secretary also claimed that he could not "quite
yield" to Higginson' s arguments because Forbes had it "in his
power" to remove "the terror" of Brown's proposed
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insurrectionary thrust. Wasn't the element of surprise the
most essential feature in the plan Brown outlined during
March? There was no doubt in Sanborn's mind about deferral
and the necessity of putting Forbes "off the track." Sanborn
further rationalized his attitude near the end of his letter
to Higginson by claiming that even if he agreed with
Higginson nothing could be done to change the May 5 decision
because the largest "stockholders" in the venture (Stearns,
Smith, and Parker) were adamantly opposed to any movement by
Brown and would not raise money to support the warrior.
Since there was "little the rest of us can do ... in that
way," Sanborn felt he must abide by the decision. 7
Higginson was cynically amused by the temerity of his
fellow conspirators and particularly angered by Sanborn's new
found obsequiousness. As secretary of the Massachusetts
Kansas Committee, Sanborn never hesitated to wield the
authority of his office in Brown's behalf. Whether he was
badgering Higginson for Worcester funds or soliciting Stearns
generosity during the North Elba subscription drive, Sanborn
had always been aggressive and calculating; never cowed by
his own lack of financial resources. Now, however, in the
face of possible exposure by Forbes, he had become uncharac-
teristically submissive to the major "stockholders." As
Higginson reread Sanborn's letter he was also struck by the
secretary's use of the w- d "terror." For an individual who
only knew of violence ill theoretical way and who, along
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with the other secret committee members, had steadfastly
avoided personal contact with violence, terror was an unknown
commodity, a mere abstraction justified by another abstrac-
tion known as Higher Law. For Sanborn and the others, vio-
lence was a topic to be discussed in lecture rooms, the gra-
cious confines of the Bird Club, and in front of an abolition-
ist gathering. Violence only had practical use to them as a
threat to slaveholders or as a rhetorical device to stimulate
and shape public opinion. As far as Higginson was concerned,
Sanborn, Parker, Stearns, Smith, and Howe would never con-
front the reality of force, never take responsibility for
subsidizing it. Higginson suspected that something more than
Forbes' disclosures held his colleagues back, a greater fear
gripped these men than concern about exposure. Even though
they had committed themselves to Brown early that spring they
were all ambivalent about the use of violent means and con-
tinued to look for a reason not to follow through with sup-
port for the Kansas warrior. Forbes' revelations provided
them with the perfect opportunity to swap abstractions. They
traded the principle of justifiable violence for that of
self-interest. They relieved their own doubts and fears.
Higginson was furious.
George Luther Stearns also worked to order the chaos
unleashed by Forbes. He also sought to throw people "off the
track." He warned Brown to hold on to the rifles and side-
arms he had been given pending further directions from the
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committee. In a few days a member of the secret group would
arrive at Chatham to discuss the "best mode" of "disposing"
of the weapons.
The letters Brown received from his Boston "friends"
telling of Forbes' destructive efforts and suggesting post-
ponement of the raid punctuated an already disappointing con-
vention. Harriet Tubman failed to appear, fewer men than
Brown expected showed up to discuss the plan, and some who came
expressed the opinion that the Kansas warrior would be "dis-
appointed in the slaves because they did not know sufficient
to rally to his support." By the end of the Chatham meeting
he had not recruited anyone to join him, was stranded in
Canada without sufficient funds to pay his hotel bill, and
seemed to have lost all credibility with a majority of the
secret committee's membership. In desperation, Brown again
turned to his son John Jr. and asked if he would "think over"
the matter. Like so many other times when his ventures were
on the brink of failure, Brown hoped his eldest son could
shed "light on the subject." Brown knew he had to act
quickly. He must regain control of the situation or face the
possibility of complete loss of support by the Secret Commit-
9tee of Six.
Calming himself, the Kansas warrior took the first step
toward reclaiming the confidence of his "stockholders" by
writing to the one man who stood firmly against postponement,
Thomas Wentworth Higginson. The letter Brown wrote at this
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critical juncture in the conspiracy is quite revealing. it
tells as much about the image he hoped to promote as his let-
ter to young Henry Stearns. Brown made no appeals to the
justice of his cause, no allusions to his providential
instrumentality, no use of Biblical quotation or inflated
antislavery rhetoric. Rather, he labored to reestablish his
image as a pragmatic, self-controlled and calculating "leader
of men." He told Higginson that it was "invariable" with him
to be "governed by circumstances." He would "not do any-
thing" while he did "not know what to do." None of his
Boston friends "need have any fears" about "hasty or rash
steps being taken." Only "knowledge" was "power." Brown
assured Higginson that arrangements had been made to quiet
Forbes, asked for funds to pay his Chatham bills, and con-
cluded his letter with the pledge that he would "not . .
act other than to secure perfect knowledge of the facts in
regard to what Forbes had already done." The course to be
taken in both Chatham and Boston should not be decided "under
excitement. "^
Brown also wrote to George Luther Stearns. Covering
much of the same ground with the Med ford businessman that he
had with Higginson, Brown closed his note with the injunction
he would live by: "In all ways acknowledge Him, and He shall
direct thy paths." But Stearns was not as deeply affected by
such biblical flourishes as he once had been. Despite these
calm assurances the businessman was too upset with Brown to
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be impressed by religious incantations. He wanted to know
why Forbes was acting so irrationally, how much Forbes knew
of the plan, why Brown had been so indiscriminate in trusting
such an erratic character, and what the true nature of
Brown's arrangement had been with the disgruntled soldier?
Most important, Stearns like Sanborn, Parker, and Smith had
lost confidence in Brown. In March, Stearns believed Brown's
version of the agreement; at the moment he was unsure of what
to believe. The businessman's slowly developing willingness
to have faith in black capabilities and to repress his fear
of violence was shattered by Brown's indiscretion. Could
Brown really lead a successful raid on slavery when he
couldn't even govern the behavior of a former military asso-
ciate? Shortly after receiving Brown's letter Stearns wrote
to Higginson, notified him that Brown had been relieved of
the arms in his custody, invited the Worcester activist to
Boston in order to discuss postponement, and coldly advised
the recalcitrant committee member that if he would only listen
"we can convince you it [postponement] is for the best."
Brown's religious injunction hadn't made a dent in the lead-
pipe manufacturers' conviction to temporarily withhold sup-
port from the scheme.^
In the week between receiving Brown's letter of May 15
and Stearns' request that he come to Boston to be "convinced"
on May 21, Higginson continued his vigorous effort to salvage
the raid. On May 18, he wrote Parker and again warned that
222
"postponement was abandonment." Forbes "could do as much
harm next year." He firmly believed threats of exposure
could only be countered by swift action. There was still
time to capitalize on the element of surprise, still time to
"steal a march." He had "little doubt" that a successful
effort could be made. Any "betrayal afterwards " would "only
inCrease the Panic " caused by the raid. To Sanborn's conten-
tion that Forbes could "injure the operation" by exposing the
"smallness of its resources," Higginson made a most revealing
rebuttal; one that indicates much about the nature of the
plan unfolded by Brown in early March. Higginson told Parker
that Sanborn had forgotten that by Brown's " original program "
the raid "was to be regarded (at first) as a mere local
flurry with no resources at all." From the beginning Brown
argued that the small size of his group would act as a per-
fect camouflage to the ultimate design of general insurrec-
tion and Higginson was "amazed" his fellow conspirators
hadn't considered this before making their decision. 12
Higginson fought hard for Brown's plan on other grounds
as well. In the last weeks of April and the first weeks of
May, Higginson became thoroughly convinced in the necessity
of black violence. The minister gave testimony to that
belief and at the same time prodded his secret committee
associates in a May 12 speech before the New York Antislavery
Society. Echoing ideas quite similar to Parker's notions
about "out door" charity, Higginson stated that "white
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Anglo-Saxon abolitionists" were "too apt to assume the whole
work" of ending slavery and tended to "ignore the great force
of the victims of tyranny." if black slaves were "ever to
free themselves," they "must strike the first blow." For
many years he had been "disposed to think" that the "salva-
tion of the slave" had to be worked out "not by him but for
him." Presently, he had begun to "see otherwise." Higginson
admitted to wondering at the "patience of the Negro" but was
confident that the time would come when seeing the "aroused
strength" of the African, whites would "at last give him
credit for the prudence which was waited until these prelim-
inary agitations [Kansas, Fugitive Slave Law]
. . . created
the sympathy
.
. .
needed for his support. " Abolitionists
often spoke of the African as "weak, down- trodden, degraded,"
and "cowardly because exposed to the institution of slavery."
But in so doing, Higginson realized that abolitionists might
have been perpetuating the institution by failing to see that
"behind all those years of cheerful submission . . . there
may be a dagger and power to use it when the time comes."
The African had been degraded by the institution of slavery
but it was time all Americans saw what he had once been and
what he "may be again." Ironically, Higginson made his
claims for the black man partially on the basis of his own
romantic racialist notions about the origins of race traits.
In the end, he based his confidence in black capabilities on
the fact that they had received blood from "heroic races,"
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the Maroons of Surinam and Jamaica, and these races had "min-
gled blood" with "a race [Anglo-Saxon] which was the strong-
est in the world." Higginson also saw significant indica-
tions of black willingness to fight for freedom. Fugitive
slaves demonstrated the black man's desire for freedom and
the Shadrach Rescue executed by Boston blacks was a prime
example of northern freeman's regard for his chained breth-
ren. Then too, as Brown noted in early March, the under-
ground railroad had "lodged tens of thousands in Canada" and
these black men and women "proved the possibility of African
civilization and African agriculture." As Howe might have
suggested, Higginson believed that blacks had "learned their
strength" in Canada by being exposed to "normal people" and
they were now ready to use that strength in the cause of
liberty. 13
On May 18, the same day that Higginson sent his letter
of protest to Parker, Sanborn wrote and told the Worcester
committeeman of Howe's efforts to "baffle" Forbes, Wilson,
and "God knows how many more" who had heard about the plan.
The secretary also informed Higginson that a committee meet-
ing had been called for May 24 in order to formally
re-evaluate support of Brown. Gerrit Smith promised to
attend since he had to be in town for an American Peace Soci-
14
ety meeting.
II
Reeling from his brother's recent death as well as the
disclosures by Forbes, Gerrit Smith came to Boston in late
May to speak before the American Peace Society. It is possible
that when Smith wrote his speech he was laboring under the
emotional burden of these two events. In any case, his words
to the society on the morning of May 24, are another example
of his "paradoxical intellect" at work. The address con-
tained "two separate arguments" about the use of force. In
one Smith spoke against a nation's involvement in external
war and in the other he spoke "in favor of armed force to
maintain internal order." Smith believed war in the inter-
national sphere "could be avoided always" and that "no nation
known to refuse to engage in it need fear it." A country's
refusal to fight would "unequivocally express" the "confi-
dence" that war would not be made on her. In addition, a
nation must give "ample proof" of her "professed principles"
by dismantling forts and disbanding her army. But Smith's
advocacy of this position on external warfare did not make
him a non-resistant (even Christ had practiced non-resistance
only from "expediency") for he firmly believed that "armed
force" was essential to the domestic life of a nation. There
was a definite need to "suppress frontier violence" and to
support the "irregular but righteous governments" set up in
Kansas. Above all, domestic violence was necessary to
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deliver the slave from bondage "at whatever harm to the
slaveholder and to restrain slaveholders by whatever terrors
it is necessary to hold over them." 15
By two o'clock in the afternoon, as Smith met with other
members of the secret committee in his Revere House hotel
room, these theorizations about the necessity of domestic
force gave way to the practical possibility of exposure by
Hugh Forbes. Smith fully agreed with Sanborn, Stearns,
Parker, and Howe that support should be temporarily withdrawn
from Brown. The secret group also decided that the best way
to diffuse Forbes' threats was to send Brown back to Kansas.
Howe had already suggested as much to the soldier of fortune
and Brown's actual return to Kansas might be enough to con-
vince him that the doctor was telling the truth. In order to
induce the Kansas warrior to go back to the territory and
assure him that he had not been abandoned, the committee
decided to promise to raise 2000 dollars for resumption of
the project at a later date. The committee also decided to
send Brown 500 dollars to pay his Chatham bills, to return
control of the rifles to the warrior, and to request his
presence in Boston for further discussion of the entire
16
matter
.
All of the secret committee members, with the obvious
exception of Higginson, were tremendously relieved by the
actions they decided upon in their afternoon meeting. Sur-
prisingly, the man who seemed to relax most was Samuel
Gridley Howe. He had not capitulated to postponement until a
few days before the meeting, but when he did he was happily
unburdened of the great pressure it took to stand by Brown.
Writing to George Woods, Howe expressed part of the reason
for his relief. The doctor claimed he could now "powerfully"
and "truthfully" assert that Forbes was "all wrong" in his
description of Brown's "intended movements." But it was more
than just being able to speak "truthfully" which eased his
mental and physical strain. Again, as in the summer of 1856,
the clash between Howe's abolitionist activity and his genu-
ine friendship for Charles Sumner had become a source of par-
1
7
alyzing guilt.
Earlier in the month Howe had been forced to lie to
Sumner when the ailing friend asked about the truth of state-
ments Forbes was making in Washington that spring. The doc-
tor claimed he was amazed Sumner didn't "see through" a man
whose "hot temper" had blinded him to the wrongfulness of his
course. Howe assured Sumner that the Massachusetts Kansas
Committee had never "directly or indirectly employed" Forbes
and that Brown's contact with the soldier had been made on
his "own responsibility." What bothered Howe was a growing
fear that Sumner would be drawn into the Forbes situation and
be subjected to undue emotional stress. Such stress might
further retard the slow recovery Sumner was making from his
beating. In fact, by mid-May, Howe wasn't certain that the
Senator hadn't already been affected. Writing to Sumner on
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May 17, in the midst of the crises, he cautioned his friend
to get plenty of "rest exercise and fresh air" and advised
him to "avoid taxing his brain by keeping away from people
and events" which "demand too much." Howe frankly admitted
that his own "doubt" had been "painfully incurred" by
Sumner's failure to improve his health and by his recent
relapse. In a comment that goes a long way toward explaining
why Howe finally agreed to postpone Brown's effort, the doc-
tor stated that his doubts would have "disappeared in a sad
certainty" if he could have been sure that the relapse "was
not occasioned by any sufficient external cause but was a
natural consequence of the internal condition of the injured
organs." Howe was very concerned that the Forbes accusations
had contributed to Sumner's failing health. Indeed, the very
next day, May 18, Howe suggested that his old friend should
resign his office and "stay away in Europe" for "a year or
„18two . "
By the time Brown received the secret committee's
request for a meeting in Boston at the end of the month, he
had calmed himself and had begun working to hold his cadre of
recruits in line during the period of postponement. Writing
to John Kagi and other members of the group who left Chatham
earlier, Brown informed them that "such has been the effect
of the course taken by Forbes on our Eastern friends that I
have some fears ... we shall be compelled to delay further
action for the presen t. " The warrior told Kagi that he had
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been urged to postpone but had been promised "liberal assis-
tance after a while." Even if they did have to "defer"
efforts, no problem should arise in "great and noble minds."
One should never indulge in "useless complaints." it was in
a "time of difficulty" that men showed what they were made of
and it was at such times that "men mark themselves." 19
John Brown began to "mark" himself with his "eastern
friends" on May 31 in Boston when he held the first of a
series of meetings in his room at the American House hotel.
Once again Brown was forced to explain his relationship with
Forbes. Once again Brown accused the soldier of being vain
and irresponsible. But this time Brown did admit that he had
not fully perceived the man's character when he first
recruited him for the scheme and that Forbes knew more about
the plan than Brown had previously suggested. Nevertheless,
Brown still argued that Forbes did not know enough to jeopar-
dize the project. Howe, Stearns, Parker, and Sanborn lis-
tened attentively as the warrior presented his case for con-
tinuation but like the pleas of Higginson, Brown's words did
nothing to change their determination to postpone the opera-
tion. After Brown finished, the committee members began to
spell out the way they felt it was best to diffuse the situ-
ation. Brown was formally notified of the committee's desire
to defer his "dash" at slavery, was asked to decoy Forbes by
returning to Kansas, and told that the secret committee fully
intended to support his venture next spring. As a way of
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demonstrating their continued commitment, they gave" Brown
another 500 dollars for his expenses. 20
Thomas Wentworth Higginson was noticeably absent from
all four days of the meetings held between Brown and the
other four Massachusetts members of the committee. He con-
tinued to fume about the attitudes and actions of his fellow
conspirators and felt that by disregarding their invitations
to attend the meetings and thereby "boycotting" those meet-
ings he could most effectively register his protest. How-
ever, Higginson was in Boston while the June 1 session was
being held and afterwards met privately with Brown to explain
his behavior. Higginson' s memorandum of his conversation
with Brown adds substantially to our understanding of the
meetings and of the relationship the warrior had with the
other committee members. Higginson noted that Brown had been
"pushed to postpone until next winter or spring," had been
"promised 2000 dollars to 3000 dollars" if he did so, and
asked to blind Forbes by returning to Kansas. Though Brown
kept actual control of the weapons committed to him in 1857,
he was to legally "transfer property" so as to relieve the
committee of responsibility. And in the future, the conspir-
ators were "not to know of his plans." Higginson reported
that Brown was very disappointed by the committee's decision
to postpone and considered those in favor of it not to be
"men of action . " Brown was very critical of the committee
membership. He was angry that they had been "intimidated" by
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Wilson, felt Gerrit Smith to be a "timid man," and thought
Stearns and Parker "did not
. . . abound in courage." Brown
did admire Howe for initially standing fast against postpone-
ment. He made no comment about Sanborn. 21
Brown's harsh words did not offend Higginson for his own
evaluation coincided with the warrior's assessment. In fact,
more than at any time in their relationship, Higginson was
deeply impressed with the man. He was a "sly old veteran"
who carefully calculated his actions. Brown admitted to
Higginson that in the meetings he had "appeared to acquiesce
far more than he really did" because now more than at any
other time " it was essential they did not think him reck-
less .
" Brown's behavior in the wake of the Forbes' disclo-
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sures truly "marked" him.
Nor were the five members of the secret committee who
had voted to defer aid to his project the only people to be
delicately manipulated by the image of a self-controlled
fighter for the right. Higginson also earned his share of
Brown's attention by his steadfast refusal to postpone the
venture. After their exchange on June 1, Brown was deter-
mined to pay closer attention to the Worcester activist. In
ensuing weeks he corresponded with Higginson more frequently,
spoke of his plans more freely, and regularly requested
Higginson 's viev/s of them, hoping all the while to deepen the
minister's interest in the scheme and earn a commitment of
23
funds from the Worcester County Committee.
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After seeming to "acquiesce" far more than he actually
did, Brown left Boston on June 3 and headed back to Kansas as
the "decoy" that "T. P. and the S's envisioned." He refused,
however, to let the committee forget their obligation to him
simply because he was out of sight. Within three weeks he
wrote from Kansas prodding his Boston friends to be "in ear-
nest ... to carry out as soon as possible," the measures he
had put forward in Boston "during the early spring." Brown
pushed them to begin collecting funds by claiming he wanted
-no delay in the matter." Brown also continued his efforts
to reestablish his image as a disciplined leader of men who
had the ability to smoothly carry out his proposed "dash"
against slavery. While in Kansas he had "concealed his pres-
ence," surfacing only long enough to let people know he was
in the territory but not "to create any excitement." He was
not in Kansas to "open a quarrel or be the first to seek
revenge." Even though the Kansas situation was gradually
resolving itself politically, Brown couldn't help exaggerat-
ing the possibility of new turmoil in order to sustain the
interest of his readers and further highlight his own discre-
tion. According to the warrior, frees taters lived in "con-
stant fear" of "new troubles" and they felt the whole Kansas
24problem would start "afresh."
In addition to these efforts to pressure the Secret Six
and refurbish his image with them, Brown also seems to have
enlisted the aid of James Repath, the frenetic young
journalist who had journeyed into Kansas with Higginson.
While no specific documentation exists to suggest that the
two men entered into an agreement, a number of facts point to
that conclusion. For one thing, Repath enjoyed the full con-
fidence of the only man on the committee who stood by Brown
during the Forbes affair, Thomas Wentworth Higginson. Cer-
tainly Higginson could use help in pressing Brown's cause.
For another, Repath had even more impressive credentials than
Brown when it came to assessing the black man's willingness
to fight for his freedom. The young journalist had traveled
extensively in the South with the expressed purpose of find-
ing out whether or not blacks were primed for insurrection.
Indeed, before Repath went south he claimed that if blacks
weren't ready for violence he would "disseminate discontent-
ment" and prepare the way for "revolution." Here was a man
with first-hand knowledge of all that Brown claimed for the
blacks. It is hardly possible that the "sly old veteran"
would miss the opportunity to put a primary source in the
hands of Harvard scholars. And there is an even greater
reason to believe Brown recruited Repath to promote his
scheme among the reluctant conspirators in Boston. Repath
was as convinced as Brown was that the only way slavery could
be ended was by black insurrection. Soon after a meeting
with Brown on June 27, in Kansas, Repath started east. For
the next year he would press for the implementation of
Brown's scheme while residing in Medford, Massachusetts and
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preparing a manuscript for publication entitled The Roving
Editor: or Talks with Slaves in the Southern An
analysis of this work, which was eventually published in
November of 1859 and dedicated to Brown, reveals a good deal
about what Repath told Brown's Massachusetts supporters. 25
In this work Repath claimed to agree with Brown in
doubting the "efficacy of political antislavery action." it
was founded on "expediency" and "the morals of the counting
room" therefore it could do nothing to solve the black man's
problems. Like Brown, Repath urged friends of the slave to
"incite insurrection and encourage in the North a spirit
which shall culminate in civil and servile wars." If, after
all, the founding fathers had been justified in "their rebel-
lion, how much more will the slaves be justified in "their
insurrection." Repath also asserted that, like Brown, he was
ready to "slay every man who attempted to resist the libera-
tion of the slave" and was willing like Brown "to recognize
the negro as brother however inferior in intelligence and
actual endowments, as having rights which to take away or
withhold is a crime that should be punished without mercy." 26
Repath 's book contained both his own reflections on the
slave's condition and those of other informed observers.
Samuel Gridley Howe contributed a piece on a slave prison in
New Orleans. One of the centerpieces of the book, which the
journalist obviously felt went a long way toward documenting
his contentions about slave desires to fight for liberation,
is a section called "The Insurrection Hero." Here Repath
quoted long passages of a story written by John Vaughn which
studied the motivations of a black slave leader named Issac
who actually led an abortive insurrection in the South.
According to Vaughn, Issac was "kind, affectionate, and simple
as a woman" and "never tired of doing for others." Yet he
had determined that insurrection was the only hope for free-
ing his people. Issac 's own rationale for this position was
included in Vaughn's account. The slave claimed he "knew
there was and could be no help for me, for my wife or my
children, for my race, except we were free, and as whites
would not let this be so and as God told me he could only
help those who helped themselves, I preached freedom to the
slaves and bid them strike for it like men." Whether
Vaughn's piece was true or fictionalized is really not sig-
nificant. What is important is Issac' s rationale. It sug-
gests what both Brown and Repath had been saying all along:
black men knew they must fight for their own freedom. 27
Repath 's belief in the possibility of a spontaneous
insurrection ignited by an attack like the one Brown contem-
plated is also contained in a section he personally wrote for
the book entitled "The Underground Telegraph." According to
Repath blacks would rally to the banner of those leading an
insurrection because of the existence of a rapid and effi-
cient system of communication among slaves which could effec-
tively disperse the first news of a raid over a wide area of
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the South long before slaveholders could hear of the attack
and organize forces to subdue it. Repath claimed that this
elaborate "underground" telegraph had begun as a "system of
secret travel" among slaves and then had grown up into a
communication network initially because of the slave's "love
of gossip" and later, because of his "yearning for freedom."
The journalist claimed that this system linked hundreds of
plantations and there was no doubt in his mind that its exis-
tence gave "power" to stir a "formidable insurrection
directed by white men." 28
There is no doubt that all the Massachusetts secret com-
mittee members who heard Re oath's descriptions were skeptical.
All of them had studied slaves and slavery and had not dis-
covered such a system. Yet it seems likely that they contin-
ued to listen to him throughout the year, for none of these
men had the substantial first-hand experience that the jour-
nalist claimed. It was becoming more and more difficult to
refute the growing evidence which seemed to indicate a bur-
geoning black yearning for freedom and the willingness to
fight cor it.
Ill
But in the first few weeks after Brown left Boston nei-
ther his pressure tactics, Repath' s appearance, or the jus-
tice of black liberation concerned Stearns, Sanborn, and
Smith. They were all too relieved at having narrowly escaped
nsas
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exposure by Forbes. George Luther Stearns eased himself back
into a belief in the political dissolution of slavery. He
was cheered by the continually improving condition of Ka
and claimed to agree with E. E. Whitman that if frees tate
were "moderately diligent" they would thwart the Slave Powe
and send the institution to "political perdition." While
Brown was in Kansas acting as a decoy, struggling to recap-
ture the confidence of supporters, and suffering with the
ague, Stearns did little fund collecting for the warrior's
"wool business." Instead, he began remodeling his Medford
mansion, followed the Lincoln-Douglas debates, plotted the
course of Donati's comet and argued against those who
believed the superstition that "all great comets have been
closely followed by devastating wars." 29
Brown's "recklessness" in the Forbes affair petrified
Sanborn. All along his commitment to the forceful dissolu-
tion of slavery had been based essentially on his attachment
to Brown. In spite of Parker's theori zations about the
necessity of black self-help, the secretary found that once
his confidence in Brown was shaken he had great difficulty in
defending the proposed raid to himself or others. Throughout
the summer and fall of 1858 he cautiously modified his sup-
port for the insurrection. After all, if Brown bungled the
raid as badly as he did his relationship with Forbes it was
quite possible the entire membership of the secret committee
Id be faced with a lot more than "abusive" letters or thewou
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wrist-slapping criticism of people like Henry Wilson. "Trea-
son" had not yet become "patriotism" as Sanborn suggested to
Higginson weeks earlier. A jail term still waited for anyone
convicted as an accessory to Brown's scheme. And the thought
of going to prison horrified the ex-schoolmaster. Sanborn's
reflections on Kansas partially indicate his growing willing-
ness to see slavery removed by other than violent means. He
even took it upon himself to lecture Brown on the subject.
Sanborn was glad Kansas was "at peace." He now felt her
"true course" lay in formulating an effective frees tate con-
stitution to guide territorial fortunes. It was best for
Kansas to use traditional "political means to end slavery." 30
In May, at the time of the Forbes blow up, Gerrit Smith
only wanted Brown's plan "deferred." But by July, he was
telling Sanborn he didn't want to know anything about the
warrior's future efforts. While Smith still claimed Kansas
had been saved by her "own brave spirits" and applauded the
efforts of Brown in beating back "border ruffianism," he
returned to political antislavery during the late summer and
early fall. During that time the Peterboro landowner reen-
tered the political arena and ran for governor of New York.
Beginning in August, he attended some fifty- three campaign
meetings, traveled some four or five thousand miles, and
spent about 5000 dollars seeking office. Throughout the
effort he claimed to have accepted the nomination "in faith
that frank, bold, persuasive speech backed by moral truth
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would be more than a match for the [proslavery] press."
While he knew his chances for election were not great he was
optimistic about the aims of the campaign, made vigorous
efforts to justify his "spontaneous" nomination, and force-
fully promoted his antislavery views. 31
Even though Smith realized from the beginning that his
actual chances for election were slight, defeat in November
left him feeling indignant and self-righteous. It seemed to
him that people simply were not ready to receive the "demo-
cratic theories" he spent his life inculcating. Smith sup-
posed that he must "live and die an unpopular politician."
What was worse than his loss (for one is never sure Smith
wasn't intrigued by the cultivation of his own unpopularity)
was his feeling that throughout New York state antislavery
sentiment was dead. By late fall, he began to change the
direction of his thinking. He again became pessimistic about
the prospects of a political solution to slavery. The "pub-
lic mind" had been drawn away from abolition into the non-
extension of slavery. Again, in the face of his own politi-
cal failure and the death of antislavery sentiment, he
returned to a belief in the necessity of force. Kansas owed
her salvation not to politics but to "ample preparations to
repel by physical force the aggressions of slavery." It was
"men money and munitions" brought to Kansas by "eastern
enterprise and liberality" which had really saved the terri-
tory. The Republican Party had actually become the
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"protector of slavery." Perhaps Brown's effort would fail.
Perhaps his mishandling of Forbes was portentous. But in
the wake of political defeat Smith overlooked such possibil-
ities. He returned to a belief in the efficacy of "men money
and munitions." At the absolute minimum, an insurrectionary
thrust at slavery would rekindle a "demoralized" public sen-
timent.
IV
In the first weeks after Brown's departure, Theodore
Parker also became more cautious about advocating the use of
violence against slavery. Unlike his friends, Stearns,
Sanborn, and Smith, however, the minister never entirely
turned his back on the issue. Before he began a restful
journey in the Green Mountains that June, Parker outlined his
position to an audience at the annual meeting of the New
England Antislavery Society. Parker claimed that it was just
such meetings that were the "best manner" in which to agitate
the slavery question. Though he did admit even to this group
that in the various struggles between freedom and slavery,
the battle had always been "settled by war," and it seemed to
him that the "great and final" abolition of slavery in
33America would have to be accomplished in that way as well.
By mid-summer, with Brown safely in Kansas and the
Forbes episode fading from memory, the minister intensified
his pleas for violence. Examining the effects of slavery in
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a July speech he began by suggesting that "compulsory toil"
was "not necessarily degrading." Slaves learned "certain
special things" which they could not have learned in Africa.
Indeed, it was a sign of the slave's "excellency" that he
repudiated "individualism" and was "pliant before his mas-
ter 'swill" while he learned these "special things." But,
ultimately, the institution of slavery was "essentially
degrading" because it denied blacks "history . . . science
.
. .
arts
. . .
literature" and "a great war to look back
on." The minister did not wonder at the slave's "despair"
and went on to point out what Brown had that spring. Parker
was deeply offended by the fact that the wrong blacks suf-
fered had awakened "very little sympathy in the mass of men,
who in their rudeness reverence strength and not justice."
Brown was correct. A show of strength by blacks was the only
way to alter the black image among white Americans. In his
speech Parker also warned of the potential for violence in
black men. He wondered aloud to the audience what blacks
would do if the United States became engaged in a war with
England and answered his own question by claiming that "at
least three million [slaves] would take sides with the
enemy." Free black men would "spontaneously" do the same
thing. It is obvious from both of these speeches that
although the Forbes affair initially jarred Parker's confi-
dence in the warrior, the theoretical case Brown made for
34black insurrection continued to grip hirn.
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Thomas Wentworth Higginson also became more certain of
the correctness of Brown's theories in the months following
his departure from Boston. During the summer Higginson
advised William Lloyd Garrison to read an article he had pre-
pared on "African Proverbial Philosophy" claiming that it
would present "quite a new view of the character and capabil-
ities of the [black] race." But Higginson' s most revealing
expression of these "new" views are actually found in an
article he prepared for the September 1858 issue of the
Atlantic Monthly
. Here, in an elaborate theoretical frame-
work, Higginson fused romantic racialist attitudes, the
beliefs of Brown and Repath about the black man's willingness
to fight, Parker's speculations on "out-door charity," and
Howe's "theory of diffusion" into a comprehensive rationale
for insurrection. In this piece, Higginson achieved his
fragile synthesis by reexamining the typology of courage and
suggesting that violence could serve as a mechanism for value
assimilation. ^
In Higginson' s view, there were three forms of courage.
The greatest form was possessed by all "heroic races" and was
called the "courage of blood." According to Higginson, men
who possessed this type of courage dared perils not merely
for the sake of principle but for "their own sake." Actually,
there was no special merit in such courage. One either had
it hereditarily or he didn't. Indeed, the courage of blood
often concealed itself under the finer names of self-devotion
and high principle. As an example of this kind of courage
Higginson spoke of the activities of evangelist George Barrow
"who convinced himself that he was activated by evangelical
zeal to spread the Bible to Spain." In Higginson 's opinion
it was "chiefly adventure" which lured Barrow to Spain. 36
In Higginson 's typology there was an environmental com-
pliment to the "courage of blood" which was called "transmit-
ted courage." This second type was produced by constant
training and practice and could "give steadiness" to less
powerful inherited forms. This "transmitted" variety was the
type shared by a captain with his men. John Brown spoke of
this kind of courage (though not using the same terminology
as Higginson) in 1857 when he spoke of organizing freestate
settlers into militia groups. In these groups "strong" men
would bolster the courage of "weak" ones. 37
It was, however, in the examination of a third variety
of courage that Higginson fully revealed his "new view" of
black capabilities. The third type of courage was the "cour-
age of self-devotion" or courage of "emulation." It was this
kind of courage that women and Africans possessed. This
courage was evoked by "special exigencies" and was powerful
enough to alter the character of slaves who had been "sup-
pled" by long years of slavery and "softened" by mixed blood.
It allowed blacks to pass from "cowering pussilanmity " to the
topmost height of daring. Under its influence a slave's
"giddy laugh" vanished, his "idle chatter" hushed, and the
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"Buffoon" became hero. Self-devotion was the most noble fo
of courage because it entered the "domain of conscience" and
was engendered by outstanding moral leadership. if black
were exposed to the right leader they would be sure to fight
violently for their freedom and produce "results which seemed
miraculous." Higginson himself had a hard time determining
where this courage came from or what it really was. In the
end, he could only suggest that it was the "element of inspi-
ration" or a "superadded something" which was "incalcuable
"
in effect. Though he never said so directly in the article,
one is left with the unmistakable impression that the
Worcester activist was convinced that John Brown was just the
man to induce this "superadded something," just the man to
kindle black desires to fight for freedom. 38
It is unimportant whether Higginson even fully believed
in his own theoretical analysis or merely forwarded it as yet
another prod to his reluctant colleagues. The simple fact
that he attempted such a synthesis is significant. It sug-
gests that Higginson was trying to resolve for himself and
his fellow conspirators a basic contradiction between their
romantic race thinking and the contentions of both Brown and
Repath. Each of the conspirators, to one degree or another,
maintained a racial stereotype which was completely at odds
with the underlying reason for Brown's espoused willingness
to attempt to stimulate an insurrection. While each of the
six men could believe in the free black man's "spontaneous"
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desire to assist enslaved brethren, none of them believed the
slave was by nature capable of anything more than "docile"
and "pliant," though virtuous, behavior. Brown and Repath
both asked them to think differently. Parker had begun the
attempt to alleviate the contradiction with his preliminary
re-evaluation of the usefulness of white reform activity.
Higginson brought this thinking to fruition in his article by
providing the mechanism (the courage of self-devotion) which,
though not erasing the contradiction, allowed romantic
racialism and the possibility of black violence to co-exist.
The other members of the committee still had some major
doubts about Brown's competency, but at least Higginson had
gone a long way toward putting aside their racial skepticism
and their ambivalence toward violence. He had gone beyond
Higher Law for a justification of insurrection.
And Higginson did more than provide a theoretical
rationale for Brown's contentions in his article. He also
slapped the wrists of his fellow conspirators for their
shameful behavior toward Brown during the Forbes episode. In
so doing, he added further insight about the motivation of
the other members for supporting the Kansas warrior.
Higginson began his criticism of the others in the
introduction to the article. Here he started by claiming
that it was a "foolish delusion" to believe that the combined
power of gunpowder and peace had "banished" the necessity for
physical courage. The demand would never pass away.
246
Physical courage was neither -Mlei n easily set aside" nor",corollarv -p a mereon y from moral rage as our reformers- »
assume. m fact ^ seemed to, lt often occurred that the leaders of -age who had ample "mora i courage „ werg .
Certainlv ^ • Physically timid."y these introductory remarks were aimed at tnBrown had chastized f.
6
a ew months earlier for beina •
^ted" by Wilson and "not abo *
in , „
unding in courage." But thesetroductory remarks were mild wh
it • .
l W en co^Pared to those wordsHanson saved for the conclusion to his piece. Here
Higgmson claimed that men WKnwh
° -re committed to the "right
In his view, the rr&Ai .w un c edit was uniust for-j r their supposed moral
eg°tlSm
-" ThiS
-ipea these supposedly
courageous men to isolate twelves from
-all tand forhuman sympathy." ln the „best^ ^ ^ ^ ^^
ally preferred to belong to a party which was conveniently
r
al1
-" WSre ™th^ «• than elitists, who upon the
slightest indicafinnc 11 ^-f no txo s of popular approbation" began to
"suspect themselves of compromise . The .. abstract martyrdQm „
of "unpopularity was "clear gain" to them. But when it came
to the "rack
.
. . revolver and the Bowie Knife" their
"habitual egotism" made them "cowards." Such men were annoy-
ing "in themselves" and annoying because they threw discredit
on "noble and unselfish reformers." Clearly, Higginson
addressed these angry words to the men who had postponed
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Brown's raid. Clearly, he was suggesting that their actions
made both their radical abolitionism and allegiance to Brown
suspect in his eyes. He implied that both were a product of
elitist, egotistical, and self-serving principles and that in
the end these same principles had been the reason Brown's
39plan was postponed.
CHAPTER VII
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Thomas Wentworth Higginson had advocated execution of
Brown's plan in the face of the Forbes disclosures. Then he
showed his disdain for the secret committee's faint-
heartedness by boycotting their May postponement meetings and
censuring them in the Atlantic Monthly
. But the minister
also understood the limits to which his colleagues could be
pushed, and he realized that any further public furor about
slave insurrections would most certainly destroy their
remaining inclination to support the project. As a result,
he was quite alarmed by a short letter he received from
Lysander Spooner near the end of November. Spooner was an
abolitionist who had been active in Boston reform efforts for
years and had recently begun to press for the use of forceful
means to end slavery. In his note to Higginson, Spooner
asked for an opinion of a "scheme" he had devised to foment
slave insurrections. He enclosed two documents which he pro-
posed to have reprinted and circulated extensively through
the South. Both called for the violent overthrow of
, 1
slavery.
In the longer of the two broadsides entitled, "A Plan
for the Abolition of Slavery," Spooner demanded that slaves
be rescued from the "hands of their oppressors" by the "for-
mation of associations" dedicated to that purpose. He wanted
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private war waged against slavery by private individuals. He
also called for compensated emancipation, separation of gov-
ernment from the interests of slaveholders, and the destruc-
tion of the "security and value" of slave property. The
second, smaller document was addressed to "non-Slaveholders"
and went farther than the first one. In it, Spooner stated
that slaves had a "right to be free" and a "right to take
that freedom by force." It was the duty of all who were able
to assist this effort, particularly non-slaveholding whites.
While slaves were flogging and kidnapping their oppressors,
forming military cadres, and building forts from which to
"carry on warfare," it was up to non-slaveholders to be sup-
portive and let the black men "know they have your sympathy."
Such support would give slaves courage and self-respect as
2
well as making "men of them."
From the moment Higginson saw the Spooner plan he real-
ized what disaster would befall Brown's project if the docu-
ments were circulated. He knew the other committee members
were certain to abandon Brov/n and disband their secret group.
Somehow he had to dissuade Spooner. In his reply to the
Boston abolitionist, Higginson claimed to read the broadsides
with "great approbation" and suggested that increased inter-
est in the subjects Spooner alluded to was "one of the most
important signs of the times." He fully agreed that the
freedom of slaves had to be accomplished "by action of slaves
themselves in certain localities with the aid of secret
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cooperation from whites." Insurrection would convince slave-
holders of the futility of keeping blacks in bondage and
would force northerners "back on the fundamental question of
Liberty." Obviously remembering Brown's words as he
responded, Higginson went on to claim that a "single insur-
rection with decent temporary success would do more than any-
thing else to explode our present political platform." What
nineteenth century America needed was a sharp slap in the
face to clear its head.
But near the end of his note Higginson cautiously moved
to prevent Spooner from circulating the two pamphlets. He
agreed that blacks needed help from whites but claimed to
feel that the cooperation should be kept "secret." In revo-
lutions "the practical end" always came first, " the theory
afterward." Admitting to Spooner that the proposed circula-
tion might serve to prepare the "public mind, " Higginson nev-
ertheless went on to suggest that he felt this had already
been accomplished by the "fugitive slave cases" and "Kansas
excitement." He then asked Spooner not to distribute any-
thing until they could speak further. This plea was echoed
by Wendell Phillips and Theodore Parker who also received
notes from Spooner. Phillips said the plan was impractical.
Parker, like Higginson, requested Spooner not to do anything
4
until the two of them could "talk about it."
Spooner decided to temporarily postpone distribution of
the leaflets. Then, throughout December, he met with Parker,
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Higginson, and the other Massachusetts members of the Secret
Committee of Six. In order to permanently derail Spooner 's
scheme, the committee gave him a vague description of what
Brown intended, told him how the Kansas warrior was counting
on the element of surprise, and warned him that if his docu-
ments were connected to Forbes' revelations they might ruin
any chance for successful insurrection. At first Spooner
strenuously objected to these arguments by claiming that the
slaves needed "previous preparation." But by early January
he relented and agreed to drop plans for distribution of his
insurrectionary documents. Later in the spring, when Brown
had returned to Boston, Spooner met with the warrior and came
away from their discussion "wholly" convinced his decision
was correct. ~*
Just how much Lysander Spooner had to be told about
Brown's plan in order to be "wholly" convinced is difficult
to ascertain. Up until the late spring of 1859, Brown him-
self had been purposefully vague with the secret committee.
It is quite possible, therefore, that even if Spooner knew as
much as the committee did in January of 1859 he didn't really
know very much at all. What Brown himself told Spooner in
the late spring is unknown, though Spooner made some telling
remarks years later which suggest the limits of his own
knowledge. He claimed then that "very few knew much about
the details of Brown's plan until it was actual ly developed
at Harper's Ferry." Brown had broadly hinted where his
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assault was to begin, specified theoretical considerations
upon which he based his plan, and continually asserted his
own ability to execute the project but he did not outline the
specific tactics he hoped to use in the raid. in fact,
Spooner came away from his meeting with Brown feeling that
the aid furnished by the secret committee was given primarily
because of a "general confidence" in him and sympathy with
him rather "than from any intimate knowledge of the plan."
Spooner' s observation is partially correct. The committee
did base some of its support on confidence in Brown's charac-
ter. By late spring of 1859, however, four members of the
committee— Sanborn, Stearns, Smith, and Higginson did know
many specific details of the plan.
During December of 1858 Brown, though still out west,
played a major role in influencing Spooner' s final decision.
In the midst of the secret committee's negotiations with
Spooner, newspaper reports revealed that Brown had run off
eleven Missouri slaves during the third week in December.
The raid was proof of what Boston committee members had been
telling Spooner for some time: Brown had returned to Kansas
to divert attention and to discredit Hugh Forbes. He would
soon come east to prepare his insurrectionary strike. If
Spooner sent his pamphlets south the entire effort to "decoy"
Wilson, Seward, and all those to whom Forbes had spoken would
be ruined.^
Actually, Brown's Missouri raid did more than help con-
vince Spooner to end his circulation scheme. It also went
along way toward informing the secret committee that he was
"in earnest" and would soon be in Boston to make good on
their pledge of the previous spring. Higginson was particu-
larly excited by Brown's feat. The Missouri venture stimu-
lated new confidence in the warrior and made the minister
more optimistic than ever that Brown would be able to "make
a dash" into the South. Higginson was desperate for a black
insurrection. Writing in the Atlantic Monthly that winter on
the need to educate women (who shared the "courage of emula-
tion" with Africans), the minister suggested that if "con-
tempt did not originally cause failure" it certainly "perpet-
uates it." Any systematic effort to discourage a class or
individual would "in nine cases out of ten" cause that class
or individual to "acquiesce in their degradation," if not
claim it as a "crown of glory." Brown's successful Missouri
raid meant that, in spite of the Forbes disclosures, he might
yet stimulate enough confidence in the other committee mem-
bers to regain their full support for his proposed venture.
And in so doing, Brown would be given the opportunity to
begin the destruction of black "acquiescence" and white "con-
tempt." To Higginson the Missouri raid was not merely a
diversionary gesture but a tactical master-stroke with which
Brown hoped to win back support of the secret committee.
Still, Higginson was very careful to hide his rekindled
enthusiasm. When Sanborn wrote excitedly about the possibil-
ity of Brown getting "great results from this spark of fire"
(the Missouri raid)
,
Higginson responded by claiming to have
"serious doubts" that Brown would ever execute his plan.
The minister obviously sought to prod his youthful committee
colleague with pessimism and to remind him of the committee's
previous faint-heartedness
.
8
Like Sanborn and Higginson, Theodore Parker was also
impressed with Brown's effort. When it was suggested to the
Boston minister that the warrior's conduct was motivated by
a desire to avenge the murder of his son Frederick, Parker
sprang to Brov/n's defense and labeled such accusations as
unjust. If Brown had been motivated by vengeance he would
have sought "cheap and easy revenge on actual transgressors
in Missouri." Instead, the man had freed eleven slaves at
the expense of only one white life. Parker's defense was
stirring especially in view of the grave misgivings he enter-
tained about Brown's leadership abilities only a few months
earlier
.
But the Unitarian minister never got to discuss the
Missouri effort with Brown or to participate in the final
planning for the Harpers Ferry raid. By late January of
1859, his tuberculosis became so severe that Howe and other
Boston physicians advised him to leave New England and seek
healthful rest in warmer climates. In early February, Parker
began a year-long journey with his wife Lydia which took him
to the West Indies, London, Switzerland, and Rome, where he
arrived in early fall. 10
Realizing that Parker's tuberculosis would probably
"spread rapidly and remove the foremost man of the conti-
nent, Samuel Gridley and Julia Howe decided to accompany the
Parkers on the first leg of their journey. The two couples
had lived near each other on Exeter Street in Boston for some
years and were initmate friends. Lydia and Theodore Parker,
childless throughout their marriage, considered themselves
second parents to the Howe children. Both couples needed a
few weeks together before they were forced to part. And, in
Samuel Gridley Howe's mind, there were other important rea-
sons for the trip. Howe himself was very ill, plagued by a
physical reaction to the heightening tension in his day- to-
day existence. He and Julia were quarreling again. They
argued about separation, family financial problems, and
Julia's continued desire for a literary career. Howe was
sure a leisurely vacation would do them both some good. 11
After a brief stopover in Nassau the two couples headed
for Cuba. Here they toured the island together for a few
weeks before separating. Theodore Parker was impatient to
see Santa Cruz, so he and Lydia said their last goodbye and
left. Samuel Gridley and Julia decided to remain in Havanna
awhile longer before returning to Boston. During their stay,
they met wealthy South Carolina plantation owner Frank
Hampton and his wife— Hampton was the son of Senator Wade
Hampton. Despite different views on the institution of slav-
ery, the two couples got along very well. Hampton respected
Howe's work with the blind and Howe was absolutely intrigued
by Hampton's acute analysis of southern politics. Before
leaving Havanna, the southern couple suggested that Samuel
Gridley and Julia visit their plantation on the way home to
Boston. The idea appealed to the Howes. They liked the
Hamptons, were very interested in viewing plantation life
first-hand, and hoped that the visit would help resolve some
serious differences of opinion that they were beginning to
have about the nature and role of the black man in American
• * 12society
.
In late March, the Howes arrived at Frank Hampton's
prosperous Carolina plantation. But by this time, Samuel
Gridley Howe had given up all notions that a vacation would
alleviate his sickness. Throughout his stay at the Hampton's
the Boston doctor suffered from severe headaches. He was
still anxious about Parker; continually worried about the
state of his departed friend's health. Then, too, spending
time on the plantation wasn't as rewarding as Howe had first
envisioned. It actually made him squeamish. Somewhat belat-
edly, it occurred to Howe that the Hamptons were the same
kind of people Brown might have to sacrifice while leading
his black insurrection. Howe realized that it was one thing
to talk about taking white lives for black freedom and quite
another to share the hospitality of the intended white
victims. More than anything else, however, Howe's uneasiness,
his tension and headaches were due to a new aggravation in
his already strained relationship with Julia. 13
Julia Howe had begun to revise her abolitionist notions.
She had become irritated by the "calm satisfaction" with
which some men divided the "national moral inheritance." she
disliked the fact that because of slavery the South had been
given "all the vices" and the North "all the virtues." Julia
was put off by the "habitual, sneer, denunciation and male-
diction" which had become "consecrated forms of piety in
speaking of the South." Northerners were not absolved from
their "labor for amelioration" of slavery but must restrain
themselves from the "infliction of wrong" and set bounds
which "the wickedest dare not pass." 14
Obviously impressed by the Hamptons* handling of their
slaves, as well as a vivid recollection of blacks she had
seen during the trip, Julia Howe felt she must be allowed
"one heretical whisper--very small and low." She now
believed the "Negro of the North" was "an ideal negro" who
was "refined by white culture" and "elevated by white blood."
But the "negro among negroes" was something entirely differ-
ent. He was "a course, grinning, flat-footed, thick skulled
creature," who was ugly, lazy, and "chiefly ambitious to be
of no use to any in the world." Even so, Julia felt strongly
that slavery must "gradually ameliorate" and "slowly die
out." While she admitted that anyone who gave a "mild . . .
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pallative view ... of slavery" should be subject to "bitter
censure," she also asserted that "intellectual justice"
revolted from "rhetorical straining, exaggeration and denun-
ciation of facts" which northern abolitionists continually
employed. 15
If Julia Howe was at once censurious of inflated aboli-
tionist rhetoric, under estimation of white southern virtue,
and over estimation of black capabilities, she could still
wonder why the negro was so despised in the South. In her
view his "gentle, attachable nature" should not have caused
such hatred. But even though she saw the black as "gentle
and attachable" and was mildly impressed with Cuban negroes
(they were "fair" physically) she would not recant her gen-
eral assumptions about blacks when she was criticized by her
husband. She justified her position in a letter to Theodore
Parker late in 1859, just after she had published the reveal-
ing recollections of her journey in a small book entitled A
Trip to Cuba . At that time she admitted that her "little
spurt about blacks" had "caused some remark" but claimed that
"without asking council of anyone" she would stick to her
resolution to write what she thought no matter whom it
offended. To Julia Howe, the aspiring writer, nothing was
more vicious than to make "observation conform to theory."
She was positive her observations of black nature were "gen-
uine, clear and immediate." Abolitionist theory would just
have to "make the best of it." After witnessing the "natural
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indolence" of blacks her convictions about the necessity of
"compulsory employment" were strengthened, though she claimed
not to be arguing for slavery. 16
There is no question that Samuel Gridley was deeply dis-
turbed by his wife's views. He argued with Julia during the
trip and during the months she prepared for the publication
of A Trip to Cuba. As he painfully noted at the time of pub-
lication, "Some things make me sad, e.g., the question of
whether viewing the actual condition of the negro enforced
labor is not best! As if anything would justify the perpet-
uation of such a wrong by the strongest race." His own
impression of blacks in Cuba led him to some other conclu-
sions. According to Howe, "climatic influences" were better
for blacks in Cuba and as a result blacks were "physically
improving." Other influences didn't help as much. Howe was
particularly concerned that there was "no organized effort
for their [the blacks] improvement, no organized effort to
keep them from going wrong." Mentally blacks were "rising"
but morally they were "sinking." It is quite obvious what
Howe was suggesting by such comments. In a sense, he was
arguing the same case that John Brown had been arguing for
two years. Simply stated, both men felt that blacks once
freed would need the firm discipline of a righteous and moral
man. Brown had drawn up the Provisional Constitution for
just such a reason and he had recruited highly moral and
,. 17
upstanding men to help execute the raid.
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Howe attached himself to Brown's cause in the spring of
1859, at least partially, for the same reason that he sepa-
rated his own racial views from Julia's. Both of the Howe's
accepted a romantic racialist image of the black man's capac-
ity and ability but they seemed to divide over the question
of the derivation of that nature. Julia tended to emphasize
heredity over environment, though she never entirely dis-
missed the influence of white culture on the black man. The
doctor placed even greater importance on the environmental
causes of the black man's nature. And it was because he
stressed the impact of environment in his definition that
Howe looked to Brown to lead an "organized effort" for black
"improvement." Getting blacks out of the debilitating insti-
tution of slavery through justitified violence and exposing
them to a "normal" person like John Brown was the same thing
as moving the blind out of permanent residence at Perkins
School and back into the "normal" community. Like Higginson,
who looked for Brown to illicit black violence by stimulating
the courage of emulation, Howe believed a violent effort by
blacks would be their first step out of slavery--a "morally
uplifting" stride into the "normal" community. Justified
violence and the willingness to fight for freedom were really
keystone virtues among the righteous men and women of the
Anglo-American community. Parker, Howe, Higginson, and the
rest of the secret committee all agreed that the essence of
the American political experience had been freedom earned by
the willingness to fight. Brown's raid would acquaint the
blacks with this virtue. Brown would demand that blacks make
an effort for their own freedom— something even Julia Howe
admitted was a prerequisite for black liberation. In so
doing Brown would break the viscious circle of environmental
debilitation and begin black assimilation of a "superior"
culture. Blacks would then start to exhibit the behavior of
"normal" men—men who lived day-to-day in the marketplace
North. If exposure to "normal" persons could help the handi-
capped, then exposure to Brown and violence could do much for
the moral sensibilities and social outlook of the black
slave. John Brown and justified violence would get the slave
"on the road to perfectibility." The slave would be organ-
1
R
ized under the "proper influence."
When Howe arrived home in mid-April he found a letter
waiting for him from Brown. In it, the warrior advised him
that all was going well and asked what efforts were being
made to raise the funds promised during the previous spring.
The only thing hindering successful execution of the raid was
a "trifling sum." Brown used the Missouri raid as a negoti-
ating lever when he noted that the "entire success of our
experiment ought (I think) to convince every 'capital-
ist. 1 ..." The old man was ready to move and Howe sensed
that this time there would be no false starts or Forbes-like
interruptions. Despite some uneasiness about reports that
Brown had taken property as well as slaves during the
262
Missouri venture, Howe began to seek funds for the "dash"
v 19
south.
II
Just a few days before Kowe arrived in Boston, read
Brown's letter, and began to search for money, the warrior
began his own fund-raising efforts at Gerrit Smith's home.
He appeared at the landowner's Peterboro mansion on April 11,
and almost immediately started analyzing the Missouri raid.
Then he brought Smith up to date on the status of his Vir-
ginia Plan and cautiously inquired about Smith's willingness
to contribute funds to the enterprise. At first Smith seemed
reluctant to make any commitment. The only thing he seemed
interested in was a religious discussion. The philanthropist
hoped to continue the theological debate they had begun one
year earlier, just before Brown revealed his plan to strike
20
at slavery in the South.
Underlying all of Smith's activities for the past two
and a half years was a strong desire to reexamine his per-
sonal religious convictions. During this period the
Peterboro squire wrote three discourses on the "religion of
reason." Smith began the whole review process in December
1857, while recuperating from a severe case of typhoid fever
which had hospitalized him in New York City for over two
months. His illness reenforced an ever-present notion that
he was "ill and destined for an early grave." When this fear
of his own death was coupled with the phenomena of religious
revival sweeping the northeast in the spring of 1858, Smith
continued his intense reconsideration of religious principle.
Although he was gravely suspicious of theology (what was
important was the practical application of Christian ethics),
he started writing his first discourse on the "struggle for
a religion of reason" in early January of 1858 and had just
finished the piece when Brown arrived at Peterboro in late
February to unveil his Harpers Ferry project. Smith intro-
duced his first discourse by suggesting that in America over
the last half century nothing had contributed to a religion
of reason more than the temperance and antislavery movements.
They had "awakened a sense of human dignity and human rights.
Both movements helped dispel the belief that salvation
depended only on believing in doctrines. Both had shown the
fallacy of believing that it was immeasurably more important
"to have orthodox views in regard to the Trinity, the atone-
ment, and future life than to imbibe in the spirit of Christ.
Smith himself was searching for creeds that would "grow out
of life" and as far as he was concerned "true religion" would
only prevail when men were "judged by their life and charac-
ter rather than adoption or rejection of creeds." For Gerrit
2
Smith reason under God was the final judge of all questions.
Yet, despite Smith's radical theological posture, a
unique religious symbiosis took place between he and Brown as
they waited for Sanborn to arrive in Peterboro. Smith had
264
never really shed much of the Calvinist teaching of his youth.
And as a result, while he and Brown would disagree on the
role of the Bible in a man's religious life, they could agree
on many fundamental spiritual principles. Smith's "manner of
stating his argument was considerably more terrifying than
his doctrine." Indeed, Smith like Brown believed in a God of
Divine Providence and Inspiration, he believed in the neces-
sity of conversion, baptism, communion, and the future life.
Like Brown he also read the Bible regularly and claimed the
priviledge of interpreting it as he saw fit. The religion of
Gerrit Smith was a blend of radical posturing and traditional
22
content.
In addition, Smith's religious discourse was something
more than an examination of sacred things. Religious dis-
cussion with Brown allowed him to vent his radical, lassez-
faire, anti-institutional wrath. Smith seems to have used
their spiritual debate as a vehicle to express certain social
concerns. The debate appears to be both reality and rubric.
And it is for this reason that Brown was not worried when
Smith diverted his first efforts to discuss the commitment of
funds in April of 1859 by turning instead to notions he was
formulating for his third discourse. Brown acquiesced because
he realized the Peterboro squire was still caught up in
feverish pietistic speculation and that in the past such
concerns had helped him compose as much of his social theory
as his religious. Brown realized that by listening closely
to what Smith now said about "true religion," he would have
just as accurate an idea of Smith's willingness to subsidize
insurrection as if Smith had spoken directly on the subject.
Very soon after Smith had launched into his newest religious
consideration, it became apparent to Brown that he would
indeed be able to count on Smith for support.
Smith started the discussion by asserting that he now
believed every individual's religion "must stand in his own
judgment" and that the one standard by which a man must test
his religion was within and not without. Not only must a
man's conscience be his guide but until it was no legitimate
religious community could be formed. Smith downplayed the
significance of the Bible, feeling that the individual
"deeply dishonored" God by surrendering his own judgment to
it or the church. While both might surpass the individual in
wisdom, the individual could not claim credit by simply
adopting that wisdom. True wisdom (like true courage for
Higginson and true morality for Howe) "became our own by
being wrought into our convictions and made part of our-
selves." One became truly religious by acting truly reli-
gious. Smith was calling for an age when men "scorned to
work for party," and age where men should "identify them-
selves with all mankind and aspire to no lot than their indi-
vidual merits under Heaven's blessing can earn for them."
Through a religious metaphor, Smith was propounding radical
individualist views that squared in all essentials with those
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of Brown. Indeed, the warrior could hardly have missed the
implications for Smith's eventual support of the proposed
"dash" at slavery. And Brown's intuition about Smith's sup-
port was fully confirmed when the philanthropist began to
develop a less abstract definition of the truly religious
man. For Smith, the truly religious man was "one who kept
all his passions, appetites and interests in subjugation to
reason." For the squire from Peterboro there could be "no
greater test of a man's religion." Certainly Smith viewed
Brown as just such an individual. After all, Brown had
labored for nearly two years to establish that image with
23Smith and the other members of the secret committee.
There was another "religious" reason for Brown's opti-
mism about Smith's support. Smith believed that even the
"most barbarous people" could be christianized if ministered
to by a proper teacher. He, like his committee associates
who were concerned about exposure to "normal persons," was
sure that a true man of religion could impart that religion
to others. At once, Brown could be insurrectionist and secu-
lar missionary. The man who could pass the greatest test of
religion could surely impart the greatest of all religious
virtue: control of all "passions, appetites, and interests."
Smith would support Brown for the same reason the others did.
He would support Brown because the man could exert a great
ul . 24
moral and organizing influence on blacks.
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After listening to Smith discourse on religion for the
better part of two days, Brown was sure he would be able to
count on the landowner's support. His assumption was cor-
rect. When Smith stopped talking and listened as Brown again
outlined his plan, he expressed complete sympathy with the
project. To Brown's repeated contention that black men must
be given the chance to strike for their own freedom, Smith
responded affirmatively by religious analogy. He noted that
when Jesus saw that men were "enslaved to authority" he real-
ized that the "experience of truth could alone set them
free." Jesus himself "took men up out of bondage to super-
stition and out of
. . . debasing
. . . blinding submission
to authority." He threw men "back upon their own consciences
and councilors and demanded they should judge for themselves
. . .
what is right." Jesus' first effort had been to "indi-
vidualize and insulate each man." Brown himself could not
have made a more eloquent "religious" defense of his posi-
25tion.
At the end of their second day of intense private dis-
cussions, ones which wove religion and insurrection into the
same fabric, Smith asked Brown to speak before a group of
abolitionists who lived in the area and Brown consented. At
the gathering the warrior made a stirring (though purpose-
fully vague) appeal for funds to support his "work." Edwin
Morton attended the meeting and later claimed that Brown's
appeal actually moved Smith to tears. When Brown had
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finished speaking Smith immediately stood up and pledged 400
dollars for his support. Then Smith briefly addressed the
group. According to Morton, Smith fervently claimed that if
he were asked "to point out the man in all the world I think
most truly Christian, I would point out John Brown. I once
doubted in my own mind as to Captain Brown's course, I now
approve of it heartily having given my mind to it more of
late." 26
Brown left Peterboro appreciative of Smith's contribu-
tion and fully convinced he could count on him for more in
the future. The warrior stopped briefly at North Elba to
visit his family and then hurried to Boston to promote his
project, obtain funds, and recapture the committee's confi-
dence .
Once in Boston, Brown sought out the one individual who
had never refused one of his requests, Franklin Benjamin
Sanborn. The young secretary was most responsive. Ever
since early January when Sanborn read of Brown's daring
Missouri raid in the New York Tribune , he realized the days
of discussing the feasibility of Brown's project were over.
He knew that as soon as Brown got back east he would want the
funds promised to him the previous spring. Brown had exe-
cuted his part of the bargain to decoy Forbes and would now
expect Boston members of the secret committee to honor their
part of the arrangement. Sanborn knew also that it was
unlikely that any other incident like the Forbes disclosures
would erupt. Higginson, Parker, and Howe had handled Spooner
nicely and Forbes himself hadn't been heard from for months.
Sanborn was sure of another thing: he would bear major
responsibility for gathering the "2000 to 3000" which had
been promised Brown. Parker was leaving for Europe, Howe was
going on vacation in February and March and Stearns was
totally absorbed in the financial problems of his friends.
Since Higginson only responded to Brown, Sanborn knew the task
would be his and his alone. He was very anxious. 27
Throughout February, March, and the first three weeks of
April, Sanborn frantically searched for funds. But during
the first two months of his effort he had little success.
The secretary was hindered by the tight money situation in
Massachusetts, the relative quiet in Kansas, and the need for
secrecy. By late March he was so desperate that he sought
out George Cabot with the advanced intention of opening the
"whole matter" to him if that was what was necessary to get
funds. Cabot had contributed 100 Sharpe ' s rifles to the
Massachusetts Kansas Committee during the early days of its
existence. It seemed worth the risk to Sanborn to fully
inform him of Brown's plan in exchange for support. At the
last moment, however, Sanborn balked and for some unknown
reason found it "not advisable" to enlist Cabot's aid. By
mid-April, Sanborn had virtually nothing to show for two and
a half months of effort. Finally, when the secretary visited
Howe shortly after his return from the West Indies, he
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received some promising words about acquiring finances for
Brown. Howe said he personally could not be counted on for
large sums but firmly believed his friend John Murray Forbes,
the wealthy Boston railroad magnate, would be willing to make
a substantial contribution if Howe sent him a strong charac-
ter reference on Brown. Sanborn breathed a short sigh of
relief. At least he had some good news for Brown. 28
On April 19, a few days after his visit to Howe's, the
committee secretary hurriedly scratched a brief note to
Higginson which read: "Brown himself is in Boston." Though
responses to his fund-raising efforts had been poor, Sanborn
was quite relieved to see him. Soliciting for support was
always easier when Brown appeared in person to make the
request. Sanborn quickly explained the difficulties he had
encountered. Brown claimed to understand but was still quite
angry. After all, the secret committee had promised to sub-
sidize his work. Eventually the two men decided that Brown
should personally seek funds in other parts of New England
for a few weeks. While Brown traveled, Sanborn would arrange
29
speaking appearances for him in the Boston area.
For the next three weeks Brown toured New England. As
he did, he began to sense the real problem Sanborn had in
seeking contributions. Funds for the antislavery cause had
dried up and he was tremendously disappointed. Some two
weeks after leaving Boston, Brown received word from Sanborn
that he was to make a speaking appearance in Concord early in
the second week of May. Brown greeted the news with relief.
Massachusetts abolitionists had been generous in the past, and
he hoped this would again be the case. 30
Brown appeared in Concord with one of his recruits,
Jeremiah Anderson, and spoke to virtually the same gathering
that he addressed two years earlier. But again his much pub-
licized visit was a dramatic success and financial failure.
He obtained only a small sum from his appreciative Concord
listeners. Just why Concord citizens received Brown so
warmly and gave so little is difficult to determine. Cer-
tainly they were not exempt from the financial toll of eco-
nomic panic. But by the spring of 1859 the effects of panic
had begun to wear off and a tight money supply doesn't seem
to have been the major reason for their reluctance to give.
Most likely, Brown's Concord audience was uncertain about how
the warrior would use the money and about what he proposed to
do to end slavery—Brown was vague on both counts. Bronson
Alcott expressed this sentiment best. He claimed Brown left
his Concord friends "much in the dark concerning his destina-
tion and designs for the coming months" but "did not conceal
his hatred for slavery nor his readiness to strike a blow for
freedom." Brown's most perceptive listeners may also have
noticed that he was more enthused and less controlled than
during his first visit to Concord. This may have made them
wary. Still, despite Brown's intensified tone, Alcott con-
tinued to regard Brown as "the manliest man" he had ever
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seen. The warrior was "the type and synonym for the
31Just.
"
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In view of the financial failure at Concord, Frank
Sanborn was extremely pleased that Samuel Gridley Howe made
good on his promise to enlist the aid of John Murray Forbes.
Very soon after the Concord visit Brown was on his way to
meet Forbes with a letter of reference from Howe. In the
letter Howe described Brown as a man who could "deliver our
land from the curse of slavery," and praised the warrior for
being "of the Puritan militant order." Howe recommended that
Forbes assist Brown because he was "an enthusiast, yet cool,
keen and cautious." Forbes should also bear in mind that
Brown had a "martyr's spirit" and would ask "nothing but the
pledge to keep to yourself what he may say." The recommenda-
tion combined with the short speech Brown gave to clergymen
gathered at the Forbes home greatly impressed the railroad
magnate. But he was judicious with his funds and gave only
100 dollars to Brown for "travelling expenses." Before the
warrior left Forbes' home, however, a representative of the
ministers approached him and pressed five twenty-dollar gold
32pieces into his palm.
Despite Howe's favorable letter to Forbes and his
intense personal desire to answer questions about black capa-
bilities, friction developed between the doctor and Brown
soon after the Forbes meeting. Howe really never forgave
Brown for the role he had been forced to play the previous
spring. Brown's indiscretion made it necessary for Howe to
lie to his friends and the doctor didn't like it. He alone
bore responsibility for putting Wilson and Sumner "off the
track" and the effort still left a bitter taste in his mouth.
For months Howe had been deeply impressed by the values and
character of Brown— impressed by his discipline, control, and
efficiency. Now, one year later, the doctor was still upset
by Brown's apparent failure to live by the very principles he
had initially seemed to embody. Mistakes like the Forbes
fiasco were unforgivable. Howe was also made uneasy by a
slight change he perceived in Brown's tone and temper-men t.
The doctor sensed a subtle difference in the day-to-day man-
ner of the "cool enthusiast" which irritated him further.
Brown seemed overly excitable, exceptionally nervous, and at
times unbearably imperious. He seemed absorbed by considera-
tions quite apart from his immediate surroundings. He seemed
too easily upset by criticism and repeatedly, almost mechan-
istically, quoted Scripture to quell any doubts expressed by
his supporters. This kind of behavior deeply disturbed Howe.
The blind biblical spoutings and stronge disembodied aura
about Brown hinted at a loss of control. Howe was forever
chastising himself for such behavior. He liked it even less
.33
in a man who was about to incite a slave insurrection.
The friction between these two men actually resulted in
a minor confrontation over the tactics Brown used during his
Missouri raid. Howe balked at Brown's seemingly cavalier
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attitude toward the theft of slaveholder's property during
the run-off. Stealing slaves was one thing. But stealing
the physical property of the slaveholder was entirely differ-
ent. Howe kept remembering the Hamptons. The doctor and
warrior actually exchanged heated words over the issue.
Brown claimed he v/as right in taking property earned at the
expense of slavery and muttered a scriptural justification of
his acts. Howe responded by reasserting his own view and
claiming he was entirely unimpressed by men who quoted Scrip-
ture to cover unlawful activity. Theft was theft. 34
But even if uncertainty and anger caused Howe to doubt
Brown, the physician did not withdraw his support from the
proposed insurrection. Concern about Brown's competence and
unresolved ambivalence about violence (masquerading as a
worry about slaveholder's property) did not drive him away
from the plan. There were too many new and unanswered ques-
tions buzzing in Howe's head about antislavery reform and the
nature of the black man once freed from slavery. Brown's
intended strike was one of the ways in which these and other
questions could begin to be answered. And there were other
reasons for continued support of the warrior. During that
spring Howe wrote to Charles Sumner and noted the "importance
and duty of giving the fullest and finest scope to individ-
uals." Each man must be encouraged to "work with his own
weapons in his own way." To allow this, implied a faith in
God's providence. 3 ^
When Howe reflected on his experience with Brown during
the past two years he realized much of the warrior's erratic
behavior had been stimulated by not being allowed to fight
for the freedom of the slave "with his own weapons" and "in
his own way." Brown's imperiousness was a product of frus-
tration. Perhaps if he was given "the fullest and finest
scope" for his activities, black men all over the South would
rally to his banner. Then, too, Howe once again reflected on
traditional political efforts to end slavery. They had all
failed. Indeed, political currents seemed to be "drifting
toward the destruction of the Republican Party." Much as he
wanted to have faith in that party, by the spring of 1859
,
Howe believed strongly that it had contributed to its own
demise. Any party "based on the principle of progress and
reform" must die away when "it ceased to call for any prog-
ress." The antislavery movement had failed to extinguish
slavery and so had the Republican Party. Where was one to
3 6turn except to a man like Brown?
During the weeks Brown spent in Boston he also met with
George Luther Stearns on a number of occasions. Their most
memorable public exchange took place at the Bird Club, an
informal gathering of Massachusetts politicians, literati and
businessmen who regularly met at the Parker House. Here,
before the many distinguished members of the club, Brown pre-
sented Stearns with the pearl-handled Bowie knife he took
from Henry Clay Pate at Black Jack. The gesture deeply moved
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Stearns, though he was mildly upset by the warrior's presen-
tation speech. When Brown gave him the knife he said he did
so with the thought that the two of them would probably
"never meet again in this world." Brown hoped Stearns would
accept the gift as a "token of his gratitude" and claimed
that in the future the knife might have some "little historic
value." The obvious fatalism in Brown's words disturbed
Stearns. For months he had been led to believe that, though
there was a chance Brown would be killed, Brown fully
expected to come away from his venture alive and ready to
command a mountain fortress full of black men. Stearns was
also disturbed by the angry exchange that took place between
Brown and Henry Wilson after the presentation. Wilson was
intensely distressed by the Missouri raid and made it clear
that he "did not approve" of it. His censure drew a sharp
rebuff from Brown. Stearns was shocked by the vehemence of
Wilson's comments and realized for the first time what his
relationship with Brown might mean for his future standing in
the political abolitionist community of Massachusetts. Still,
Stearns' uneasiness did not prompt him to pull back from sup-
porting the Kansas warrior. When Brown left Boston he did so
with 1200 dollars which had been contributed by the Medford
37businessmen
.
Whether by mere chance or Brown's careful planning, one
incident which occurred in late May did a great deal to bol-
ster the confidence of Howe, Stearns, Higginson, and Sanborn
in the project. Harriet Tubman, the black woman whose under-
ground railroad activities were legendary, appeared in Boston
to support Brown. Tubman's visit seemed to buttress what the
Kansas warrior had claimed all along: once the insurrection
was started southern slaves could depend on the support of
their free northern black brethren. Sanborn was particularly
impressed by the imposing woman. He immediately notified
Higginson of her presence and asked him to come to Boston.
The minister would be "amazed" at the rescue stories she
told. The secretary also hoped Tubman's appearance would
prompt Higginson to tap the Worcester County Committee funds
which both he and Brown had been pursuing for months. 38
Higginson did travel to Boston to speak with the power-
ful Canadian black woman and after listening to her descrip-
tions of eight railroad trips to the South, he was indeed
"amazed." Her "tales of adventure" were beyond anything in
fiction and her "ingenuity" was extraordinary. But the trip
to Boston did more than strengthen Higginson 's belief in
Brown's project. As he saw the efforts being made for Brown
by Stearns, Sanborn, and Howe, the Worcester activist became
less critical of their decision to postpone the plan during
the previous May. Now they all seemed very interested in
keeping their promise to raise funds for the venture and even
showed some confidence that the whole effort would succeed.
In particular, Higginson became more charitable toward
Sanborn who v/as again playing a very active role in Brown's
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behalf. As a sign of this new-found respect for the young
secretary's exertions, Higginson promised to stop in Concord
during July to evaluate the progressive educational program
Sanborn and his sister Sarah had devised for the children of
39the town
.
Ill
After having collected almost 2000 dollars from secret
committee members and other New Englanders who knew little or
nothing of his proposed plan, John Brown left Boston on June
3, 1859, for the last time. He was generally pleased by his
fund-raising efforts and felt that "final arrangements" could
be made for the Harpers Ferry raid. He confided to Sanborn
(who most certainly conveyed the message to the other commit-
tee members) that he expected to be "on the ground" as soon
as possible and hoped to begin operations "by July 4th."
Brown seemed optimistic. He had funds, arms, a crew of fine
men, and continued hopes of "recruiting people from Harriet
Tubman's ranks." On his way to New York City, the warrior
stopped at Collinsville , Connecticut and made the last pay-
ment on the 1000 steel pikes he had ordered from blacksmith
40Charles Blair two years earlier. Everything seemed ready.
From his Peterboro mansion Gerrit Smith carefully fol-
lowed the proceedings in Boston that spring. As he did, the
intensity of his commitment to Brown and insurrection
increased. Before Brown left Boston the Peterboro squire
forwarded an additional 200 dollars for his "Kansas work."
But Smith's commitment is reflected by more than the alloca-
tion of funds. He had just finished working on his third
religious discourse and the degree of influence Brown had on
him is clearly indicated in the tract. For three years Brown
had been telling Smith that he felt a divine inspiration, a
mission to free slaves and overthrow slavery. For the same
length of time Smith had just as vigorously advocated a
"religion of reason" which emphasized man and conscience not
doctrine, the Bible, or God's providential manipulation of
human events. Now in June, 1859, Smith made a revealing the-
ological concession to Brown. Before submitting his final
discourse for publication, Smith felt compelled to incorpo-
rate the notion of divine inspiration into his own religious
theory in a way which significantly departed from his previ-
ous treatments of the concept. In his third discourse he
asked whether or not reason alone was sufficient to achieve
"true religion" and answered that it was not. Smith asserted
that "unless Divine influence" upon men was increasing there
could be no "true religion." Enlightened reason was vain
unless there was also a "God-given spirit of submission to
its control." Reason and will were vain unless man allowed
"his maker to work in him." Man must let Heaven dispose him
to put his physical, mental, and moral powers to "heavenly
use." Certainly these notions about inspiration can be
interpreted in many ways. They may be seen as just another
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manifestation of Smith's desire to maintain certain well-
established Calvinist concepts while advocating a radical
religion of reason. it has already been shown that during
Smith's religious perambulations he always held to certain
basic Calvinist tenets. And Smith was never one to worry
about maintaining seemingly antithetical positions at the
same time. Yet, it also seems that Smith's need to discuss
inspiration and the emphasis he accorded it is reflective of
both Brown's argumentation and Smith's view of him as the
"greatest living Christian." Smith's support of Brown was
based primarily on his regard for the warrior's individualist
values, on Brown's control, discipline, and ability to
"restrain passions and appetite." But, at least in part, it
was also premised on a belief in Brown's assertions of his
.... 41own providential instrumentality.
Smith indicated the strength of his support for Brown
more fully in the months ahead, particularly in the way he
handled his annual invitation to speak at the Jerry Rescue
commemorative ceremonies on October 1, at Syracuse. When
the invitation was submitted to Smith in late August he
declined to speak. The refusal was extraordinary. Smith had
participated in the rescue effort and had always used the
ceremony to elaborate his abolitionist views. The speeches
he gave in the years following the attempt were harbingers
for his continually shifting thoughts on the direction in
which abolitionism should be moving. In 1856, for instance,
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he used the occasion to lash out at the moral decadence of
southern slaveholders, claiming they were victims of "a total
delusion" which had been endorsed by most of the churches and
clergy of the country. Slavery was ruining the slaveholder
"soul and body for time and eternity." 42
But in August of 1859, Smith shocked and disappointed
many who had shared the occasion with him previously by
asserting that it was "unwise to repeat the farce any longer."
The rescue attempt had been a noble effort. Its participants
had had their "humanity up" when they acted to resist Jerry's
arrest. They understood there could be no law for slavery.
But as far as Smith was concerned, it was now time to again
"let
.
. .
professions make room for practice." People who
talked well for slavery should stand aside for those who
would vote well against it. Actually, Smith pushed aboli-
tionists to do more than vote. He went on to suggest that
any declarations which were made against forcible resistance
to the laws of slavery were "senseless." It was to instances
of forcible resistance that nations were "indebted" for their
"greatest progress." American government was in rebellion
against the "right of every innocent man to his personal lib-
erty." Indeed, it was because of this rebellion against jus-
tice that the New York abolitionist felt it might be "too
late to bring slavery to an end by peaceful means— too late
to vote it down." Rather, it must "go out in blood." In
Smith's opinion there was not enough virtue left in white men
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for them to vote slavery down. Blacks had "come to despair
accomplishment of this work by white people." The feeling
among blacks was that they must deliver themselves and it was
a feeling that "gained strength with fearful rapidity."
There was no resource left to black men but "God and insur-
rection. " Smith then promised that white Americans could
look for insurrections "any year, any month, any day."
Insurrection was a "terrible remedy" but it was necessary to
overcome a "terrible wrong." Even an abortive uprising would
have an effect. It would fill the South with horror and
startle northern moral sensibilities. Smith closed his let-
ter with a warning to all those who took his remarks lightly.
He was "not a lying prophet— another Cassandra." Slavehold-
ers' blood would be shed—soon. 43
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CHAPTER VIII
Before John Brown left Boston for his base of opera-
tions, he promised to start his insurrectionary thrust by
Independence Day. But once he arrived at Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, he realized that the promise would be impos-
sible to keep. There were good reasons to delay the raid.
None of the Canadian or northern radical abolitionists who
had hinted they might be willing to join him came south and
when Brown revealed that he wanted to instigate a full-scale
attack on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry some of the
men he had recruited began to grumble. Then, too, Brown him-
self became extremely cautious. Throughout the summer he
continually postponed the attack for fear that he did not
have enough intelligence information. These delays caused
financial problems. Maintenance costs for the small cadre of
recruits and his payment to Charles Blair all but depleted
the funds he had received in Boston that spring. By early
August he again pressed Sanborn for money so that his "oper-
ations" would not be delayed. He also sent John Jr. to seek
further support from George Luther Stearns.^"
Sanborn received Brown's request and immediately wrote
to Higginson asking for assistance. Sanborn claimed to take
great pleasure in hearing that the warrior had completed the
first phase of his "business" and pleaded with Higginson to
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help him make up 300 dollars so as not to thwart final exe-
cution of the plan. But by the first week in September, the
committee secretary hadn't come close to raising the amount
Brown desired. Samuel Gridley Howe did send 50 dollars south
and then started scurrying around Boston looking for more
money. Higginson could only raise 25 dollars for Brown.
When Sanborn pressed him for more, the minister became infu-
riated by the implication that he was somehow shirking his
duty. At the same time that Sanborn looked for funds Stearns
listened to John Jr.'s pleas for assistance. Stearns told
him that he had the "fullest confidence" in his father "no
matter what the outcome of his efforts," but the Medford
businessman refused to give anymore money. Finally, in the
third week of September, Sanborn sent 50 dollars to
Chambersburg along with an apologetic note explaining why he
2
was unable to raise the full sum Brown had requested.
For the next two weeks Sanborn continued to search dis-
creetly for funds. On October 6, that search ended when
Sanborn met and interviewed young Francis Merriam, the emo-
tionally erratic nephew of the distinguished Boston aboli-
tionist, Francis Jackson. Merriam was obsessed with the
thought of joining Brown and asked Sanborn to give him spe-
cific information about the warrior's plans. He already knew
a good deal about the scheme because of his friendship with
James Repath. At first, Sanborn balked. But when Merriam
offered to contribute 600 dollars to the effort if he were
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allowed to participate in it, the committee secretary recon-
sidered the request. Sanborn quickly summoned George Luther
Stearns and Lewis Hayden to Concord to assist him in making
the decision. During the evening of October 6 and the early
morning hours of October 7 , all three men rigorously ques-
tioned Merriam about his motives for wanting to join up with
Brown and the personal qualifications he had for assisting
the scheme. Merriam said he had traveled with Repath in 185 7
and 1858 as the journalist gathered information for his book
Talks with Slaves
.
In spite of these experiences neither
Sanborn, Stearns nor Hayden were impressed with the unstable
youth. But all of them knew of Brown's desperate need for
cash. Merriam might not be qualified to participate in the pro-
ject but the money he would contribute insured execution of the
plan. Eventually, they all decided to send him to Chambersburg
.
Within a few days Sanborn received a note from Merriam
indicating that he had joined Brown, turned over the 600 dol-
lars and patiently awaited the "business operation" that was
to commence Saturday, October 15. Sanborn was tremendously
enthused. Later, when he received a letter from Higginson
complaining about Brown's failure to execute the plan and
questioning the wisdom of sending Merriam south, he felt so
confident that Brown was about to begin the venture that he
boldly criticized Higginson for his doubts. Sanborn asked
Higginson if they had "seen so little print" from Brown's
labors "that we should distrust ... his valor?" Hadn't
Brown "saved Kansas in '56 and wounded Missouri in '58."
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There was absolutely no reason to doubt Brown. The secretary
also met Higginson 's criticism of Merriam with a highly
matured cynicism. Merriam had not been chosen because of any
"great passion for Repath" or belief in the youth's personal
capacity. Sanborn agreed that Merriam was about "as fit to
be in the enterprise as the Devil to keep a powder house."
Merriam had been selected only because of the money he could
contribute to the project. Sanborn reminded Higginson that
"everything has its use and must be put to it if possible."
Then, after informing Higginson that news could soon be
expected from the site of Brown's activity, the secretary
concluded his letter with a brief lecture on one of the most
important lessons he had learned in the past few years.
Sanborn told Higginson that he never expected much from any-
body but believed there was "a grain of use in all persons
and things." When a plum dropped in one's mouth, one
shouldn't refuse to eat it because it wasn't "a peach or a
pumpkin." Francis Merriam might not be "Divine property"
4but he was a "plum" and had his use.
By Monday, October 17, a few days after he received
Sanborn's note Higginson was forced to agree. Merriam had
been useful. His money had primed an explosion at Harpers
Ferry, Virginia. Reports circulated in Worcester about an
attack on the federal armory in that small southern town and
Higginson was thrilled. In fact, he thought of rushing south
to assist Brown and claimed he would have done it if it
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weren't for his wife's poor health. He considered Brown's
venture the "most formidable insurrection" that ever
occurred, felt there was "great capacity and skill" behind
it, and was sure it would weaken the Slave Power. in the
past nothing had so strengthened the institution of slavery
as the black man's "timid submission." Now, as Higginson
heard the first, sketchy, reports of the raid, he was confi-
dent that such submissiveness was ended. If this new assert-
ive attitude was coupled to "constant communication with
Canada" it would teach blacks "self-importance and resis-
tance." Since first reports of the raid were incomplete,
Higginson eagerly awaited Brown's retreat to the mountains
where he would establish a Maroon colony, like those in
Jamaica. Hoping to publicize the positive effect that such
a fortress community would have on blacks and at the same
time discreetly link himself to Brown among those abolition-
ists who were not already aware of the connection, Higginson
wrote James Russell Lowell at the Atlantic Monthly asking if
he could do an article about the Maroons of Surinam and
Jamaica-- "suggested by the late Virginia affair."^
The minister's initial optimism was soon replaced by
utter dejection because further reports from Virginia indi-
cated the raid had failed. After quickly joining Howe, John
Andrew, and others in forming a defense committee for Brown,
the minister spent the next week reading newspaper accounts
of the attack and carefully gauging the impact it had on
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northern public opinion. In a speech given at Brimley Hall
in Worcester on October 25, the day Brown's trial began,
Higginson claimed that "nine out of ten of the republic of
Worcester sympathize with the insurrection and only regretted
that Captain Brown was not successful." Despite this bold
claim Higginson knew that in Worcester there was less enthu-
siasm for insurrection than the man who attempted it. People
were unsure about the act even though they had a strong, per-
sonal sympathy for Brown himself. This situation forced a
predicament upon the minister. On one hand, he knew that
given such tremendous popular sympathy Brown's martyrdom
would be a powerful spur to antislavery sentiment. On the
other, Higginson himself had very strong feelings that he
should make some kind of effort at rescue. Higginson 's
ambivalence is fully reflected in his emotional response to
his mother's scoldings about the failure of Massachusetts
abolitionists to do anything to secure Brown's release.
Higginson told his mother that of course he thought about
Brown's plight but claimed he didn't feel certain the war-
rior's "acquittal or rescue would do half as much as his
being executed." He assured his mother that a defense com-
mittee was doing all it could for Brown. They had provided
counsel and even sent a young Athol lawyer named George Hoyt
to assist Brown and to act as a liaison with his Massachusetts
supporters. Beyond such help no way seemed open for anything.
There was "no chance for forcible assistance and next to none
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for strategem." The minister had never seen a situation more
impractical for rescue. 6
Higginson was torn between the desire to make a rescue
attempt in spite of its impracticality
, and the desire to
exploit Brown's death for the cause of abolition. No doubt
he remembered the advice of Wendell Phillips and Albert
Browne in the wake of the Burns rescue attempt. At that time
the two men told him to shake off any despair about the fail-
ure of his efforts. Burns rendition was a secondary matter.
What was essential was Higginson* s effective use of the issue
to influence popular opinion against the Fugitive Slave Law.
Higginson had been involved with the tactics of abolition
long enough to understand the effect Brown's death would have
on the mind of the northern white community, abolitionist and
non-abolitionist alike. While no specific documentation
exists to prove the contention, it also seems certain that at
least a small portion of Higginson 's willingness to subsidize
Brown was based on this realization. After the Burns affair
there can be no question Higginson clearly understood that a
failed abolitionist effort often did as much for the cause as
a successful one. He said as much in a letter to John Jr.
shortly after the raid aborted. Higginson told young Brown
that his father " had failed in his original effort only to
7
succeed in a greater result .
It has been suggested that Thomas Wentworth Higginson
denied John Brown by never again admitting what he had when
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first reports of the attack filtered into Worcester, namely,
that the warrior's actions were directed at inciting the
"most formidable slave insurrection ever." He has been crit-
icized for waiting a long time to make even a veiled attempt
to explain the absence of a slave uprising at Harpers Ferry.
But this so-called denial becomes more understandable as we
examine Higginson's awareness of the way in which northern
public opinion responded to Brown. Higginson's overriding
concern in the days after Harpers Ferry was to exploit the
personal sympathy that welled up for Brown and was fueled by
his heroic trial behavior. As Higginson saw it, his primary
task and that of other northern abolitionists was to promote
Brown's character and play down the act of insurrection.
Tactically this was simply a variation on the same theme used
by Howe, Parker, and Phillips when they attempted to remove
Edward Loring from his probate judgeship after the Burns ren-
dition. Higginson knew that many northerners had not accepted
the justification of violence and insurrection; therefore it
was necessary to evoke their empathy by personalizing the
issue. It was not insurrection which was justified but
Brown's character. In this way Brown could do "more than
Sumner or Kansas to re-awaken antislavery agitation." John
Andrew, the abolitionist lawyer and state representative,
made the point most clearly in an address to abolitionists
who gathered at Tremont Temple shortly after Brown's sentenc-
ing in early November. Andrew claimed not to consider
"whether the enterprise of John Brown and his associates in
Virginia was wise or foolish, right or wrong." He only knew
that "whether the enterprise was one or the other, John Brown
himself was right." Like Higginson and other noted aboli-
tionists, Andrew claimed to sympathize with the man and the
idea, because he believed in "eternal right." He never said
anything about sympathizing with the actuality of insurrec-
tion.
II
Julia Howe read about Brown's raid in the Boston Trans-
cript. When she told her husband, he is said to have casu-
ally replied, "Brown has got to work." That simple assertion
belied Howe's tremendous inner turmoil over the seemingly
disastrous results of the attack. This turmoil flared into
panic on Wednesday, October 19, when an investigation uncov-
ered letters written to Brown by Howe and the other members
of the secret committee at the Chambersburg headquarters.
While Howe claimed to be confident that Brown wouldn't com-
promise himself or those dealing with him, he couldn't help
remembering the Forbes fiasco. During the weeks following
Brown's arrest, the doctor was virtually paralyzed by the
fear of being implicated in the venture. Although he joined
Higginson, John Andrew, and others in setting up a defense
committee for Brown, his apprehension prompted vehement oppo-
sition to even the discussion of using extra-legal efforts to
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gain the warrior's release. And the fear also forced Howe to
become excessively dependent on the advice of Frank Sanborn.
This dependence is ironic because Sanborn was quite as
unnerved by the whole episode as the doctor. 9
In February 1858, shortly after leaving Smith's home
with Brown's newly revealed plan ringing in his ears, Frank
Sanborn received a short letter from Edwin Morton. In the
note Morton recounted a curious experience with Brown. It
seems that shortly after Sanborn left Peterboro, Brown asked
Morton whether he would mind accompanying him on a short eve-
ning walk. Morton said he'd be happy to. After walking side
by side through drifts of freshly fallen snow for some time,
Morton began to daydream and lost consciousness that Brown
was walking with him. Then when he realized what he had done
and he turned to apologize to Brown for allowing his mind to
wander, Morton found that he was indeed walking alone. He
turned around to look for his companion and saw Brown a few
yards behind him. The warrior was alternately looking at
the fresh imprints his boots made in the snow and the untrod-
den expanse that lay before him. After a few moments of
silence, Brown looked thoughtfully backwards where his and
Morton's footprints lay uncovered in the snow, he turned to
Morton and spoke slowly, "I like to see my tracks behind me."
Morton felt like he was in the presence of a man who would
"leave tracks in the snows of centuries." And Sanborn heart-
ily agreed. After Harpers Ferry, however, Sanborn was
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considerably less sentimental about the "tracks" Brown left
behind. Those "tracks" were incriminating letters from him-
self, Howe, Stearns, and Smith which were left in a leather
sachel at the Chambersburg farm house Brown had used as his
base of operations. They led all the way back to Boston,
Peterboro, and the Secret Committee of Six. 10
On October 19, many newspapers carried the first full
account of the contents of the sachel. In it there were two
letters from Sanborn, a note from Gerrit Smith, and an enve-
lope addressed to Brown from Howe. The two letters from
Sanborn were dated September 4 and 23, and contained drafts
for 50 and 55 dollars respectively. In the draft sent on
September 23 Sanborn told Brown he was "glad to hear all
goes well and is so ready for business." Even more disheart-
ening to Sanborn and the other committee members was the New
York Herald
[
s published report on the questioning of Brown's
men about northern assistance. The Herald noted that all of
prisoners stories were the same except for "Young Brown." He
answered a question about whether or not his father had
received support from radical northern abolitionists by say-
ing there were "parties in the North connected with this
4. „11movement
.
Sanborn was very distraught when he read these reports.
Late in the afternoon on Wednesday (the same day the account
was printed) he rushed to Stearns' home in Medford to decide
what action he should take to prevent the inevitability of
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arrest. After consultations which lasted into the early
morning hours on Thursday, October 20, the two conspirators
decided to seek the assistance of Stearns' legal counsel,
John Andrew. In their meeting with Andrew both men wanted
to know if they were liable to arrest in Massachusetts for
their complicity with Brown, though they did not give Andrew
the "full particulars" of what that complicity entailed.
Since Andrew was uncertain about what the two men had actu-
ally done, he was only able to give vague answers to their
questions. Stearns and Sanborn became more upset. As a pre-
cautionary measure against arrest, they decided to run to
Canada for safety. Late Thursday afternoon they boarded a
cargo ship bound for Quebec. One day later they arrived in
Canada
.
Once in Canada, however, the two secret committee mem-
bers began to have second thoughts about their flight. Both
Sanborn and Stearns feared arrest and fled Boston hoping to
avoid it but during their stay they began to see how panic
had intensified the threat. At the same time they attempted
to rationalize their behavior by claiming that they only left
Massachusetts to keep the size of Brown's effort concealed.
By so doing, both the reach and character of the raid would
be "exaggerated." While in Quebec the two conspirators
received further disheartening news about their legal posi-
tion. Wendell Phillips sent a detailed analysis of Andrew's
views. According to Phillips, the lawyer now believed
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Stearns' and Sanborn's complicity could be regarded as trea-
son. These words shattered both men. A year earlier they
were certain that such treason would be considered patriotism
by most northerners. Now they were confused about where they
should be, uncertain about what they should do and doubtful
about support from the citizens of Massachusetts. It seemed
that treason would not be considered patriotism. 13
Phillips' letter did contain some information that gave
them hope. Andrews felt that if they were arrested for trea-
sonous activity they could only be "tried in the district
where the acts had been committed." This advice, coupled
with Higginson's urging that they come home immediately, a
tearse note from Emerson suggesting the same thing, and their
own worries about running away, prompted a return to Boston
on October 26 just six days after they had started their
panic-stricken flight. They arrived home just in time to
read newspaper accounts of Brown's stoic trial behavior.
Unquestionably, the guilt they already felt was compounded by
the warrior's heroic posture. But that guilt was not enough
to prevent either man from further flights, further denials
of complicity, further rationalizations, and further panicked
14
discussions about the possibility of arrest.
In Worcester, Thomas Wentworth Higginson was shamed and
angered by the dichotomy between Brown's behavior and that
of his fellow conspirators. He saw their actions as nothing
more than a shabby re-enactment of the cowardice that
characterized their activity during the Forbes disclosures.
The same patterns of moral self-righteousness and non-
existant physical courage were appearing once again. And
Higginson didn't like it. In fact, he was so outraged that
he began to re-enact some behavior patterns of his own. This
time he decided to do more than boycott a few meetings to
show his displeasure. This time he tried to completely dis-
sociate himself from his fellow committee members. This time
he would separate himself by more than a few stinging words
in the Atlantic Monthly
. Though he fully realized the impor-
tance of Brown's death to the antislavery movement and though
knew the logistical impracticality of any rescue effort,
Higginson began toying with the idea of rescue. It was his
way of divorcing himself from Sanborn and Stearns and atoning
for the dishonor their acts brought to the committee. Years
later, Higginson claimed he acted because he would have been
"ashamed of doing nothing for Brown." But during the last
days of October, as Brown's trial proceeded to its inevitable
conclusion, the minister thought of rescue less out of shame
for having done nothing to help Brown, than out of shame at
being associated with the other members of the Secret Commit-
f c . 15tee of Six.
As Brown's trial ended on November 2 and he was sen-
tenced to hang one month later, Higginson began a "mock"
attempt to free the warrior— a symbolic gesture of dissocia
tion. He traveled to North Elba ostensibly to pick up Mary
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Brown and bring her back to Boston from where she was to
begin the journey to her husband's side in Charles town.
Higginson actually made his trip to the Brown homestead for
a far different reason. He hoped to persuade Mary Brown to
argue the case for rescue with her husband who up until then
had steadfastly spurned all such suggestions. The minister
was counting on a plea from Mary to change Brown's mind and
convince him that escape was still desirable. Even if Brown
refused Mary's request, Higginson knew her visit wouldn't be
wasted. It was sure to "evoke sympathy." 16
On November 4 Mary Brown arrived in Boston with
Higginson. She was warmly greeted by many prominent members
of the Massachusetts abolitionist community at a reception
in the American House hotel arranged by Sanborn, Stearns, and
Howe. Early the next day she departed for New York City
accompanied by George Hoyt, who had recently returned from
Virginia, Thomas Russell, and Higginson. When the group
reached the city, Higginson turned around and headed back to
Worcester. The others continued on to Philadelphia where
Higginson had arranged for Mary to be met by J. Miller McKim
who was to accompany her to Charleston. But soon after his
return, Higginson received a telegram from George Sennot
another young Massachusetts lawyer sent to Virginia by
Brown's Boston defense committee. Sennot told Higginson that
Brown had been informed of his wife's pending visit and did
t want to see her. The warrior felt certain the meetingno
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would only distract Mary's mind and add to his own "afflic-
tion." He didn't feel a visit could possibly do any good.
Higginson immediately notified McKim, explained Brown's
reluctance to see his wife, and asked that Mary not be taken
17
south.
Higginson doubted that Brown's desire to see Mary was
merely a "matter of sentiment." It occurred to the minister
that Brown might be worried about her being called as a wit-
ness in the pending trials of others caught in the raid.
Higginson also felt something other than Mary's well-being
prompted Brown's refusal to see her. Mary Brown might not
only be distracted she might also distract. Mary's appear-
ance might disrupt the image of Brown as a solitary warrior
struggling against the institution of slavery. Higginson now
strongly sensed that Brown knew (better than anyone) the
implication of his own martyrdom. Brown's composure at the
trial and his consistent refusal to save himself by pleading
insanity or contemplating rescue, all led Higginson to wonder
at the "mysteriously inept" handling of the raid. Brown's
veto of Mary's visit stimulated that wonder even more.
Higginson was now certain that Brown fully understood how
much a failed attempt at insurrection could mean to aboli-
tion, and his own historical identity. A failed attempt
could mean as much as a successful one--perhaps more. It
could mean that others would see Brown's "tracks" in the
snows of centuries, that the further inscriptions on the
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Brown family gravestone would have meaning and that there
would be no speculation about the historical significance of
his gift of Pate's knife to Stearns. For a failed
ex-businessman martyrdom at Harpers Ferry could mean success,
in the wake of an inglorious string of failures. 18
Soon after the effort to send Mary Brown to Charleston
had failed, Higginson wrote a short note to the Brown chil-
dren explaining what had happened. He told them of their
father's reluctance to consider escape but suggested that
something might still be done for him. Higginson claimed
that there was always a possibility their father would change
his mind once he realized his sentence would not be commuted.
But there can be little doubt that Higginson made such
remarks only to bolster the children's spirits. By early
November, the minister fully realized Brown would not change
his mind. He never mentioned it to the children but
19Higginson knew their father wanted to die.
In addition to the minister's sense of Brown's wish, two
letters further reinforced his conviction about the impracti-
cality of rescue. On November 7 Higginson received a note
from John LeBarnes, a former Kansas freedom fighter, who had
traveled to Charleston to check on the feasibility of rescue.
LeBarnes told Higginson that the whole idea of escape was the
furthest thing from Brown's mind. The warrior would not lis-
ten to it. Six days after receiving the LeBarnes letter,
Higginson heard from James Repath. The journalist's note
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convinced Higginson that his assumptions about Brown and mar-
tyrdom were correct and all but ended his flirtation with
rescue. Repath wrote from Baltimore where he had traveled in
search of members of the raiding party who had not been cap-
tured. He told Higginson that he heard rumors about a
planned rescue attempt and expressed surprise that anyone
would undertake such a scheme. Repath didn't want Brown
freed. He didn't have the faintest hope that the warrior
would escape from martyrdom. Brown's death meant too much to
abolition. Repath himself had already begun the effort to
enhance the warrior's reputation. As soon as "Old B was in
heaven" the journalist intended to publish a biography which
would glorify Brown's martyrdom and quietly repudiate "the
notion that his wrongs in Kansas had any influence on his
present movements." Such notions cheapened the Harpers Ferry
attack and degraded Brown "from the position of Puritan (war-
ring for his Lord) to a guerrilla chief of vindictive man-
,,20
ner . "
Higginson understood the implication of "Old B's" mar-
tyrdom. He understood the catalytic effect Brown's death
would have on northern antislavery sentiment. He understood
Brown's repeated refusal to cooperate with rescue efforts was
based on a complete understanding of his martyrdom's impact.
He knew of the near strategic impossibility of actually
breaking the warrior out of jail. Yet, he continued plan-
ning. Higginson did so in direct response to his fellow
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conspirators who continued to behave in ways which angered
and disturbed him. Making such efforts, even if they were
ritualistic, provided a dramatic way in which to dissociate
himself from their acts.
Higginson also felt Gerrit Smith squandered his reputa-
tion by the way he acted after Harpers Ferry. In August,
Smith boldly predicted insurrection "any month, any week,
any day," but Brown's capture shocked and unnerved him.
Fearing his own implication (especially when some of his let-
ters to Brown were found at the Chambersburg farm house)
,
Smith immediately sent his son-in-law Charles Miller to
Boston to collect all other letters that might link him to
the scheme. Smith's Peterboro mansion was guarded day and
night and parcels arriving for the landowner were inspected
for bombs. During Brown's trial and while he awaited the
gallows afterwards Smith became deeply distraught and spoke
of going to Virginia himself to assist the warrior. Just
21
what he intended to do by such action remains a mystery.
Smith's biographer suggests that these feelings of
shock, anger, fear, and guilt put a tremendous strain on the
philanthropist in the weeks following the raid. Indeed, he
suggests that when this strain is coupled with the residual
effects of Smith's bout with typhoid in 1857, the exertions
of the gubernatorial campaign in 1858, and Smith's arduous
religious research in 1859, the reformer's breakdown in the
cond week of November is quite understandable. Smith isse
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said to have gone "down under a troop of hallucinations." He
supposedly stalked around the Peterboro mansion ranting about
his responsibility to Brown and claiming he ought to go south
and join the warrior. Because his family believed he might
try to actualize these fantasies they had him committed to
Utica Asylum under the "humoring notion" that he was indeed
going south to share Brown's fate. At Utica, Smith was
attended by Dr. John P. Gray during the next four weeks.
Then, shortly after Brown went to the gallows, Smith was
released from the asylum, spent a few weeks recuperating at
Gray's home, and returned to Peterboro on December 29 fully
22
recovered
.
It is difficult to say whether or not Smith actually did
break down only to recover miraculously in four weeks. There
is no doubt that Smith had a long history of physical and
emotional collapse in the face of extreme tension. On a num-
ber of occasions such breakdowns were treated by isolation,
rest, and relaxation. And it is entirely possible the trauma
caused by Brown's capture and his own implication in the
scheme demanded repetition of such therapy. It is also pos-
sible his incarceration at Utica was an elaborate effort to
avoid arrest. However, to suggest that Smith went "temporar-
ily insane" as one historian has is quite another matter. No
accurate medical analysis of his collapse exists and a break-
down under pressure is a far cry from insanity. What is cer-
tain about this whole episode is that Smith, like his
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co-conspirators in Boston, had contemplated Brown's failure
but not prepared himself for his own implication in the
effort. Neither Smith nor his committee associates ever
dreamed that Brown would leave letters behind in Chambersburg
.
Brown's mistaken character evaluation of Forbes was one thing;
the idea that he did not have enough sense to burn correspon-
dence before venturing out to Harpers Ferry quite another.
Nor did Smith understand Brown's seeming ineptitude in get-
ting the raiding party trapped inside the federal armory. If
Brown was anything he was a disciplined, controlled, and com-
petent guerrilla leader
. Given such eventualities Smith's
nervous breakdown seems plausible. In any case, Smith and
his family must have realized that a brief stay at Utica made
a great deal of sense whatever his condition. The asylum
was the perfect sanctuary in which to avoid the retributive
acts of proslavery adherents and to await the actions of
authorities who were investigating the possibility of con-
spiracy. By mid-December, when it looked as though the only
prolonged investigation of the affair would be handled by a
Senate committee chaired by James Mason of Virginia, Smith
felt he could relax. Word had it that Mason was more intent
on playing down the notion of conspiracy than exposing the
- 23
existence of one.
In addition to Smith's so-called "insanity," Thomas
Wentworth Higginson continued to be disappointed by the
behavior of Stearns and Sanborn. During Mary Brown's visit
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to Boston, the two men incessantly discussed the eventuality
of arrest and what to do about it. Rumors also circulated
that Stearns had asked George Sennot to retrieve the supplies
Brown used during the raid in order to recoup some of the
money he had invested in the project. Sanborn continued to
contemplate a flight to Canada. He claimed to have "no
intention of going to Canada to avoid arrest as a criminal
nor for any cause," but he rested that claim on the stipula-
tion that he could be "reasonably sure" of being protected by
his Concord townsmen. And though he often stated he would
"hate to leave" Massachusetts he asserted he wouldn't hesi-
tate to do it rather than go to jail for six months or a
24year.
Throughout the first- two weeks of November, the panicky
committee secretary frequently huddled with Andrew for advice
though still holding back "full particulars" of his partici-
pation in the conspiracy. The advice Andrew gave him wasn't
pleasing to hear. Andrew believed that under an 1846 law a
material witness could be arrested by warrant from a U.S.
judge without any previous summons. While there was some
possibility for a writ of habeus corpus in the procedure, the
lawyer felt that unless a state judge was willing to rule the
law unconstitutional the only way a witness could be released
was "by tumult." When Higginson wrote to Sanborn advising
him to seriously reconsider running to Canada, the secretary
somewhat angrily insisted that if he, Howe, and Stearns had
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the same assurance of citizen protection which Higginson had
there would be no need to run. Sanborn also lectured
Higginson on the undesirability of Brown's rescue. He
claimed to agree with Bronson Alcott that the "spectacle of
martyrdom" would be of "greater service to the country than
years of agitation by Press and voices of partisans."
Higginson didn't need the lecture. By this time he was cer-
tain Sanborn was more concerned with Brown's deathly silence
than his deathly service. 25
The minister was also upset by the poor advice Sanborn
seemed to be giving Howe and Stearns. Prompted by Sanborn's
views on the reasonableness of flight, and Andrew's dismal
assessment of their legal position, both men fled to Canada
shortly after Mary Brown's visit. They were reluctant to
leave Massachusetts but decided that unless a resolution was
introduced in the Massachusetts legislature to protect them
they should stay in Canada as long as it was necessary.
Howe's rationale sounded remarkably like Sanborn's. The doc-
tor claimed that Brown's "best chance" was "the appearance of
acting upon his own motive and responsibility . . . without
the active cooperation of organized Committees or from . . .
26individuals of the North."
It was Higginson' s view that flight documented conspir-
acy far more completely than if secret committee members
stayed home. But even in his anger at the activities of
Howe, Sanborn, Stearns, and Smith, Higginson continued only a
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ritualistic consideration of rescue and had all but abandoned
the scheme during the first two weeks of November because of
his own realization of the importance of Brown's martyrdom.
He abandoned the idea, that is, until November 15 when he
picked up a copy of the Worcester Telegram
. That day the
Tjele^ram and other newspapers around the state contained a
disclaimer card from Samuel Gridley Howe. In the card Howe
attempted to justify his flight to Canada and disavow any
responsibility for John Brown's actions. He insisted that he
had no specific knowledge of the Harpers Ferry raid, implied
he had no general knowledge either, and suggested that his
expatriation should "draw attention to the infamous act by
which slaveholders throw a lasso over northern citizens." 27
When Thomas Wentworth Higginson read the denial card he
immediately roughed out a response. He thought it was one
thing to rationalize flight quite another to begin believing
in ones own rationale. In fact, Higginson considered it to
be "extreme baseness" for Howe to deny complicity in Brown's
general scheme. He reminded Howe of his suggestion that
secret committee members make no statements about their rela-
tionship to the warrior. The minister understood the impro-
priety of judging other men's acts but said he could not help
but feel that Smith's "insanity" and Howe's card were the
"only two bad results of the whole affair." It would be the
"universal" opinion of all "intelligent" people that the
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doctor denied "all knowledge" of the raid, "not merely the
precise time and place." Higginson knew this was false. 28
Surprisingly, Higginson did not send his rebuke to Howe.
Instead, he drafted a second note of protest and sent it to
the individual whose advice he suspected was behind Howe's
act, Franklin Benjamin Sanborn. In a brief letter to the
secretary, Higginson asked if there was "no such thing as
honor among confederates." Sanborn replied by apologizing for
Howe's card but claiming not to accept the minister's conclu-
sion that it was the "height of baseness." Sanborn said he
saw good reason for any effort to prevent southerners from
knowing who Brown's accomplices were. Then he made what
Higginson must have construed to be a ridiculous assertion.
Sanborn claimed that if names of the conspirators were kept
secret they might "work in the same way" again. As far as
Sanborn was concerned, it wasn't "any worse to conceal the
29facts now than before the outbreak."
What worried Sanborn much more than Howe's card was the
possibility of erratic behavior by the volatile Higginson.
Any factual testimony by the minister about the secret com-
mittee's activities would be disastrous and Sanborn knew
Higginson was capable of doing just that if only as a ges-
ture of atonement for the "dishonorable" acts of his fellow
conspirators. The minister's testimony threatened Sanborn
far more than Smith's "insanity," a few burnt letters, some
trips to Canada or a denial card. So Sanborn tried to head
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off any such action. In his reply to Higginson, he suggested
that the minister could recoup his own "honor" by declaring
himself in Brown's plot. But Sanborn warned Higginson that
he had no right to implicate anyone else. Only such an
implication, declared the petulant committee secretary, con-
stituted the definition of "baseness." Maybe Howe hadn't
"acted well in all ways" but neither had Higginson. Sanborn
concluded his note by suggesting that "so long as each person
acts for himself we must allow some diversities." 30
The covert efforts of Sanborn, Stearns, Smith, and Howe
to deny their relationship with Brown prompted Higginson to
contemplate a rescue attempt, if only as a gesture of disdain
for their acts. He needed a lever of dissociation. Yet, up
until Howe's card and Sanborn's petulant reply to his remon-
strance, Higginson held back from total commitment to the
rescue. His efforts were more ritualistic than real. Now,
in the face of Sanborn's rejection of the scheme and Howe's
contention that Brown's death would be "holy and glorious,"
the minister began a serious effort to gain the warrior's
freedom. He would not allow men who were totally lacking in
physical courage to dictate his actions. Ironically, it was
just as Howe wrote to Andrew from Canada and confessed that
he was beginning to believe he had "come away from Boston on
a fools errand," that Higginson began the process of separat-
ing himself from the other committee members by returning to
his plans for rescue.
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The minister first wrote to Sanborn. He assured the
secretary that he would not "expose the whole matter"and he
would not reveal the names of the other secret committee mem-
bers if he decided to testify about his own role in the
affair. Next, he contacted John LeBarnes and resumed dis-
cussion of rescue. LeBarnes seemed to be more optimistic
about an attempt than he had been a few days earlier. He
now felt a rescue project might have a chance and that assis-
tance could be obtained in Kansas. Finally, xHigginson began
considering specific rescue proposals. Lysander Spooner sug-
gested chartering a boat, sailing up Chesapeake Bay, kidnap-
ping Viginia's governor Robert Wise and then exchanging him
for Brown. When LeBarnes heard of the scheme he applauded
its audacity but wasn't sure it would work. He and Higginson
thought in more conventional terms. They debated a variety
of infantry assaults on Charles town, though both realized that
some one thousand soldiers guarded the town and a direct
infantry attack could only be accomplished with 200 to 300
men. The two men also discussed the possibility of sneaking
a handful of well- trained mercenaries into Charlestown.
32Stealth might be more effective than strength.
Five days after LeBarnes and Higginson began their
debate, Lysander Spooner contacted the minister and notified
him that LeBarnes had recruited men, a pilot, and a boat for
the "Richmond expedition." Spooner expressed full confidence
that the plan would work if someone would furnish the money.
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On November 22 Higginson received another report from
LeBarnes in which the freedom fighter assured him that one
of the plans they had discussed could be managed. Only the
money was "uncertain."
But the same day Higginson also heard from Brown and the
letter severely dampened his enthusiasm for rescue. Brown
tried to explain more fully why he had refused to see his
wife and also wanted to assure everyone that though he was
unable to write he had not forgotten their love and kindness.
Brown's obvious effort to appear heroically resigned to his
own death stunned Higginson and made his rescue gestures seem
foolish. When Higginson coupled this feeling with the pes-
simistic tone of a report LeBarnes sent him on November 24,
his momentary sense of foolishness was converted into a deci-
sion to totally abandon the rescue project. LeBarnes wrote
about the progress he was having in recruiting men and, in
the process, signaled his skepticism about the Richmond plan.
He said that he didn't feel well enough about the scheme to
go in other than a supervisory capacity and claimed to agree
with Wendell Phillips that "success would be brilliant
—
34
defeat fatally inglorious."
Even though both Higginson and LeBarnes had really given
up on the idea of rescue, they played out the charade during
the course of the next few days for appearance sake. On
November 27, LeBarnes notified Higginson that 15 to 25 men
had been assembled and were ready to attack Charlestown or to
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execute Spooner 's Richmond scheme. The men were resolute and
confident of success, though LeBarnes himself thought that
under the circumstances such confidence was unwarranted, even
"strange." If 1500 to 2000 dollars could be raised, the
"desperate chance" could begin; if not the whole matter must
be forgotten. LeBarnes didn't have to wait long for an
answer. One day later Higginson notified him that the money
could not be raised. Within hours the minister received a
simple reply from his confederate: "objects abandoned." 35
Soon after receiving this confirmation from LeBarnes,
Higginson wrote to Lysander Spooner to explain the reasons
for failing to carry out a plan. There were several objec-
tions to an advance on Charles town. It was "absurd" to assume
that money could induce the "worst men in the country to a
desperate act." Anyone of them could have made twice as much
by betraying the scheme. The same held true for Spooner'
s
Richmond plan. Near the end of his note Higginson said he
felt "most unwillingly compelled to abandon the hope of
redeeming the honor of the Free States in the only way open--
3 6by the rescue of John Brown."
At one level of intention Higginson was entirely sincere
in his efforts to rescue Brown. He had the natural and laud-
able desire to save an admirable individual from what he con-
sidered to be an unjust execution. If the minister could
have saved Brown he would have. But to suggest this does not
mitigate Higginson 1 s equally strong impulse to see Brown
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martyred. Higginson knew quite well the significance Brown's
death would have for the abolitionist movement: it would
inflame popular indignation in the North. Even if most
northerners were just as horrified by the thought of insur-
rection as southern slaveholders, Brown could be portrayed
as a man of the highest Puritan virtue "warring for the
Lord." The intense personal sympathy which went out to him
could eventually be converted to the cause of abolition.
What is more, Higginson knew perfectly well that Brown him-
self understood and relished this fact. Thus, in examining
the correspondence between Higginson and those who helped
develop rescue plans, one senses an underlying reluctance to
ever carry out such plans. Not only were these schemes prac-
tically impossible, they were also at odds with abolitionist
exploitation of popular sentiment. As LeBarnes noted, defeat
of an attempt would have been "fatally inglorious." It is
in this context then that Higginson' s remarks about "Free
State honor" and "honor" among confederates should be inter-
preted. Higginson's effort was less of an attempt to redeem
northern integrity than an attempt to redeem the integrity
which he believed had been squandered by the other members of
the secret committee. In the wake of Canadian flights,
Smith's retreat to Utica, Howe's disclaimer card, and
Sanborn's repeated denials of complicity with Brown,
Higginson felt compelled to dramatize his contempt of such
behavior by a mock rescue effort. It was his way of
boycotting the actions of the secret committee; his way of
dissociating himself from their lack of probity. Perhaps the
most poignant symbol of the way in which Higginson used the
rescue attempt is the comment he made to LeBarnes at the end
of one of his letters. While other members of the committee
were making exertions to destroy all incriminating evidence,
Higginson warned LeBarnes not to burn any of their correspon-
dence. Some demonstration of integrity and conviction had to
be made by those individuals who subsidized Brown. Higginson
believed he was the only committeeman capable of doing it.
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CHAPTER IX
In Rome, Theordore Parker read about Harpers Ferry in
letters written by his many Massachusetts friends. As he
did, he grew more and more certain that the money contributed
to Brown by the secret committee had not been thrown away or
"wasted." Over three thousand miles from America, separated
by a vast ocean from threats of arrest or trial, Parker felt
free to speak calmly and rationally about the whole affair.
As far as he was concerned, Harpers Ferry was just the
beginning and "many acorns must be sown before one comes up."
But if Theodore Parker could remain dispassionate about the
episode, such was not the case with his longtime friend and
fellow secret committee member, Samuel Gridley Howe. The
doctor was thoroughly confused, and his panic-stricken behav-
ior from the time he was notified of the raid's failure until
Brown was hanged in the first week of December underscores
that confusion. Howe was terrified by the possibility of
his implication with Brown and looked for other men to make
decisions for him. When John Andrew told him that he might
be indicted or imprisoned and Sanborn justified any action to
prevent arrest Howe guiltily ran to Canada. It wasn't until
just before Brown went to the gallows that the doctor was
able to regain control of his emotions."'"
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Soon after Brown's execution Howe asked Andrew for a
re-evaluation of his legal status and an estimate of public
sentiment in Suffolk County toward those who might have
assisted Brown. Andrew did not give him encouraging news.
Efforts to change the law of 1846, by which those implicated
with Brown could be compelled to give testimony, had bogged
down in the Massachusetts legislature. Even though Andrew
had written numerous letters to newspapers assuring
Massachusetts citizenry of Howe's innocence, he did not feel
that people were aroused enough about the issue to prevent
the doctor from being taken outside of the state. Andrew
also told Howe about rumors circulating throughout Boston of
the possibility that a special United States Senate committee
would be selected to investigate the raid. The lawyer felt
that, if these rumors were true, Howe, Stearns, and Sanborn
would surely be summoned to testify. He speculated that once
in Washington anything could happen. They might be "spirited
over the river to Virginia and lynched; or taken by Va
.
authorities and proceeded against as accessories before the
fact if they gave Brown aid and comfort for general purposes
2
even if they were ignorant of special purposes."
Despite Andrew's dire prediction, this time Howe didn't
panic. He was waiting for an opinion from Charles Sumner
about the state of affairs in the nation's capital. Howe was
certain that Sumner's views would be more accurate than
Andrew's. Besides, Howe wanted to testify. He had begun to
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feel that it would be a better way to alleviate his problems
than continued flights to Canada. He wanted to atone for his
behavior during the past two months and was beginning to feel
bolder now that the only person outside of the secret commit-
tee who could give prima facie evidence against him was
dead. 3
By the middle of December, rumor became fact. A special
investigating committee was appointed under the chairmanship
of Senator James Mason of Virginia. As soon as news of the
committee's appointment reached Boston, Howe, Stearns, and
Sanborn met and debated their course of action. Sanborn
refused to consider the possibility of going to Washington
when Howe suggested it. Stearns was less adamant. Sanborn
was certain Andrew's assessment of their fate was accurate:
a trap was being set for all who were suspected of assisting
Brown. When Howe disputed this view but could not prove oth-
erwise (he hadn't received a reply from Sumner yet), he and
Sanborn argued. Howe wanted to testify. He felt guilty for
having issued the disclaimer, felt a strong need to recoup
his public reputation, and he was tired of panicky trips
north. Then, too, Julia was expecting their fourth child at
4
the end of the month; he wanted to be with her.
Sanborn wouldn't budge. He would not testify just to
"avoid a conflict." He would not honor a summons because he
was certain that was what the South wanted. And there were
other reasons for resisting Howe's arguments—reasons Sanborn
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kept to himself. Unlike Howe, who only received second-hand
information about Brown's movements in the last few weeks
before Harpers Ferry, Sanborn was directly linked to the war-
rior in the days prior to the raid. If the committee ever
found Francis Merriam and persuaded him to talk, Sanborn knew
he would be in deep trouble. Sanborn was also beginning to
believe he could count on protection from arrest by Concord's
citizenry should he ignore the summons. Above all, Sanborn
resisted testifying because he felt certain his own conten-
tions about the hearings were correct: they were an elabo-
rate pretext to lure Brown's friends into prison. The thought
of a jail sentence terrified him. 5
The intensity of his fear is clearly reflected in his
treatment of Francis Merriam. A few days after meeting with
Howe and Stearns, Merriam appeared at the door of Sanborn's
Concord home looking for help as he dodged arrest by Virginia
authorities. He was heading toward Canada and needed food,
shelter, and funds before continuing his journey. Sanborn
refused to see him; refused to have anything to do with the
"plum" wno only a few weeks earlier had been of such great
"use" to the cause of freedom. The secretary later claimed
that his inaction had been governed by "a regard for his
[Merriam's] safety," that Merriam was "wholly crazy," and
that to have been seen with him would have jeopardized the
entire secret committee. There is, however, little question
about whose safety most concerned Sanborn. He did send his
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sister Sarah to speak to Merriam and Sarah, in turn, sought
Henry David Thoreau's help. Thoreau introduced himself to
Merriam as "Mr. Lockwood," took the youth to the Concord
train station, and gave him a ticket to Canada. 6
Because Howe had not received word from Sumner about the
political climate in Washington, he grudgingly conceded that
Sanborn might be correct about the possibility of a trap. So
both he and Stearns went back to Canada to await Sumner's
assessment and continued the debate about their course of
action. They remained in Canada for a little over a week and
then came back to Boston ready to give evidence as long as
they didn't have to "give their bodies." Howe was determined
to "own up" to his part in the affair and he told Andrew this
in a letter written from Canada just before his return. When
Andrew received the letter he immediately informed Sanborn.
The young secretary again made efforts to quell Howe's
desire. Writing the doctor on December 19 (a few days before
Howe and Stearns returned) he assured Howe that his reasons
for going to Canada were "righteous," that he should not be
upset at Higginson ' s criticism of the disclaimer card and
that such criticism was by no means reflective of popular
opinion about his behavior. According to Sanborn, Howe
should not feel pressed to testify in order to regain his
reputation. He had never lost that reputation and should
understand that Higginson 's remarks to the contrary were
"extravagant." Sanborn desperately tried to head off Howe's
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testimony by convincing the doctor that he had no reason to
atone for his behavior. The secretary also tried to hold
Howe in place by suggesting that once information came in
from Washington on the nature of the investigation they could
all act publically. He seemed to hint at a willingness to
testify in some other forum than a Washington hearing room. 7
Actually, Sanborn's hint was only a ploy. He had no
intention of testifying anywhere. About the same time he
wrote Howe indicating a desire to act in public, he also
wrote Higginson and scolded him for leaving incriminating
letters in John Andrew's possession. Sanborn was bent on
destroying every piece of evidence that could possibly tie him
or any other committee member to Brown. He also told
Higginson that he believed Boston abolitionists should direct
all their attention toward challenging the federal govern-
ment's right to compel individuals to leave their own state
in order to give testimony before a committee like Mason's.
Sanborn felt that repeal of the 1846 statute was a good issue
for reformers to stand on and said he hoped Henry Wilson
could be persuaded to lead the fight. No matter what anyone
said, Sanborn knew that abolitionists didn't "stand a chance"
in Washington D. C. How could they? It was a place that
couldn't protect its own senators, an absurd sanctuary for
g
"creeping things" called office seekers.
As already suggested, the effort to stop Howe from
returning failed. The doctor and George Luther Stearns came
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back to Boston fully intending to appear before the Mason
Committee. Both men were buoyed by Sumner's contention that
they had "nothing to fear from Virginia's menaces." They
called for a meeting at Henry Wilson's offices on the day
before Christmas and asked that Sanborn and Martin Conway, an
ex-Kansas Committee agent, attend. When the group convened,
they first had to endure an outburst by the tempestuous
Wilson. The Senator was furious about the whole Harpers
Ferry episode, claimed he would do nothing to block summonses
from the Mason Committee, and insisted that anyone called to
Washington to testify ought to do so. Wilson felt that any
attempt to avoid testimony would endanger Republican Party
chances in the coming fall elections. If it wasn't made
clear to the public that the party had nothing to do with
Brown and had not sanctioned his violent, illegal activity,
then all hopes of increasing party strength in Congress were
doomed. Wilson also assured the group that they would be
perfectly safe in the capital. Howe was angered by Wilson's
outburst and defended Brown's effort by claiming that the
warrior only strove to carry certain "currents of antislavery
thought to their logical sequence in action." But when tem-
pers finally settled, Howe, Stearns, and Conway reaffirmed
their desire to face Mason and the other members of his com-
9
mi ttee
.
Frank Sanborn did not agree to honor a committee sum-
mons. He believed that Howe and Stearns were mistaken in
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a craven
their decision and condemned Wilson for acting like ",
and a blockhead." As far as the secretary was concerned,
there were "a thousand better ways of spending a year in war-
fare against slavery than by lying in a Washington prison."
By the time he received his summons in early January, he was
so upset that even assurances of protection couldn't keep him
in Concord. So he fled to Canada. Once there, he claimed
that friends and family urged him to go away . He also sought
to legitimize his flight by writing Mason and making a request
he knew the Senator could not allow. Sanborn claimed that he
was willing to give testimony but only in Massachusetts. But
what Sanborn really wanted to do was "go abroad" and join
Edwin Morton who had fled to England at the first news of
Harpers Ferry. Sanborn also toyed with the idea of taking up
permanent residence in Canada where he could go on with his
work for the black man. There he could continue to "set an
example" and continue to make antislavery his "business." He
could "go down among the fugitives and explore their condi-
tion with a view to some better organization of them.
"
Throughout his life Sanborn was always trying to organize one
group or another.
In addition to being afraid of arrest and censurious of
those who disagreed with his refusal to testify (they were
all "wholly crazy," "extravagent, " or "blockheads"), Sanborn
now became as concerned about his public reputation as had
Howe. He wanted to avoid jail and maintain the respect of
those who applauded his efforts for Brown. To do so, he
wrote the one man who would most likely criticize his behav-
ior—Thomas Wentworth Higginson. In the letter to Higginson,
written only a few days after arriving in Canada, Sanborn
claimed he would have been "glad to give Massachusetts a
chance to keep her citizens at home" but didn't "have much
faith in her people in the capacity of defenders against the
law." Indeed, the " keeping back of evidence " was much "too
important to leave to chance." Without testimony, Sanborn
was certain "no new light could be thrown on the matter."
The South would exaggerate the raid and the North would
extenuate it. The committee secretary also believed the
North's silence would very likely foster similar schemes and
he claimed he wanted to "reserve" himself for that time. A
few weeks before he had attempted to alleviate Howe's guilt
in order to keep the doctor in Canada but now he tried to
create guilt. At the end of his letter to Higginson, Sanborn
criticized the minister for "rushing upon" his friends and
implied that any harsh words about his flight to Canada would
not do. Sanborn also pleaded with Higginson. He "implored"
the minister not to tell what he knew to the "enemies of the
,,11
cause.
The meeting with Wilson and his eventual summons drove
Sanborn to Canada, but they had a far different effect on
Samuel Gridley Howe. The doctor stood by his decision to go
to Washington. He was through running and through taking
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Sanborn's advice. Henry Wilson wanted to use the hearings
to exonerate himself and the Republican Party and Howe wanted
to use them to recapture the civic reputation he believed he
had lost. A few years earlier, in the midst of a crisis of
character, the doctor had admitted his feelings of cowardli-
ness in "dangerous situations" but at the time he also
remarked that he was proud of his ability to seem "cool" in
such instances. Between October 16 and December 24, 1859, he
had failed even to act cooly. He had failed to maintain a
calm demeanor for public consumption and he was deeply embar-
rassed. His concern for what "one or the other may think" and
his worries about lost "public approbation" far outweighed
his fears of arrest. He had once been wary about being lured
into prison if he set foot in Washington. Now he wanted to
go there, correct his "misteps," set himself "in rectus
curia ,
" and "express the admiration and respect" he felt for
12John Brown.
But if Howe wanted to redeem his reputation, he was
decidedly against fully revealing his true relationship with
Brown. He wanted to exonerate himself, avoid imprisonment,
and "express his admiration" for Brown but he intended to
divorce himself from the warrior's "special purposes." He
would claim that his hands and those of other abolitionists
who supported Brown were "clean." He intended to use
Massachusetts Kansas Committee records to prove this conten-
tion before a public tribunal. And obviously, he never
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thought of mentioning the Secret Committee of Six. if ques-
tions were asked about the arms distributed by Massachusetts
Kansas he would claim that the arms were only to be used as
the subscribers intended. Stearns had instructed Brown about
this but the warrior had disobeyed orders. Howe also thought
of suggesting that Brown was "already tete exalte : not mad
but intensified to the verge of madness." This monomania
took "the form of the love of arms," but these weapons "had
only been entrusted to him for the defense of Kansas." 13
Howe also stood by his decision to testify because he
had begun to hear stories from Washington that cast some
doubt on James Mason's willingness to fully document conspir-
acy. The doctor reflected this information in a letter to
Charles Sumner in mid-January. Howe said he wanted to "clear
up" the matter of his relationship to Brown but was certain
that by the time he testified Mason would "have got so much
of what he did not want that he will hardly press me into
service." And to make sure this was the case, Howe asked
that the date of his testimony be moved from January 24 to
the first week in February. The more Mason heard the depth
of support for Brown, the less likely he was to pressure
those most closely associated with the martyr. Thus, with
evidence assembled to dissociate himself from Brown's "spe-
cial purposes," a strong possibility Mason didn't want to
document the conspiracy anyway, and the assurances of Sumner
and Wilson that he need not fear coming to Washington, Howe
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was prepared to correct his "misteps." He was relieved with
his decision to go on; relieved that he had stopped yielding
"too much to others." The thought of evading testimony was
always "repugnant" to him though he admitted having some mis-
givings about a trap when he was first notified of the com-
mittee's formation. Now he wanted to stand boldly before the
Senate investigators. 14
One man in Massachusetts watched Howe's new found bold-
ness with curiosity, confusion, and a bit of disgust. In
fact, Thomas Wentworth Higginson was so upset with the
actions of Howe, Sanborn, and Stearns that he refused to
"expostulate" on their motives anymore. In November, long
before the Mason Committee was set up, Higginson had decided
not to volunteer testimony because, even though he did not
fear proclaiming his relationship to Brown, he was worried
about implicating other secret committee members. Now he saw
that none of the other members were hindered by such consid-
eration for him. Each had offered their "own confession" on
their "own terms," after urging him to hold back evidence.
The minister wondered what Sanborn hoped to accomplish by
running to Canada or what Howe felt he would prove by con-
senting to testify after twice flying there. Howe and
Stearns couldn't accomplish a thing by going in front of
investigators who didn't want to throughly probe the alleged
conspiracy. Higginson had recently discussed the matter with
Vermont's Senator Jacob Collamer and knew, as he was sure
Howe did, that Mason's determination to uncover wrong doing
was beginning to weaken. According to Collamer, all the
Virginia Senator wanted to do was claim he had tried to
expose the conspiracy but had failed because he "could not
obtain the necessary information." Collamer speculated that
Mason took this new approach to the investigation because he
was very fearful of "the effect on the country of witnesses
who shall defend John Brown." 15
Higginson suspected that personal considerations fully
controlled the actions of his less than honorable confeder-
ates and he was deeply offended. Previously he had criti-
cized all of them for a lack of physical courage while con-
deding their moral courage. But he wasn't sure of even that
anymore. The only thing he was certain of was why he had not
been called to the Mason hearings. He had always openly
refused to go to Canada and refused to disavow his support of
Brown. If Collamer was correct, the committee chairman
wasn't willing to take a chance on examining a witness will-
ing to speak the whole truth.
Jacob Collamer 's comments to Higginson about James
Mason's fears were astute. The Virginia Senator was worried
that popular emotions would be inflamed by men willing to
defend Brown. Still, he had not always been afraid of such a
result. As early as October 21, only two days after the dis-
covery of documents hinting at the possibility of an organi-
zation behind Brown's raid, James Mason had been eager to
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start a thorough-going investigation. He felt enough evi-
dence existed to warrant belief in conspiracy and was deter-
mined to expose it. Mason knew Brown "acted from the impres-
sion made upon him by abolitionist tracts," which implied
that all one had to do was put arms in the reach of slaves to
incite immediate insurrection. The Virginian wanted an
inquiry made to discover the source of funds for this "mili-
tary expedition." By mid-December, 1859, Mason had his wish.
He was appointed chairman of a special Senate committee
charged with examining the Harpers Ferry incident. And he
was empowered to ask questions which bore directly on the
issue of conspiracy. Mason and his fellow committeemen, J.
N. Fitch, Jefferson Davis, J. R. Doolittle, and Jacob
Collamer were asked to find out whether or not Brown worked
with any organization which "intended to subvert the govern-
ment of any of the states," whether any citizen of the United
States was implicated as an "accessory to [the raid] by con-
tributions of money, arms, munitions or otherwise," and what
the character of such an organization might be if it did
. . 16
exist.
Mason's intense initial desire to prove conspiracy dis-
mayed Brown's Boston friends. At first it seemed to them
that their only hope for sympathy lay with the two Republi-
can's on the committee, J. R. Doolittle, and Jacob Collamer.
Collamer 's attitude toward the whole investigation was par-
ticularly heartening and best exemplified by his statements
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to A. A. Lawrence in late December. The Vermont Senator was
certain that any "fair investigation" would show that the
number of Brown's accomplices, beyond those caught at Harpers
Ferry, was "extremely small." Collamer seriously doubted
whether anyone who contributed to Brown "knew his purpose to
be of the criminal proportions and insane expedition it
turned out." Though the Senator was very disturbed by people
furnishing arms "to carry violence into the Slavery States"
and he termed such acts as "criminal," his hints were obvious.
The committee lacked enough evidence to build its case, Erown
was dead, and those called to the witness stand would really
be in charge of the direction of the investigation. If they
handled themselves properly, the inquiry might prove to be a
blessing in disguise. They (Brown's supporters) could prove
that the warrior had not received arms "for the purposes to
which they were eventually put." The hearings could exoner-
17
ate as well as implicate.
Ironically, in view of the respective positions taken by
Mason and Collamer previous to the actual hearings, one of
Brown's friends, George Luther Stearns, found he had more to
fear from the Vermont sympathizer than the Virginia enemy.
Mason developed misgivings about the investigation's poten-
tial impact as a catalyst for northern antislavery sentiment,
and slowly moved away from his commitment to fully expose
conspiracy. On the other hand, Collamer, by the time he
interrogated Stearns, began to sense that Brown's Boston
supporters might not have been as ignorant of the warrior's
"criminal" intent as he had originally supposed. Collamer
would end up pressing witnesses to speak fully and truthfully
about their attitude toward Brown and his violent acts. And
at times, it seemed he was much more concerned about the
possibility of conspiracy than Mason had originally been.
Mason pressured witnesses—but never too much. Collamer
defended them—but not entirely. Mason was never a lion nor
Collamer a lamb.
Ill
When subpeonas went out in early January some men
refused to comply. Gerrit Smith, James Repath, Hugh Forbes,
Frank Sanborn, and John Brown, Jr., would not go to Washing-
ton and testify for one reason or another. The younger Brown
also used the occasion to dissociate himself from certain of
his father's supporters. John Jr. claimed he would not
appear to testify but also let it be known that his "busi-
ness" didn't call him to Canada. If he visited that tempo-
rary home for "American exiles," it would be from "other con-
siderations than personal safety." Most men subpeoned by
the Mason Committee, however, did consent to make an appear-
ance. Throughout late January, February, and early March,
they paraded through the hearing room and answered numerous
questions about their knowledge of Brown, his antislavery
activities, and his Harpers Ferry plans.
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When Henry Wilson was asked about his relationship with
Brown, he answered by describing Hugh Forbes' revelations,
discussing his exchange of letters with Howe, speaking of his
own (and the Republican Party's) disdain for violence and
documenting this position by telling the committee of his
confrontation with Brown at the Parker House the previous
spring. John Andrew was asked why he didn't defend Brown
during his trial. Andrew answered that as a Republican, a
Massachusetts man and abolitionist he would have been on
trial quite as much as his client. He was also unfamiliar
with Virginia jurisprudence. Andrew's testimony is also sig-
nificant because it represents the basic defense agreed upon
by Brown's Boston supporters in meetings held previous to
their testimony. Andrew emphasized what most impressed him
about Brown, as well as what he thought would enhance the
dead warrior's reputation in the eyes of northern people. At
the same time, he depicted Brown as one who would never have
shared his Harpers Ferry plan with anyone. Who was John
Brown? According to this abolitionist lawyer, Brown was a
controlled enthusiast, one who spoke in tones "perfectly
level without emphasis and exhultation of feeling." Brown
was a paragon of those virtues that Andrew, and the secret
committee membership saw as a necessary component of the
American character. The warrior represented those mainstream
values which would bring order to the chaos of mid-nineteenth
America. He personified the values they imagined could bring
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a return to the halcyon days of eighteenth-century revolu-
tionary America. In a time when the corporation had begun to
nudge the rugged individualist off the stage, Brown was a man
who "scarcely regarded other people," who was entirely "self-
possessed and unto himself." He "appeared to have no emotion
of any sort but to be entirely absorbed in an idea." Ironi-
cally, Andrew and the others had romanticized a product of
the very socio-economic reality that appalled them. 19
As suggested, Andrew's testimony continued the theme of
secrecy originally begun by Brown's Kansas associate, Richard
Realf. In testimony given on January 21, Realf, who had par-
ticipated in Boston meetings intended to orchestrate the
statements of all those who were summoned, denied knowledge
of where Brown had procured funds for his venture. He
claimed Brown was cautious and uncommunicative about the par-
ticulars of his plan. Brown didn't trust anyone with any-
thing more than what was "barely sufficient" to "secure coop-
eration and support." Realf did admit that Brown told him
Gerrit Smith "promised to assist him in his further enter-
prises against slavery." But Realf did not know if this
20
meant assistance against the South.
On January 11 Samuel Gridley Howe was summoned to appear
before the committee thirteen days later. But the doctor
asked to postpone his testimony until the first week of
February claiming he had previously scheduled an exhibition
of blind children before the Canadian Parliament, which was
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considering an appropriation for rehabilitation institutions
similar to Perkins School. Howe also wanted to see how the
investigation was proceeding before he subjected himself to
questioning. He had met with Realf, Stearns, Andrew, and
Wilson and knew what they would say, but he did not want to
be surprised by the unexpected. The more testimony given,
the better his chance to avoid surprise. Howe's postponement
request was approved and he was resummoned for early
February. ^
From the outset of his testimony, Howe moved quickly to
close the door on any effort to link him to Brown. To
Mason's question about who controlled guns purchased by
Massachusetts for Kansas, he replied that he could not answer
"with precision." From that moment on, he qualified his
answers by claiming that he could "not recall," or had "no
definite knowledge of" or "could not say for certain." Asked
how Brown regained possession of weapons supposedly confis-
cated by the Massachusetts Kansas Committee in May, 1858, the
doctor deftly noted that he had "no means of knowing" that
the arms used at Harpers Ferry were the same donated for
Brown's defense of Kansas. Unsatisfied with this reply,
Mason asked Howe to produce letters which proved that Brown
was given the guns only for defensive purposes in Kansas.
Howe balked and claimed he could only speak for himself.
Correspondence with Brown was the responsibility of the com-
mittee chairman, George Luther Stearns. Howe admitted that
he saw Brown in the spring of 1858, but said that Brown "gave
no definite information" about his plans. When Collamer
interjected and asked Howe what he meant when he suggested
that Brown sought arms and funds for the "defense of Freedom
in Kansas/' the physician answered revealingly. Howe
asserted that when Brown used such terms he (the doctor) had
no thought about "anything but the freedom of Kansas, as
such, without any thought of colored men at all." Further on
in the questioning, Collamer returned to the issue of Brown's
plans in 1858 and the funds he collected in Boston during
that spring. Again Howe hedged. Brown gave him "no definite
statement of any plan or purpose." The warrior only appealed
22to him as an antislavery man.
Up until that point in the testimony the committee had
no evidence to dispute Howe's vague denials. When it came tc
questioning him about his relationship to Brown in 1859, how-
ever, the doctor found himself under more pressure. The com-
mitteemen had enough evidence partially to rebut his denials
and they proceeded to rattle the forgetful physician. What
is more, Collamer started to suspect that Howe and the other
men who supported Brown had taken no clear stand against the
warrior when he advocated the use of violence. Collamer
began a series of questions about 1859 by asking Howe to com-
ment on a note found at Chambersburg . It read: "Dear
Friend, Our friend from Concord called with your note. I
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began the investment with fifty dollars enclosed and will try
to do more through friends. Doctor."
Collamer
:
Will you say to whom it was addressed?
Howe: I presume it was addressed to Captain Brown.
Collamer ; Do you remember the fact of time?
Howe '• I do not remember the time. 23
James Mason was disturbed by Howe's failure to answer
the question and so prodded the doctor by asking him if he
recalled sending a telegraphic dispatch to John Kagi, a
friend of Brown's in June, 18 59.
Mason : Will you be good enough to inform the committee
whether you were acquainted with a man named J. H.
Kagi?
Howe : I never saw him.
Mason : Did you have any correspondence with him?
Howe: I never corresponded with him that I recollect.
Mason then exhibited the telegram sent by Howe to Kagi
on June 6, 1859 which read: "He got the needful and left
three days ago, direction unknown. S.G.H."
Mason : Will you say if you have any recall of this tele-
graphic dispatch?
2 4
Howe: I have not the slightest idea.
Howe was then questioned about a note John Brown, Jr.,
sent to John Kagi on August 17, 1859 after his Boston visit.
The note read: "First called on Dr. H- though I had no let-
ter of introduction he received me cordially. He gave me a
letter to a friend who does business on Milk Street. Went
with him to his house in Medford and took dinner. The last
word he said to me was, 'Tell friend (Issac) that we have
the fullest confidence in his endeavor
, whatever may be the
result' .
"
Mason: Did he tell you the object of his visit?
Howe : He did not.
Mason : Did he apply to you for money?
Howe : He did not.
Mason : Did you learn it [the object of his visit] from
any other source?
25Howe : I did not.
After Howe admitted that he gave money to Brown in 1857
and 1858 but that he did not know "what disposition" was made
of the funds, Collamer interjected.
Collamer : To prevent any misunderstanding about these con-
tributions I desire to ask a question. Were not
the contributions received by the committies which
were made by the people of Boston and Massachusetts
for and during the Kansas troubles?
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Howe
Collamer
:
Howe
:
Mason
:
Howe :
Mason:
Howe
For that definite purpose.
Was any money of these contributions ever sent to
Brown in 1858?
Not that I know of.
But there were other contributions that were sent
to him after the fall of 1858 ... to be used at
his discretion.
I had personal knowledge of several small sums.
What were the limits imposed on his discretion?
No further than the confidence he inspired among
his friends by two opinions entertained by him,
one of which was that he was opposed to promoting
insurrection among slaves, and another that he was
opposed to shedding human blood except in self-
defense .
Do you know of any plan he had . . . for . . .
promoting insurrection?
Howe : I know of no definite plan; he was secretive.
Doolittle : In all your conversation or communication with
Brown had you ever . . . any intimation ... of
an organized effort, on his part, to produce an
insurrection among slaves?
Mason
:
Howe
:
Never
.
26
Most certainly the committee members— Democratic and
Republican--were not pleased with Howe's vague and negative
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responses. Yet they dismissed him after he answered
Doolittle's question because they realized they did not have
enough evidence to fully contravert his story. it is also
possible they believed more information could be obtained
from the one individual in charge of Massachusetts Kansas
Committee funds, namely, George Luther Stearns.
In mid-January, while the first sessions of the Mason
Committee were being held, Stearns traveled to North Elba to
visit the Brown family. He wanted to assure them that
Massachusetts abolitionists would continue their financial
assistance. At the same time he presented the family with
funds already contributed for their support. Stearns also
inquired as to the possibility of Ann Brown attending
Franklin Sanborn's school at Concord tuition- free . While in
North Elba, he mentioned his forthcoming testimony but
claimed not to be worried about it. Like Samuel Gridley
Howe, the Medford businessman knew that if he was able to
maintain his composure during questioning nothing illegal
could be proved against him. The evidence in the committee's
possession was scanty and inconclusive. Only his own admis-
sion of guilt would give investigators enough material to
recommend prosecution. And Stearns wasn't about to make that
kind of slip. He carefully prepared an opening statement for
the committee, attended meetings with Howe and others in
order to coordinate his story with theirs, and closely fol-
lowed the committee proceedings in the newspapers. When he
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returned home from North Elba he found his summons waiting.
He was to appear on February 24 before Mason, Collamer, and
2 7the others.
Stearns began his testimony by reading the prepared
statement about his relations with John Brown. In it he
claimed to have known nothing about the Brown's Chatham meet-
ings or the remarks attributed to him by John Brown, Jr.,
after their August meeting. The younger Brown's visit to his
Medford home was only a pleasure call. No money was given
for his father's use. Stearns also reiterated the theme
which echoed through all previous discussions of Brown by
those testifying: he never knew much of John Brown's plans
because of the warrior's extreme secretiveness . Brown
repeatedly told Stearns that "it was the worst possible pol-
icy for a man to reveal his plans." Surprisingly, Stearns
did admit to having had contact with Francis Merriam, but
only after the raid. The Medford businessman stated that
while he was in Canada during December, Merriam came to his
hotel room and introduced himself as a "Mr. Lockwood."
Merriam tried to discuss Harpers Ferry, but Stearns promptly
cut him off by saying that he was "very busy and could not
2 8
attend him.
"
Having finished his statement Stearns began his ques-
tioning. Mason asked him whether or not it was true that he
attempted to claim the weapons taken from Brown during his
capture. Stearns denied having done so, saying that he
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presumed "in the confusion of Harpers Ferry everything was
distributed." Stearns did admit that George Sennot came to
him and asked what was to be done with the recovered equip-
ment. At the same time Sennot exhibited a letter from Brown
authorizing him (Sennot) to take possession of the property
for the benefit of the Brown family. 29
Like Howe, Stearns never gave his questioners much sat-
isfaction. He could deny knowledge of Brown's plans, deny
knowledge of funds being raised to support insurrection and
he never had to worry about rebuttal. Circumstantial evi-
dence like John Brown, Jr. 's letter pointed to Stearns'
assistance of Brown and indicated he knew more than he admit-
ted. But the committee lacked the will and direct evidence
to establish such a connection convincingly. Indeed, Stearns
handled himself with relative ease before their barrage of
questions. He almost began to relax. But it was the confi-
dence he gained in dealing with Mason, G. N. Fitch, and
Jefferson Davis, that led him to make an unintended admission
to the increasingly suspicious Collamer.
Collamer : Did you at any time before the transaction at
Harpers Ferry, in any way directly or indirectly,
understand that there was any purpose on the part
of Brown to make an in road upon the subject of
slavery in any of the states?
Stearns: No sir ... I did not suppose he had any organ-
ized plan.
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My idea is, making any forcible entry upon
Virginia, or any other state.
No sir.
Had you ever any intimation of that kind, any idea
of it?
No Sir. Perhaps I do not understand you. I did
suppose he would go into Virginia
. . . and
relieve slaves.
In what way?
In any way he could, give them liberty.
Did you understand he contemplated doing it by
force?
Yes sir, by force if necessary,
(testily)
: Will you explain in what manner by
force you understood he contemplated doing it?
(realizing his mistake and becoming a bit flus-
tered) : I cannot explain any manner because . . .
I never talked with him on the subject,
(in heated tones) : Had you any idea that these
arms were to be used for any such purpose as
making an inroad into any State?
(upset by Collamers display of anger) : I think I
do not understand you.
(angrily) : John Brown has made an inroad into
Virginia, with force and arms to relieve slaves;
you understand that'
Stearns
:
Yes sir.
Collamer
:
Now, did you ever before that took plao
intimation that that was
. . . intended
ave any
. by
him?
Stearns; No sir. I never supposed that he contemplated
anything like what occurred at Harpers Ferrv.
Collamer: Then I ask you do you disapprove of such a trans-
Despite his previous admission that Brown contemplated
the use of force, Stearns' final denial of Brown satisfied
Collamer enough to end his questioning. Undoubtably, the
Vermont Senator no longer saw the inquiry as a way to exoner-
ate Brown's Massachusetts supporters. Collamer learned too
much during the hearings to continue holding that view. Yet
like his committee colleagues Collamer was handicapped by a
lack of substantial factual evidence to support any further
action against certain witnesses. He knew it and Brown's
Boston friends knew it. They had come to Washington believ-
ing there was very little chance a case could be made against
them. And they were right. Stearns, like those who preceded
him, was dismissed from the witness stand only superficially
bruised by the experience.
Stearns
:
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As he traveled back to Boston, Stearns realized that he
was just as nervous and concerned about the way in which the
Massachusetts public would react to his Mason Committee per-
formance as he had ever been about going to Washington to
give that performance. He had denied Brown and claimed to
disapprove of his tactics before the Senate investigators.
Now he returned home to face all the men and women he had
boldly defended Brown to in the months leading up to Harpers
Ferry. He wondered if they would condemn him as a hypocrite
and desperately hoped they would be satisfied with his testi-
mony. When he arrived in Medford he was a bit surprised to
find that people were not only satisfied with his testimony
but also praised him heartily for his "bold speech." This
reaction convinced him that Harpers Ferry had sunk "deep into
the hearts of our people" and would greatly influence forth-
i 31coming elections.
Undoubtably, George Luther Stearns was also thankful
he had had the wit to make certain additions to his Mason
Committee testimony after that testimony had ended. As has
been suggested, Stearns was fearful of defending Brown once
he had inadvertantly admitted that he knew Brown contempla-
ted the use of force. He answered Collamer's most important
question by asserting that he would not have approved of the
Harpers Ferry scheme if he had known of it in advance. But
when Stearns completed his testimony and all of the commit-
teemen (except Mason) left the hearing room, the Medford
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businessman asked the committee stenographer if he would add
another sentence to that answer. Stearns now claimed that
disapproval of Brown's act had only been his first reaction
and that since then he had "changed" his opinion. In his
addenda Stearns claimed that instead of disapproving of the
raid had he known of it, he now believed John Brown to be the
"most representative man of this century" and regarded
Harpers Ferry as an event that would free America. Mason
just smiled as Stearns added the statement and left the room.
Once home, Stearns was relieved to find that all newspaper
accounts of his testimony included the addenda. He had
expunged his most blatant denial of the warrior and it actu-
ally looked as if he had made the firmest commitment to Brown
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of all those who testified.
Samuel Gridley Howe was also concerned with public reac-
tion to his testimony. After all, he went to Washington pri-
marily to set himself " in rectus curia , " to correct "misteps,"
and recapture public "approbation." Howe was particularly
hopeful that his testimony would dissolve the animosity of
Thomas Wentworth Higginson. And when the doctor came home
from Washington, he continued efforts to rehabilitate himself
with the minister. Howe wrote Higginson and told him that
when Brown had been in Boston the previous spring the two of
them had argued about the morality of stealing slaveholders'
property during slave rescue efforts. As a result of this
disagreement, Howe claimed that he and Brown had no
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conversation about his future plans. Brown's appearance at
Harpers Ferry was "astonishing" to the doctor. Howe did have
some trouble trying to explain why he sent money to Brown in
September 185 9 and how he knew where to send it. Howe said
he sent funds only to show sympathy for the warrior but did
so "without cognizance of his purposes." Howe did admit to
something he failed to say before the Mason Committee. He
told Higginson that if he had known that Brown intended to
steal nothing but slaves he would have given "aid and encour-
agement" to the warrior. Unquestionably, Higginson wondered
how the doctor managed to avoid discussion of Brown's plan
during his numerous conversations with Sanborn and Stearns
between June and October. Was it possible Howe sent the
money to Chambersburg without knowing of its proximity to
Harpers Ferry? Was it possible that Howe didn't know of
Sanborn's and Stearns' all-night meeting with Francis
Merriam? Higginson hardly thought so. The minister wondered
if Howe seriously believed he could divorce himself from
33Brown's "special purposes."
Howe tried to be recondite about the disclaimer card.
He told Higginson it would not have been published if the two
of them had been able to speak to each other before it was
submitted to the newspapers. Howe claimed that he doubted
the "expediency" of the card all along. But he had shown it
to "an honorable man" who "knew about Brown's movements and a
great deal more" and that man had approved of it. So Howe
submitted the card. At the end of his letter Howe returned
to his introductory theme. He told Higginson that he had
assisted Brown with his plans because he had "confidence" in
the old warrior but claimed he never expected "anything like
what happened or anything more than a stampede." 34
It is doubtful that Higginson' s attitude toward Howe was
changed by the letter. None of the members of the secret
committee expected what had happened at Harpers Ferry. For
one thing, Brown wasn't supposed to get caught in the arse-
nal. The warrior had hoped to obtain additional weapons
there but did not expect to get trapped inside. All commit-
tee members were stunned by that occurrence, so Howe could
not separate himself from the project by claiming that
Brown's entrapment surprised him. Nor could Howe get away
from his role in the whole affair by claiming he only
expected "a stampede" and no violence. They all expected a
stampede but they were also prepared for the shedding of
blood if that was necessary to make the stampede a success.
Maybe Howe did argue with Brown about stealing slaveholders'
property but Higginson remembered that at the time of the
Missouri raid a year earlier, Howe had accepted the death of
a white slaveholder without comment. Howe accepted Parker's
estimate of the episode and was more than willing to trade
one white life for that of eleven slaves. No, Howe could not
remove himself from responsibility for Brown's acts in the
eyes of Thomas Wentworth Higginson.
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IV
When Sameul Gridley Howe and George Luther Stearns met
after the hearings both agreed that the investigation had
been conducted "unskillfully . They had not had to make
incriminating revelations because the questions had been
poorly conceived. Actually, the failure of the committee to
uncover conspiracy had nothing to do with a lack of skill.
It resulted from a combination of half-truthful answers, a
minimum of evidence, Mason's reluctance to fully establish
conspiracy and Collamer's initial wish that the hearings
exonerate all those called to testify. These factors and not
poorly conceived questions produced a less- than-probing anal-
ysis of the money and men behind John Brown. When the com-
mittee's report was issued in June of 1860, these elements
3 Swere reflected on virtually every page of the testimony.
Mason's misgivings are particularly noticeable in the
majority report of the investigation. Mason concluded that
Brown's purpose in Kansas was to keep the public mind
inflamed on the subject of slavery "with a view to effecting
such organization as might enable him to bring about servile
insurrection in the slave states." Mason stressed that tes-
timony before his committee indicated the "utter insecurity
of peace and safety, in some states of the Union, in the
existing condition of the public mind and its purposes in the
non-slaveholding States." He was convinced that northern
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public opinion was like a tinderbox and could easily be set
off by the committee hearings. This view is pervasive in the
majority report. Despite obvious flaws in the testimony of
Howe and Stearns, despite Realf's implication of Smith, and
despite the refusal of certain associates of Brown to tes-
tify, the resport carefully avoided any accusation of direct
complicity with Brown. Admittedly the committee lacked the
necessary hard evidence to make a direct accusation of wrong-
doing but what evidence did exist the chairman handled in a
remarkably subdued fashion. 36
On the whole issue of accessories "not present" who
might have given Brown arms, money or munitions, the majority
report held that it appeared such contributions were not made
with "actual knowledge of use for which they were intended by
Brown." Money was freely contributed by those who considered
themselves Brown's friends "without inquiry" about how it was
to be used. Mason accepted the conspirators' own definition
of the way Brown obtained funds. By doing so, he walled them
away from the very thing he suspected: that they believed in
the appropriateness of violent means to end slavery. Mason
described Brown as one who "successfully impressed himself
and his capacity . . . upon the sickly . . . depraved sensi-
bilities of his allies." In the process, Brown commanded
their confidence "if he did not altogether bill their
37
suspicions .
"
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Mason's analysis was not an "unskillful" one. Indeed,
anyone who reads the report can easily recognize it as a
piece of master craftsmanship. At once, the Virginia Senator
implied a full understanding of how and why the conspiracy
took place. Yet he succeeded in doing the same thing to the
general public that the conspirators tried to do to him. In
the report he successfully obscured the relationships of
Brown and his supporters so as to prevent the public from
becoming fully aware of their tacit recognition of the prin-
ciples of justified violence. Mason accepted statements
about Brown's "remarkable retinence" and his " secretiveness
"
not so much because he believed that this was the case, but
because he hoped to turn these claims to his own advantage.
Brown's friends might escape prosecution by pleading that
they were not fully informed of his intentions but Mason then
used the same argument to prove they did not fully condone
Brown's acts at Harpers Ferry. Mason hoped to conceal pre-
cisely the same thing Brown's conspirators did. Mason wanted
to demonstrate that men who supported Brown did so out of a
"lack of knowledge" and not because they believed in the
"cause of insurrection." There was no need to suggest legis-
lation on the matter because the invasion was "simply the
act of lawless ruffians under the sanction of no public or
political authority." Mason beat Howe and Stearns at their
38
own game.
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In their minority report, Collamer and Doolittle were
less interested than Mason in portraying Brown's act as one
of "lawless ruffians." Consequently they tended to focus
more attention on Brown's friends. In the end the minority
report came down much harder on Brown's supporters than the
majority report did. Both Senators Doolittle and Collamer
accepted the premise that Brown's Boston friends "placed too
much implicit confidence in him." But while they saw no con-
clusive evidence of conspiracy, they were appalled by the
Bostonians' tacit acquiescence in the use of violence. They
believed it was "astonishing" that there should "still be
found large bodies of men laboring under the infatuation that
. . .
a good object can be affected by lawlessness and
. , „39
violence
.
V
Thomas Wentworth Higginson ended his immediate relation-
ship to the Harpers Ferry episode when he decided not to pro-
ceed with his rescue scheme. Gerrit Smith severed his
attachment to the affair by being committed to the Utica
Asylum. When the Mason Report was published in the late
spring of 1860, it officially ended Howe's and Stearns' con-
nection with the Brown effort—although they considered Feb-
ruary's testimony as the termination date. In the first
week of April, i8 60, Frank Sanborn came full circle.
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Early in the evening of April 3 a group of deputies
under the direction of Silas Carlton rode into Concord,
inquired where the young committee secretary lived, deployed
themselves around his home on Sudbury Road, and then quietly
waited until darkness enveloped the town. At about nine
o'clock, Carlton accompanied by five deputies walked up the
front steps of Sanborn's home and knocked on the door. When
Sanborn answered, he was informed that Carlton had been dep-
utized by the sergeant-at-arms of the United States Senate,
Dunning R. McNair, to arrest him for failure to heed a Mason
Committee summons. Carlton and his men then burst into the
house, grabbed Sanborn and began pulling him toward their
carriage in the road. Sanborn struggled violently against
the group, first pinning his long legs against the doorway,
then hooking them on the railing of the front porch. As he
struggled, he called to his sister Sarah, told her he was
being arrested without warrant, and asked her to warn the
neighbors. Sarah ran from the house screaming. She managed
to awaken a friend named Colonel Whiting and then returned to
her front yard where Frank was still struggling against
Carlton and the others. Sarah ran to the deputy's carriage,
grabbed the whip, cracked it, and sent th horses bolting off
40down the street.
The enormous commotion caused by the arrest attempt woke
people in the area. Colonel Whiting and many others came out
of their homes to see what was happening and soon found
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themselves grappling with the deputies in an effort to
release Sanborn. John Keyes had the presence of mind to run
to the nearby home of Judge Rockwell Hoar, obtain a writ of
habeus corpus and then seek out the town constable, John
Moore. When Moore and Keyes arrived at the scene, they tem-
porarily called a halt to the melee and tried to discuss the
situation with Carlton. Moore asked Carlton on what author-
ity he was arresting Sanborn. Carlton told Moore he had been
deputized by McNair. Moore then showed Carlton the writ and
asked him to give Sanborn up. When Carlton refused, Moore
deputized the Concord residents who were present and asked
them to take Sanborn into custody. During the night of pro-
tective custody he spent at George Precott's home, the secre-
tary hastily penned an open letter to the Massachusetts leg-
islature censuring that body for allowing laws to persist,
which encouraged the "kidnapping" of "white men" by federal
authorities .
^
Early the next morning, Sanborn traveled to Boston where
a hearing had been called in the chambers of the Chief Jus-
tice of the Massachusetts Court—Lemuel Shaw. Appearing with
lawyers Robert Treat Paine, Samuel Sewall, and John Andrew,
Sanborn patiently endured the legal arguments and then waited
for Shaw's decision. Shaw did not feel Sanborn should be
taken to Washington. In his ruling, he refused to challenge
the constitutionality of the law of 1846 or the inherent
right of a congressional committee to arrest witnesses who
had disregarded a summons. But Shaw based his decision
against the government on the premise that "the warrant
returned the power to arrest the respondent in terms limited
to McNair
.
. .
and could not be executed by a deputy." in
short, McNair could not legally delegate the authority to
arrest Sanborn. The young secretary was free. 42
During the hearing a large crowd gathered outside the
Court House. George Luther Stearns, fearing an unpleasant
confrontation when his young friend left Shaw's chambers, had
a carriage waiting by a side door of the building. When the
hearing ended he hustled Sanborn to the carriage and the two
of them then rode out to Concord. Upon arriving in Concord,
Sanborn was greeted by a cheering crowd and saluted by a can-
non. He also watched people scream insults at Colonel Joseph
Holbrook and Postmaster Charles Davis, the two townsmen who
provided information to Carlton the night before. Soon
Sanborn learned that a town meeting had been called in his
honor. That evening he was to share the platform with
Emerson, Thoreau, and Higginson. In less than twenty- four
hours he had been arrested, tried, found innocent and made
43
Concord's "hero of the hour." He was dazed and overwhelmed.
At eight o'clock that evening his moment of triumph
began. He strode briskly to the speakers platform, thanked
Emerson and Thoreau for their introductory remarks, turned to
the assemblage, and launched into a brief but dramatic tirade
against the Slave Power. Sanborn started by describing the
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arrest attempt. He then acknowledged the heroic efforts of
those who assisted him and spoke of Shaw's decision. Sanborn
firmly believed the decision "agreed with the sentiments of
two-thirds of the people of Massachusetts." Then he lashed
out at the men who tried to arrest him. They were "ruffians."
Furthermore, he was convinced that, had they been killed dur-
ing the rescue, the deed would not have been judged unlawful.
In fact, Sanborn said he believed the deputies "ought to have
been killed." Finally, in a dramatic gesture, Sanborn held
up the handcuffs used to bind him during the arrest attempt.
He asked the crowd what they symbolized. "Tyranny!" came the
resounding cry. Sanborn had learned many lessons during the
course of his relationship with Brown. He showed Francis
Merriam one of them in early October. And, now, Concord was
. . 44
receiving a demonstration of another.
After holding the handcuffs aloft, Sanborn continued to
whip the emotions of the crowd. Dealing with southerners was
like "dealing with demons." Slavery had to be opposed by
force. But, as always, Sanborn was careful not to go too
far. He did not counsel attacking slavery. Rather, he sug-
gested that northerners prepare to meet the encroachments of
slavery with force because that was the "only argument some
people can understand." Sanborn then concluded his remarks
with a Brown- like nod to the Almighty and to practical aboli-
tion. He swore that "so help him God" he would "put in prac-
tice the teachings of the last twenty-four hours." The
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secret committeeman received a tremendous ovation, waved to
the audience, walked off the platform, and strode out of the
building into the cool night air. He was much too excited to
listen to the remaining speakers and undoubtedly he realized
that he might never receive such a powerful acclamation of
popular favor again. It was something to be savored in
solitude. 45
The kidnap incident and Sanborn's reaction to it suggest
a good deal about his motives for committing himself to full-
time work in the abolitionist movement and for attaching him-
self to John Brown. From the time he first moved to Concord
in the spring of 1855 Sanborn felt alone; estranged from the
community. Of course, he had his schoolteaching, Sarah's
company, and a superficial acquaintance with some of the
famous personages of the town. But these things did not sus-
tain him; did not create in him a feeling of acceptance.
Indeed, he was somewhat dismayed by the aloofness of both
Emerson and Thoreau. They liked him but kept their distance.
For all of Sanborn's transcendental ardor, he could not make
the famous men and women of Concord his intimates. At the
same time, his identification with these men and women closed
him off from the rest of Concord's citizenry. As he noted
years later, in peaceable times the "Concord majority sided
with itself and did not approve of people like abolitionists
and Transcendentalists who would turn the world upside down."
This Concord majority disliked the "enemies of constituted
authorities" and turned "all the weapons of exhortation, gos-
sip and Pharisiac aloofness" against them. So there he was,
a schoolteacher and second generation transcendentalist
,
spurned by the Concord majority and not yet fully sustained
or accepted by those he longed to emulate. Even during the
six months after Harpers Ferry, when he received repeated
hints that he would be protected by the community, Sanborn
did not fully trust in Concord's citizens. Then, in little
over a day, he had experienced a dramatic and intoxicating
alternation of his status. He had been rescued, feted,
saluted by cannon, and rhapsodized by men whose intimate
friendship he had so long and vainly sought. The "people"
had "defended" him and "vowed" to protect him. 46
In the next few days the young man had a chance to
reflect on his new found station. He decided to write to
Theodore Parker about it. In the letter Sanborn strained to
define the essential meaning of the whole episode. He man-
aged to do so in two crucial and revealing sentences.
Sanborn told Parker that "everything is going on favorably
for me as it can." The tyranny of "the other side has put
all good citizens with me of all parties." The kidnap
attempt and, by indirection, his relationship to abolition
and Brown had won him acceptance. He was, as he noted years
later, made "popular in quarters where I was not known
before." Frank Sanborn, the bright young son of a New
Hampshire clerk, who found that a Harvard education did not
automatically provide one with a niche in Boston society, had
finally found his place. 47
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